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In a companion article, I argued that the purpose of punitive damages 
should be to advance—in part—the public’s interest in retributive justice.  
These “retributive damages” should be an expressly intermediate sanction, in-
dependent of other remedial or penal options.  The companion article provided 
the basic structure of these retributive damages; however, the theoretical nature 
of the proposal did no more than touch on how they would operate in practice.
This Article addresses the next question:  how should punitive damages, 
including retributive damages, work?  This question is especially timely in light 
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 
which held that juries may not consider the harms to nonparties in determining 
punitive damages awards.
To make punitive damages work, we must first separate retributive dam-
ages from other extracompensatory damages meant to achieve cost internaliza-
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tion or to vindicate the victim’s dignity interests.  Because these three purposes 
are distinct, conflating them carries the danger of both under- and overprotec-
tion of various defendants.  Once we understand these purposes and the dis-
tinctions between them, we should be able to map them on to our existing insti-
tutional design for civil damages.  This Article begins that important task, 
first, by explaining why and how defendants should enjoy certain procedural 
protections depending on which purpose the damages serve, and second, by ad-
dressing two critical implementation issues associated with this pluralistic 
scheme of extracompensatory damages:  insurance and settlement. 
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INTRODUCTION
What are punitive damages for?  In a recent article, I argued that 
states should understand and restructure punitive damages, in part, to 
advance the public’s interest in retributive justice.1  For clarity’s sake, I 
called such damages “retributive damages” to distinguish them from 
extracompensatory damages designed to pursue other goals, such as 
cost internalization or victim vindication.  Although that article ex-
plained the normative rationale and basic structure for retributive 
damages as an intermediate sanction and why society should want that 
sanction independent of other remedial or penal options, the theo-
retical nature of the proposal merely scratched the surface of how 
such damages should operate in practice. 
This Article, the second in a series, addresses the next logical 
question:  how should punitive damages work?  Both questions are es-
pecially timely in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams.2  This Article focuses on a range of im-
portant implementation issues left previously unaddressed—e.g., are 
any procedural safeguards for defendants facing punitive damages 
necessary and, if so, which ones and why?  How should such damages 
interact with criminal prosecutions?  Should an insurance market be 
permitted?  How should settlement be regulated? 
A discussion of these implementation issues, however, should only 
occur after explaining why “punitive damages” should be relabeled 
“extracompensatory damages,” as well as why extracompensatory 
1 See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages:  A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009) [hereinafter Markel, Retributive Damages].
2 549 U.S. 346 (2007).  In Philip Morris, the Court held that the Due Process Clause 
forbids juries from figuring in the harms to nonparties in determining the amount of 
punitive damages that a defendant must pay.  The Court also addressed punitive dam-
ages more recently in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).  Because the 
Exxon case was resolved under federal maritime law, however, its significance for this 
project is not nearly as substantial as the Court’s constitutional decision in Philip Morris.
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damages should treat retributive damages separately from damages 
meant to pursue nonretributive goals, such as compensating the in-
jury to a victim’s dignity or facilitating the pursuit of cost internaliza-
tion to the extent permitted after Philip Morris.  Because these pur-
poses are distinct, a jurisdiction that conflates them risks both under- 
and overprotecting various defendants.  Once we correctly understand 
these distinctive purposes, our institutional design should map them 
appropriately.  This Article begins that task, so that states can build a 
pluralistic framework that is both attractive from a policy perspective 
and compatible with constitutional values and doctrine. 
Unfolding in four Parts, the Article begins in Part I by furnishing 
some background to the recent law and scholarship on the purposes 
of punitive damages.  Readers of the earlier companion article may 
profitably skim that Part, the role of which is primarily to set the stage 
for the discussion in this Article.  Part II offers a structure that tries to 
disaggregate the distinct purposes of extracompensatory damages in a 
manner that is both constitutionally feasible and attractive from a pol-
icy perspective.  Rather than argue that retributive damages should 
play an exclusive or primary role,3 I urge a pluralistic approach for 
state legislatures to consider.  Under such a legislative framework, ex-
tracompensatory damages would be available separately, if necessary, 
for retributive, cost internalization, and personal dignity repair (or 
what I more frequently call victim vindication) purposes.  Correspond-
ingly, there would be three kinds of extracompensatory damages 
permitted under the relevant statutes:  retributive, deterrence, and 
aggravated damages.4  Much work has already been performed on the 
conceptualization and implementation of deterrence and aggravated 
damages.5  While this Article builds on those achievements, its com-
3 Cf. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice:  Punitive Damages and Legal Plural-
ism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1451 (1993) (“Efficiency plays no role in the normative 
universe of punitive damages as we conceive of it.”). 
4 I use the terms “deterrence damages” and “aggravated damages” in ways that 
might seem idiosyncratic to some readers.  Deterrence damages signify those damages 
meant to facilitate optimal deterrence or “cost internalization,” not “complete deter-
rence.”  Aggravated damages are meant to account for, and thereby vindicate, that part 
of a victim’s injury, not already compensated in all jurisdictions, for insults to one’s 
personal dignity.  See infra Part II. 
5 See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 244-47 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (advocating nonpunitive extracompensatory damages for the sake of cost 
internalization); Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages:  Divergence in 
Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 805-26 (1989) (discussing cost internalization 
and aggravated damages for compensation of dignity harms); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., 
Augmented Awards:  The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 12-13 
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parative advantage and its focus are on the procedural safeguards and 
mechanisms necessary to implement the public interest in retributive 
justice, a point that has been demonstrably underexamined in the ex-
isting literature.6  States should employ a damages scheme that sharp-
ens juries’ and judges’ decision making by disaggregating the retribu-
tive and nonretributive functions that are normally conflated in 
awards of punitive damages. 
Part III turns to the issue of which procedural safeguards should 
be in place when awarding these types of extracompensatory damages.  
A number of scholars have argued that punitive damages, insofar as 
they serve public retributive goals, are unconstitutional because civil 
defendants lack procedural safeguards such as those provided in 
criminal cases.7  The problem with this claim is that it mistakenly sug-
(1990) (describing cost internalization damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shav-
ell, Punitive Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-76 (1998) (de-
veloping a set of principles for determining cost internalization damages); Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 401-02 (2003) (dis-
cussing how a “compensatory societal damages” framework improves upon limitations 
of Polinsky and Shavell’s method for ensuring cost internalization); Mark A. Geistfeld, 
Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 269-74, 296-309 
(2008) (conceiving the role of punitive damages primarily in terms of individual victim 
vindication and proposing methods to ensure that such vindication satisfies due proc-
ess); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages:  From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 961, 
1023-29 (2007) (arguing that punitive damages should be regarded as “a form of state-
sanctioned revenge”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 105 (2005) (offering a conceptual and interpretive account of punitive damages 
as victim vindication).  More recently, Tom Colby has joined the group defending a 
victim vindication interpretation.  See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip 
Morris v. Williams:  The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 
434 (2008) (“Punitive damages vindicate the dignity of an individual victim by allowing 
her to punish the defendant for committing a humiliating or insulting tort upon 
her.”).
6 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2085 (1998) (“Regrettably, the legal culture lacks 
a full normative account of the relationship between retributive goals and punitive 
damages.”).  My goal in Retributive Damages, supra note 1, was primarily to address that 
lacuna.
7 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem:  Punitive Dam-
ages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 643-50 (2003) 
(arguing that punitive damages for public purposes and without procedural safeguards 
would be “indistinguishable from criminal punishment”); Jeffrey W. Grass, The Penal 
Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 241, 242 (1985) (“By punish-
ing defendants rather than compensating plaintiffs [the] purpose [of punitive dam-
ages] falls squarely under the ambit of criminal law.” (footnote omitted)); John Calvin 
Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 
(1986) (noting the lack of procedural safeguards in awarding punitive damages); Mal-
colm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA.
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gests that criminal procedural safeguards apply like a binary switch 
that toggles between “on” and “off.”  In fact, the extent of protection 
provided by many procedural safeguards operates on a continuum 
marked by the severity of the punishment imposed.8  The same logic 
should inform the design of safeguards for defendants facing retribu-
tive damages—or so I argue. 
After introducing the debate over this issue, Part III examines 
which safeguards, if any, would be necessary, from a constitutional 
point of view, for aggravated and deterrence damages.  When defen-
dants are facing nonretributive damages, the same precautionary 
measures do not necessarily apply; however, certain measures might 
still be warranted to ensure fidelity to federalism principles and basic 
procedural fairness.  More importantly, if states adopt a retributive 
damages regime, they should, if they have not already done so, also 
add some heightened procedural safeguards for defendants facing re-
tributive damages. 
As explained in Part III, the extent of such protections should fall 
roughly between the kind of protection we confer upon defendants in 
cases involving compensatory damages and the kind of protection we 
confer upon defendants in criminal cases involving modest sanctions 
such as criminal fines.  But consistency with constitutional mandates is 
not the only goal—the level of procedural protections should also be 
faithful to the basic values underlying retributive justice.  These orga-
nizing principles are applied, albeit in a preliminary fashion, to mat-
ters such as exposure to duplicative punishment for the same miscon-
duct, standards of proof, standards of review, the privilege against self-
incrimination, access to counsel, jury trial rights, and bifurcation of 
evidence going to liability and evidence of a defendant’s financial 
condition. 
Finally, Part IV addresses two basic issues related to implementing 
this disaggregated scheme of extracompensatory damages.  Specifi-
cally, it examines how this structure would intersect with insurance 
and settlements.  There are, of course, other issues that warrant dis-
cussion:  First, is it intelligible and attractive to impose retributive 
damages against corporate defendants and other entities?  Second, 
how does one deal with the array of federalism, duplicative punish-
ment, and bankruptcy concerns of defendants whose misconduct af-
L. REV. 269, 270 & n.5 (1983) (citing sources that discuss the application of criminal 
procedural safeguards to defendants facing the imposition of punitive damages). 
8 See infra Section III.A.
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fects multiple parties across jurisdictional lines?  I leave these related 
areas of inquiry to resolve in the next article in this series, Punitive 
Damages and Complex Litigation.9  In the meantime, my current goal is 
to lend clarity to the basic muddle of punitive damages law and policy 
by suggesting some solutions for what might be called the “simple liti-
gation” context—i.e., where X commits Y misconduct and, in so do-
ing, threatens or causes injury only to Z.
I. THE ACTION IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A.  Recent Developments in Punitive Damages Law and Scholarship 
1.  The Law 
Without rehashing the entire history of punitive damages in 
America,10 it is important to appreciate the major developments in the 
field of American punitive damages law and theory.11  Early Anglo-
American courts awarded “exemplary” damages for a range of pur-
poses; in some cases, they served as compensation to a plaintiff for suf-
fering “intangible wrongs,”12 while in other cases these damages served 
as punishment designed to make an example of the defendant.13  On 
the conventional account, the compensatory function of punitive 
damages has waned as the scope of compensatory damages has ex-
panded to include such “intangibles” as hurt feelings and indignities.14
9 Dan Markel, Punitive Damages and Complex Litigation (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) [hereinafter Markel, Punitive Damages]; see also Dan Markel 
& Gregg Polsky, Taxing Punitive Damages (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor) (addressing proper taxation policies associated with this proposed punitive dam-
ages scheme and other related tax issues). 
10 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (furnishing a brief history of punitive damages). 
11 This Section draws upon the discussion in Part I of Markel, Retributive Damages,
supra note 1.  Readers familiar with that work may skim or skip this Section.  Those 
seeking a more comprehensive introduction to the topic might also consider looking 
at Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages in the United States, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., forthcoming 2009). 
12 See Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitu-
tional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 13-16 (2004) (discussing early English cases in which the plain-
tiff demonstrated a dignitary harm that would otherwise remain uncompensated in the 
absence of exemplary damages). 
13 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620 (2008) (providing exam-
ples of the application of this punitive damages function). 
14 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 438 n.11 
(2001).
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There remains concern among some scholars, however, that, contrary 
to the conventional wisdom, the scope of compensatory damages in 
contemporary tort law does not encompass the “aggravated” nature of 
the injury to a plaintiff when her dignity has been insulted by the de-
fendant’s misconduct.15
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
punitive damages should be principally understood as “quasi-criminal” 
“private fines” designed to punish the defendant and deter the mis-
conduct at issue.16  Unfortunately, although courts frequently invoke 
the purposes of retribution and deterrence,17 they often offer little 
analysis of these purposes or their implications.  For instance, courts 
rarely instruct juries to parse the amount of money necessary to pun-
ish the defendant and the amount necessary to achieve deterrence.  
Moreover, they rarely distinguish between optimal deterrence (aiming 
at cost internalization) and complete deterrence (aiming at prevent-
ing the commission of similar misconduct in the future).18
15 See Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?  Why Misunderstanding the 
History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 205 (2003) (“If pu-
nitive damages served a compensatory function [in early cases], it would have been for 
a category of injury that is still not considered compensable by contemporary tort law, 
namely the injury of insult that wounds or dishonors.”). 
16 See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
350 (1974) (describing punitive damages as “private fines” designed to punish and de-
ter “reprehensible conduct”).  Nevertheless, if a state passed an enabling statute au-
thorizing punitive damages expressly for the purposes of compensating a plaintiff or 
society, the Supreme Court would probably not say that such purposes are inherently 
improper or unconstitutional.  Cf. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 391-92 (elaborating a pro-
posal for compensatory societal damages). 
17 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (2008) (“[T]he consensus today is 
that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deter-
ring harmful conduct.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) 
(“This Court has long made clear that ‘[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed 
to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its 
repetition.’” (alteration in original) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 568 (1996))). 
18 For those unfamiliar with these terms, under an optimal deterrence or cost in-
ternalization regime, a defendant who pays the costs of her tortious activity should be 
able to continue pursuing that activity.  The decision to seek cost internalization for an 
activity is predicated on a determination that the gains to the defendant are socially 
licit.  The basis for concerns about cost internalization is further described by Judge 
Calabresi in Ciraolo v. City of New York. See infra note 68.  By contrast, complete deter-
rence endeavors to remove the incentive for the defendant to undertake that conduct 
altogether because the gains from such conduct are deemed illicit.  See Keith N. Hyl-
ton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998).  
Complete deterrence is a goal that, if realized, would entail that zero instances of the 
particular misconduct would occur.  Others have used different terms to distinguish 
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As this consensus on the purposes of punitive damages—
retribution and deterrence—has emerged, the Supreme Court has 
begun to establish a constitutional framework for regulating such 
damages.  The Court’s requirements can be summed up in six rules. 
First, when courts review the constitutionality of punitive damages 
awards, the most important factor that they must consider is the de-
gree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.19  Second, re-
viewing courts must also consider whether “the disparity between the 
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive 
damages award” is constitutionally excessive.20  More controversially, 
in State Farm v. Campbell, the Court established a presumption that “in 
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive 
and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”21  Third, reviewing courts should consider “the disparity be-
tween the punitive damages award and the ‘civil penalties authorized 
or imposed in comparable cases.’”22  Fourth, reviewing courts, under 
the Supreme Court’s recent Philip Morris decision, must ensure that 
the jury does not impose on defendants an amount that includes the 
harms to nonparties to the litigation.23  One might see this rule as re-
lated to the Court’s stated interest in ensuring that one state refrain 
from punishing defendants for conduct lawfully performed in another 
state.24  Fifth, judicial review of a jury’s award of punitive damages 
between optimal and complete deterrence.  See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68-69 (1970) (distinguishing between 
general (permissive) deterrence and specific (prohibitory) deterrence); Robert 
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524-31 (1984) (distinguishing 
between the “pricing” and “sanctioning” of different types of behavior).  Lastly, it is 
worth noting that complete deterrence, which calls for a sentence designed to signal 
that the conduct is prohibited, should not be confused with complete enforcement, 
which would call for sufficient resources to reduce the misconduct to zero. 
19 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (restating 
the rule that punitive damages only be awarded where a defendant’s conduct is so repre-
hensible that it justified an award in addition to compensatory damages).  The Court has 
further specified a number of factors that contribute to a determination of reprehen-
sibility.  See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-77 (1996) (listing factors 
that indicate a greater degree of reprehensibility). 
20 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418. 
21 Id. at 425. 
22 Id. at 428 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
23 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007). 
24 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421. 
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must be available.25  Finally, appellate review of punitive damages must 
apply a de novo standard of review of the jury’s award, at least in a 
federal case.26
Importantly, although the Court developed these rules to improve 
fair notice and proportionality for defendants facing these sanctions,27
the Court has not extended to defendants the protections normally 
applicable in the criminal law context.  Indeed, defendants have no 
safeguards established under the Constitution beyond what has been 
discussed,28 though most states have introduced a flurry of caps, mul-
tipliers, and other limits on punitive damages.29
2.  The Normative Scholarship 
The complex and rapidly evolving nature of punitive damages law 
has attracted the attention of scholars from a variety of disciplines.30
In terms of normative approaches to punitive damages, a number of 
scholars, such as Professors Polinsky and Shavell, think that extracom-
pensatory damages should focus on advancing the goal of optimal de-
terrence (or what I also call “cost internalization” or “deterrence”).31
Under this framework, which I discuss in greater detail in Part II, a de-
fendant’s culpability or state of mind is immaterial to her obligation to 
pay for the harms that she causes.  Instead, what matters is whether 
any likelihood exists that the defendant would evade paying compen-
sation for the harms that she caused.  If there is such a possibility, 
then the amount of punitive damages should be calibrated accord-
25 See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (holding that Oregon’s 
denial of adequate judicial review of punitive damages violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause). 
26 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435-36 (2001). 
27 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416-17. 
28 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 249-53. 
29 See Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1297 app. A (2005) (surveying punitive damages practices across states and the 
District of Columbia). 
30 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 242-43 nn.4-9 (citing different 
approaches taken by scholars in considering extracompensatory damages). 
31 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 897-98 (arguing that courts should use 
damages determinations to facilitate optimal deterrence by applying the “punitive 
damages multiplier” developed by the authors).  I recognize that by conflating deter-
rence with optimal deterrence (or cost internalization), I am implicitly obscuring the 
work of some economists who view this law through the prism of complete deterrence.  
See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 18, at 423 (arguing that the optimal deterrence model 
should be used in limited cases and that complete deterrence should be the goal in 
most situations).  See infra note 58 for a partial explanation of the reasons for this move. 
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ingly.32  A number of judges have embraced the basic insight under-
girding this approach.33 However, as Professor Sharkey points out, a 
total cost internalization approach would not necessarily provide vic-
tims compensation for their losses.34
In contrast to the cost internalization school, other scholars ana-
lyze punitive damages law in terms of how such damages might vindi-
cate a victim’s dignity and autonomy interests, which may have been 
injured or insulted by the defendant’s misconduct.35  Since these vic-
tim vindication approaches effectively legitimize the utilization of en-
hanced awards to repair the injury that the defendant’s misconduct 
caused to the plaintiff’s dignity, these damages are more precisely la-
32 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 887-96 (“[I]f a defendant can sometimes 
escape liability for the harm for which he is responsible, the proper magnitude of 
damages is the harm the defendant has caused, multiplied by a factor reflecting the 
probability of his escaping liability.” (emphasis omitted)).  But see Keith N. Hylton & 
Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 388 (2005) 
(registering skepticism toward the use of the multiplier approach in the context of civil 
damages based on concerns regarding the supply of lawsuits and the cost of litigation).  
Professor Sharkey’s proposal for compensatory societal damages was designed to ad-
dress perceived shortcomings with the Polinsky-Shavell model for achieving cost inter-
nalization. See Sharkey, supra note 5, at 368-70 (identifying problems with the use of a 
strict punitive damages multiplier, such as the failure to include cases involving “dif-
fuse” harms).  The suggestions for compensating society for defendants’ more diffuse 
harms to society, however, are not likely to survive Philip Morris for reasons similar to 
the argument that I make about Professor Colby’s claims in Part II.  That is, notwith-
standing the avowedly nonpunitive rationale behind compensatory societal damages, 
my sense is that the Supreme Court is unlikely to think that such an approach satisfies 
due process because it allows an award of damages for harms against persons or enti-
ties that a defendant cannot litigate against specifically.  See Michael B. Kelly, Do Puni-
tive Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1429, 1433-35 (2004) (raising 
concerns that Sharkey’s proposal will founder on due process grounds). 
33 See Sharkey, supra note 5, at 372 n.71 (collecting cases in which courts have ex-
pressed their approval of the multiplier approach). 
34 See id. at 390-91; see also infra note 91. 
35 See, e.g., Colby, supra note 5, at 434; Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1432 
(discussing the view that culpably wronging a person expresses that the victim is of less 
value than the wrongdoer); Geistfeld, supra note 5, at 269-74 (advancing the idea of 
punitive damages primarily in terms of the private interest in victim vindication of “tort 
rights”); John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us):  Private Law in 
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 7 (2004) (“What is at stake in [punitive dam-
ages] is not [a state’s] interests in obtaining retribution on behalf of its citizens or in 
deterring sharp business practices, but the [plaintiffs’] interest in vindicating their 
rights not to be mistreated in the way that they were. . . . [These rights include] provid-
ing [the plaintiffs] with satisfaction—a remedy adequate to acknowledge and avenge 
[the defendant’s] predatory conduct towards them.”); Sebok, supra note 5, at 1007-15 
(“[T]he private right whose violation grounds [a punitive damages] award is the pri-
vate right not to have one’s dignity violated.”); Zipursky, supra note 5, at 151-53 (discuss-
ing the plaintiff’s right “to be punitive” toward a defendant liable for a willful wrong). 
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beled “aggravated” damages, as they are called in various common law 
jurisdictions.36  Some victim vindication theorists have defended large 
parts of extant punitive damages common law on the ground that 
these practices serve as vehicles by which victims or their allies can 
persuade juries to avenge victims’ interests through ad hoc, and there-
fore unpredictable, awards of money damages.37  Indeed, for some so-
cial justice tort theorists, common law, jury-driven punitive damages 
practices serve as means for ordinary people to fight malfeasant enti-
ties and their lobbyists seeking business-friendly tort reform.38
Some of these scholars, such as Galanter and Luban, drawing on 
the work of Jean Hampton’s victim vindication justification for pun-
ishment,39 view themselves as committed to the goals or values of re-
tributive justice.40  But as emphasized in the insightful interpretive ac-
36 See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 5, at 763 (“Where there is already injury 
in place that the law recognizes as damages, this added ‘insult’ to injury would count 
more accurately as ‘aggravated,’ than as punitive, damages.”). 
37 See Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS.
L. REV. 1115, 1119 (defending the role of juries in “protect[ing] us from rule by legal 
economists” through “relatively unconstrained punitive awards”).  Galanter and Luban 
also endorse (at least implicitly) a jury’s imposing punitive damages against a defen-
dant, in a single case, for all the harm that the defendant’s misconduct caused persons 
in similar situations.  See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1436-38 (providing 
examples of “expressive defeat” of defendants through punitive damages).  Galanter 
and Luban also think that judges should extend “great deference” to jury determina-
tions because of juries’ special competence in articulating “the community’s ‘message’ 
through the medium of damages.”  Id. at 1439.  My view circumscribes jury decision 
making considerably more. 
38 See Rustad, supra note 29, at 1301 (characterizing tort reform of punitive dam-
ages as “special legislation to help corporate America”). See generally THOMAS H.
KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001) (providing a para-
digmatic account of the social justice theory of tort law); Richard L. Abel, Questioning 
the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis:  The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533 (1999) (argu-
ing that legislatures are beholden to special interests, while courts are more likely to be 
focused on the common good in the tort law context); see also David F. Partlett, The
Republican Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409 (2004) (defending a 
robust role for juries in punitive damages awards on the basis of republican theory). 
39 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs:  The Goal of Retribu-
tion, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1685-98 (1992) (arguing that conduct that expresses disre-
spect and does damage to “the value of a victim” warrants a punitive response to vindi-
cate the victim’s moral worth). 
40 See Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1432-35.  For reasons that I explained in 
the first article in this series, I view Galanter and Luban’s account of punitive damages 
as primarily (though not exclusively) a victim vindication account, not a retributive 
justice account.  See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 255 n.62.  I note also 
that a number of other punitive damages scholars, including Professors Colby, Sebok, 
Zipursky, and Geistfeld, have claimed to be influenced by Professor Hampton’s work 
and, to varying degrees, have identified themselves as interested in developing the re-
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counts of tort law and punitive damages by Zipursky and Sebok, the 
tort system conventionally empowers victims either to pursue punitive 
damages or to forbear pursuing such damages.41  That is important be-
cause it shows that no one forces (punitive) damages on the victim in 
the common law approach.  Rather, the decision to seek legal recourse 
(or not) permits the victim to exercise her autonomy and seek repair to 
her dignity interests.  The same may be said for allowing victims to 
have almost unfettered control over settlements with defendants. 
As I explain further in Section II.B, however, these two practices 
reveal an important gap between victim vindication accounts and the 
interests underlying a retributivist account, properly understood.  Re-
tributivists, as I explained in Retributive Damages, have strong reasons to 
give weight to the reduction of both Type I false-positive errors—in 
which people are mistakenly punished (or excessively punished rela-
tive to comparable offenders)—and Type II false-negative errors—in 
which wrongdoers escape their punishment altogether (or receive too 
lenient a punishment as compared to other similar offenders in the 
jurisdiction).42  Importantly, the victim vindication accounts say little 
about the need to build a system that tries to reduce all four catego-
ries of Type I and II errors. 
Indeed, to the extent that victim vindication supporters invoke re-
tributive justice values to bolster their accounts, this silence is a real 
weakness.43  After all, the failures to defend procedural safeguards and 
lationship between punitive damages and retributive justice.  My own view is that their 
interests and values are better described as consistent with “victim vindication,” and less 
so with retributive justice, properly understood as a practice of state punishment inter-
ested in developing institutions that promote equality and rule-of-law values in the reduc-
tion of Type I and Type II punishment errors.  For discussion of my view of the proper 
role of victims in retributive theory, see, for example, Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud:  
A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 452-57 (2005) [hereinafter Markel, State, Be Not Proud].
41 See Sebok, supra note 5, at 1005-06 (“Plaintiffs who may have a valid legal claim 
for punitive damages are under no obligation to pursue them.  In theory, a plaintiff 
could request a sanction smaller than what justice might otherwise require the wrong-
doer to repay.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1028-29 (“[O]ne element of the repair of 
wrongful losses in tort is the active role of the victim in determining the appropriate 
remedy for her case of wrongful loss.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Correc-
tive Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 733 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse] (“[T]ort 
cases ultimately require courts to respond to demands by plaintiffs . . . .”); Zipursky, 
supra note 5, at 152 (“The state permits the plaintiff to seek and to receive [punitive 
damages], but the state is not in the driver’s seat.”). 
42 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 247, 266. 
43 To its credit, Professor Sebok’s state-sanctioned revenge account is consistent 
with a desire to reduce “piling on” (or Type I overpunishment) errors that occur 
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to create meaningful guidelines for cabining jury discretion and judi-
cial review are recipes for Type I error creation.  Moreover, giving 
only victims the right to pursue retributive damages or giving all vic-
tim-plaintiffs the unfettered authority to settle a case involving allega-
tions of reckless or malicious misconduct enables more Type II er-
rors.44  This should be of concern to nonretributivists as well:  
certainty of punishment, perhaps more than severity of punishment, 
has, for the last generation or so, been thought to have an appreciable 
effect on reducing misconduct.45
If we want a retributivist scheme of punitive damages, it has to re-
flect some concern for reducing all four types of Type I and Type II 
errors.  Of course, a pluralistic scheme of extracompensatory damages 
should be designed to provide space for the pursuit of both cost in-
ternalization and victim vindication as well, and Part II says more 
about how to do that.46  But since these two goals have received sub-
through introducing evidence of harms to strangers to the litigation.  See Sebok, supra
note 5, at 1031-35.  But Sebok doesn’t address the public’s interest in reducing Type II 
errors of either sort, or the procedural safeguards necessary to prevent Type I errors of 
the mistaken-punishment sort.  Similarly, for cases involving fatal risks, the methodol-
ogy proposed by Professor Geistfeld, see Geistfeld, supra note 5, is helpful in ensuring 
some evenhandedness across cases involving certain tort victims.  That said, this meth-
odology says little about how to reduce the gamut of Type I and Type II errors outside 
the relatively narrow but important context of victims facing fatal risks; moreover, even 
in the context of fatal risks, Geistfeld’s account is quiet about the need for reducing 
Type II errors involving nonpunishment. 
44 Such Type II errors leading to underenforcement are rife.  See Michael J. Saks, 
Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183 (1992) (“One of the most remarkable features of the tort 
system is how few plaintiffs there are.  A great many potential plaintiffs are never heard 
from by the injurers or their insurers.”); see also Richard L. Abel, The Real Torts Crisis—
Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:  An Anti-
dote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1159 (1996) (stating that “relatively few” tort 
claims are brought to court and that, even if more claims were filed, the tort system 
may not have the capacity to handle them). 
45 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVER-
ITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 45-48 (1999) (examining empirical literature 
and noting that there exists a correlation between increased certainty of punishment 
and decreased crime rates but that the evidence showing a correlation between severity 
of punishment and crime rates is comparatively weaker); Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. 
Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 308 (1991) (“The results point to large 
deterrent effects emanating from increased certainty of punishment, and much smaller, 
and generally insignificant effects, stemming from increased severity of sanction.”). 
46 Punitive damages might be thought to pursue a mixture of other goals as well.  
See generally Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (“At least seven purposes for imposing punitive damages can 
be gleaned from judicial opinions and the writings of commentators:  (1) punishing 
the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring 
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stantial attention already, we must see how they would fit alongside or 
apart from what a public retributive justice theory entails for the im-
plementation of punitive damages.47  To that end, let me provide a 
summary of the basic structure of retributive damages that I proposed 
earlier. 
B.  The Basic Structure of Retributive Damages:  A Recap 
While this Section outlines the basic structure of retributive dam-
ages, it does not explain in detail the rationale underlying this struc-
ture or why this structure is desirable vis-à-vis other remedial or penal 
options.  Those issues are both addressed and defended at length in 
Retributive Damages.  As I demonstrated there, retributive justice theory 
offers not only a reason for reconfiguring punitive damages, but also a 
set of constraints.48  After all, once properly understood, retributive 
justice is tethered to concerns for equality, modesty, accuracy, propor-
tionality, impartiality, and the rule of law; such notions are largely 
missing not only from current common law punitive damages prac-
tices but also, to varying degrees, from the accounts of those scholars 
emphasizing punitive damages as vehicles for vindicating a private 
plaintiff’s interest in “poetic justice”49 or revenge50 or a jury’s interest 
in ventilating its outrage.51  In some respects, this public retributive in-
terest means ensuring modest and fair sanctions across the realm of simi-
others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law 
enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) 
paying the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.”).  Ellis, however, subjects these possible purposes 
to close scrutiny and finds some of them lacking.  See id. at 76. 
47 While I adopt certain scholars’ views on how to conceptualize and implement 
what I am calling aggravated and deterrence damages, I don’t necessarily present 
the most comprehensive or sophisticated version of those particular approaches.  
This caveat seems necessary in light of the fact that there are disagreements within the 
cost internalization school and within the victim vindication camp over various details.  
In designing a pluralistic structure, I have simply tried to draw on the ideas that 
seemed most feasible and attractive for a post–Philip Morris world of extracompensatory 
damages.
48 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 304-09. 
49 See Galanter and Luban, supra note 3, passim.
50 See Colby, supra note 5, at 433 (“[T]he desire for revenge burns bright in the 
human heart—too bright for the law to ignore.”); Sebok, supra note 5, at 1031 
(“[S]tate-sanctioned revenge is the best interpretation of [punitive damages].”). 
51 See Wenger & Hoffman, supra note 37, at 1138-40 (explaining that jurors often 
reject efficiency rationales for punitive damages and instead base their awards in part 
on their level of moral outrage). 
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larly situated defendants; in other respects it means ensuring safeguards 
to achieve accuracy, impartiality, and proportionality in a particular case.
In Retributive Damages, I made these claims based largely on the ac-
count of punishment that I call the confrontational conception of retribu-
tivism (CCR).52  The CCR seeks to communicate to defendants our se-
riousness about certain interests by applying some level of coercive 
condemnatory setback to the defendant’s interests on account of her 
violating the state’s law.  In the retributive damages context, the stat-
ute describing the scope of retributive damages is the dictate of law.  
Hence, someone who violates that statute stands in a similar position, 
vis-à-vis the CCR, as someone who, for example, violates a typical 
criminal prohibition against theft or fraud.  The offense warrants a 
coercive response by the state that adequately and parsimoniously 
communicates condemnation of that offense to the offender.  Assum-
ing that the offender is without further justification or excuse, she 
ought to be punished through retributive damages because doing so 
helps instantiate our commitments that we are moral agents capable 
of conforming our behavior to law and being held responsible; that, 
under the law, we all are entitled to enjoy equal liberty; and that we 
will defend our democratic sovereignty regarding that delineation of 
liberty against usurpations by offenders.  By extending punishment 
52 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, pt. II.  My prior works have ad-
dressed how this theory applies to other policy issues.  See generally Dan Markel, Against 
Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004) [hereinafter Markel, Against Mercy] (providing a 
retributivist critique of sites of unreviewable discretion for grants of mercy by executive 
figures); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?  Retributivism and 
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) (consid-
ering alternative criminal sanctions through the lens of retributive justice theory); 
Markel, State, Be Not Proud, supra note 40, at 457-77 (arguing that retributive justice is 
incompatible with the death penalty); Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty?  Towards a 
Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389, 392 (1999) (arguing 
that the particularized amnesty utilized by some recovering states as part of a transi-
tional justice program can be “compatible with justice, even when justice is understood 
as retributive in nature”).  More recently, I have extended this theory to the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism:  Pa-
netti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263683 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), is predicated on an 
understanding of retributive punishment as a communicative action directed at the 
offender and that this conception of punishment diminishes the constitutional justifi-
cation for the death penalty).  I also have extended the theory to the role that a defen-
dant’s family status should play in her criminal liability and punishment.  See DAN 
MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009) (examining and often challenging 
the current use of family status in the criminal justice system).
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against violators of this retributive damages statute, we continue to 
vindicate both the value of persons’ rights and interests and our belief 
in the moral competence of persons to act freely within a zone created 
by those protected rights and interests. 
One virtue of this account, when fully fleshed out, is its ability to 
explain both the internal intelligibility of retributive justice within a 
liberal democracy and the limits that may reasonably be placed on 
that social practice to help distinguish it from naked revenge.  Signifi-
cantly, this account explains the need for reducing Type I errors—in 
which people are mistakenly punished or excessively punished relative 
to comparable offenders—and Type II errors—in which offenders es-
cape their punishment altogether or receive too lenient a punishment 
relative to comparable offenders.  Accounts of both retributive justice 
and retributive damages ought to offer sustained reflection on the 
reasonable reduction of all of these kinds of error.  By contrast, victim 
vindication and cost internalization lack the conceptual resources to 
do so effectively.53
To realize these goals, I argued that under the retributive dam-
ages framework, when people defy certain legal obligations, the state 
may either seek to punish them through traditional criminal law or 
make available the sanction of retributive damages.  Such damages 
would be credited against any further criminal sanctions imposed by 
the state for the same misconduct.  Retributive damages statutes 
would empower victims—or in some cases, private attorneys gen-
eral54—to act on behalf of the state to seek the imposition of an “in-
termediate sanction.”  These penalties are basically a stripped-down 
fine; they neither trigger the status of a “conviction” nor do they insti-
gate any collateral consequences or future disabilities as a result of re-
tributive damages liability. 
Under this scheme, the amount of the penalty is determined 
largely by the reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.  Specifi-
cally, the fine’s amount is informed by two kinds of measurements.  
53 The victim vindication accounts say little about how to achieve consistency and 
predictability across cases.  Furthermore, the dominant cost internalization accounts 
do not typically require inquiry into and judgment of the reprehensibility of the de-
fendant’s actions, so cost internalization proponents are not really interested in com-
municating condemnation to offenders.  See, e.g., Galligan, supra note 5; Polinsky & 
Shavell, supra note 5. 
54 In Retributive Damages, I explained why and how nonvictims should have a role 
in facilitating the punishment of misconduct that involved harmless wrongdoing or 
wrongs that victims themselves did not seek to vindicate (fully).  See Markel, Retributive 
Damages, supra note 1, at 279-86. 
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The first measurement is a number on a reprehensibility scale, while 
the second translates that reprehensibility score to an amount of 
damages.  As a preliminary matter, the state legislature or sentencing 
commission would devise a set of guidelines for juries (or judges in 
bench trials) to help them objectively assess how reprehensible the 
misconduct is.55  The guidelines would calibrate reprehensibility, per-
haps on a scale of one to twenty, with twenty being the worst, using 
many of the factors that courts currently use to evaluate the defen-
dant’s reprehensibility.56  Some factors, such as a defendant’s history 
of past adjudicated misconduct, might increase reprehensibility, while 
other factors, such as preexisting compliance programs or remedial 
actions and restitution measures taken by the defendant upon discov-
ery of the misconduct, might mitigate reprehensibility.  In addition, 
the guidelines would include commentaries with hypothetical exam-
ples of misconduct that fell on various places on the scale.  The state 
would assess a percentage of the defendant’s financial condition (or 
net value for entities) that increases with the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s misconduct.57  To use an example, a finding of two on the 
reprehensibility scale could lead to a retributive damages award of one 
percent of the defendant’s net wealth, and a finding of twenty could 
lead to ten percent of the defendant’s assets being assessed. 
To ensure that the defendant does not benefit from the miscon-
duct against the plaintiff, the total retributive damages award should 
also strip the defendant of gains, if any, in excess of compensatory 
damages that are owed to the plaintiff and that arose from the mis-
conduct.  These payments (the gains and the reprehensibility-based 
penalty) go to the state.58  The defendant should also pay plaintiff’s 
55 See generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in In-
tuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007) (providing research on widely shared 
intuitions regarding the scaling of reprehensibility); Sunstein et al., supra note 6, at 
2077-78 (noting consistency in moral judgments but inconsistency in translating out-
rage into dollars).  Legislatures and courts might also look to Michael Welner’s re-
search on the “Depravity Scale.” See Michael Welner, The Depravity Scale, http:// 
www.depravityscale.org (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
56 This scaling approach addresses some of the concerns raised by Cass Sunstein.  
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 
179-81 (2004) (recognizing the value of guidelines and benchmarks for improved cog-
nition and fairness in punitive damages awards across cases). 
57 Cf. Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 290-96 (offering rationales for 
“scaling fines to the defendant’s financial position”). 
58 The gain-stripping aspect of the retributive damages structure makes this ap-
proach broadly consistent with the “complete deterrence” approach advocated by 
economists like Keith Hylton.  See Hylton, supra note 18, at 464-67 (stressing that an 
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lawyers’ fees (for the marginal labor necessary to prove the defen-
dant’s reprehensibility) and a modest and fixed award to the plain-
tiff—I suggested something in the range of $10,000—for bringing the 
case to the public’s attention.59  These payments (to the state, the 
plaintiff, and the lawyer) together constitute what I take to be the 
most sensible, though not the only, way to structure extracompensa-
tory damages designed to advance the goals of retributive justice.60  Of 
course, the plaintiff could also receive an amount based on compensa-
tion for aggravated injuries to the person’s dignity if compensatory 
damages in that jurisdiction did not already account for that injury. 
Consistent with the notion that retributive damages are supposed 
to serve as an intermediate sanction on the public’s behalf, legislatures 
should authorize courts to order defendants to pay the damages 
amount as a percentage of profits in coming years in situations where 
a defendant has reason to doubt its viability if required to pay one 
lump sum.  However, if one is concerned that a defendant committed 
grave misconduct and then restructured its finances to make it appear 
that it could not pay the amount owed, the courts might adjust the re-
tributive damages based on the financial condition of the defendant 
at the time the misconduct (last) occurred.61
The scheme described above furnishes potential defendants with 
little basis for complaining that the amount or award of retributive 
optimal-penalty system would eliminate the prospect of gain by the offender); see also
David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions,
78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1990) (“Enforcing property rules requires stripping all gain (or 
more) from a taking.”).  The retributive damages penalty also includes a wealth- and 
reprehensibility-informed monetary penalty that puts the defendant in a worse posi-
tion than she was at the status quo ante.  Complete-deterrence models permit but do 
not require that setback, which is part of how the retributive message of condemnation 
is communicated.  See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 242-43 (contrasting 
the messages of complete deterrence and retribution). 
59 Such a flat fee avoids the lottery effects that a plaintiff would enjoy from having 
the good “fortune” of having a wealthy injurer. 
60 Other valuation methodologies might also be consistent with retributive justice 
values. See Geistfeld, supra note 5, at 286-92, 306 (proposing for torts involving fatal 
risks a damages valuation that examines government data regarding the monetization 
of fatal risks); Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 287 n.166, 290 n.181 (ex-
plaining why a multiplier of compensatory damages for torts involving purely financial 
losses might also comply with retributive justice values).  Despite my open-mindedness 
toward these alternative methods of assessing retributive damages, I should clarify that 
if they were to be used, the amounts imposed would also need to satisfy the retributive 
goals of stripping the gain and imposing an adequate, proportionate, and parsimoni-
ous setback on the defendant. 
61 Indeed, depending on the circumstances, the restructuring to evade payment 
could arguably be a factor used to raise one’s reprehensibility score. 
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damages is a surprise, since the standards that would be applied to 
them are no different than the guidelines that have now become fa-
miliar in many jurisdictions when assessing criminal liability and sen-
tencing.62  Of course, the defendants in criminal cases have more pro-
cedural safeguards in place, and thus, if we are deputizing plaintiffs to 
facilitate the imposition of an intermediate sanction, then we should 
enhance at least some of the procedural protections available in re-
tributive damages cases—an aspect of the argument I develop in 
greater detail in Part III.  But first, let us turn to some questions about 
structuring a pluralistic approach to extracompensatory damages. 
II. PLURALISM ABOUT PURPOSES
Thus far I have discussed three purposes to guide punitive dam-
ages:  retributive justice, cost internalization, and victim vindication.  
As mentioned at the outset, unlike those who endorse a dominant 
role for one purpose or another,63 I submit that we should be plural-
istic about the purposes of punitive damages.64  Different cases present 
62 See generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:  Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1194-1208 (2005) (summarizing 
states’ use of sentencing guidelines). 
63 See, e.g., supra note 3. 
64 I am obviously not the first person to note that punitive damages serve different 
purposes; my hope is that the discussion here advances the ball by explaining in 
greater detail what a disaggregated scheme of extracompensatory damages would look 
like if implemented with care.  Others who have contemplated disaggregation and plu-
ralism include Professors Galligan, Sharkey, Calabresi, Polinsky & Shavell, Rustad, and 
Salbu. See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 244-46 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, 
J., concurring) (“Indeed, it would not be inappropriate to disaggregate the retributive 
and deterrent functions of extracompensatory damages altogether and allow separate 
awards to further the two separate goals.”); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-
Than-Whole Damages in Personal Injury Law:  Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV.
117 (2003); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5; Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More:  Feder-
alism Derailed by the Court that Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 468-
93 (2005) (adumbrating the plural goals that punitive damages serve); Steven R. Salbu, 
Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies:  Beyond the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247 
(1997) (recognizing different rationales for punitive damages and noting that those 
rationales can be used separately or jointly to calculate damages); Sharkey, supra note 
5, at 363 (“Notwithstanding the fact that the retributive-based and deterrence-based 
components of punitive damages are not fully separable, and indeed have potentially 
synergistic or overlapping effects, there are significant gains to be achieved from treat-
ing them as conceptually distinct.”).  In various respects, my account builds on and de-
parts from these earlier efforts, most significantly in terms of distinguishing between 
the public interest in retributive justice and the private interest in victim vindication, 
and also in explaining how cost internalization intersects with these goals, especially 
after Philip Morris.
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different problems; not every case requires pursuit of any of these 
purposes.  Pluralism means relabeling punitive damages because the 
name “punitive” is somewhat misleading in certain contexts.  I suggest 
calling them “extracompensatory damages” and use that umbrella 
term to encompass what I referred to earlier as retributive, deter-
rence, and aggravated damages. 
Because these three purposes are distinct, jurisdictions need to 
weigh their attractiveness and develop structures capable of realizing 
those goals without overlap or confusion.  One way to accomplish 
these goals is to devise special jury forms that ensure that the jury pro-
vides a written explanation for what it is awarding and why.65  Courts, 
with legislative input, could provide the jury with instructions mod-
eled on those appearing in this Article’s Appendix, which give clear 
guidance regarding these various purposes and how to arrive both at 
appropriate figures for aggravated and deterrence damages and at an 
appropriate reprehensibility finding for retributive damages.  Several 
other issues of retributive damages require attention, specifically as 
they interact with deterrence and aggravated damages. 
A.  Cost Internalization and Deterrence Damages 
1.  Overview 
The idea of disentangling the purposes of extracompensatory 
damages received its most prominent attention in a concurring opin-
ion by Judge Guido Calabresi in Ciraolo v. City of New York.66  In that 
65 See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1439-40 (urging jurisdictions to re-
quire jury explanations).  The jury-explanation device undermines the confidentiality 
of jury deliberations, but it is hard to understand why that confidentiality should be a 
higher priority than the achievement of the public’s interest in the fair and accurate 
imposition of justice.  The concern of judicial interference with the jury’s role is espe-
cially exaggerated given that judges perform various gatekeeping roles. 
66 216 F.3d 236, 244-46 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring).  Calabresi drew 
on the work of other scholars in endorsing cost internalization and urging the separa-
tion of cost internalization from punishment.  See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, 
at 906 (“[T]he imposition of damages equal to harm, appropriately multiplied to re-
flect the probability of escaping liability, achieves proper deterrence.”); see also Galli-
gan, supra note 5.  Galligan’s account is very instructive regarding the deterrence func-
tion, but it does not work through the details of implementing the public’s interest in 
retributive justice.  It also fails to separate the public interest in retributive justice from 
the victim’s private interest in vindicating the injury to her dignity.  Nonetheless, the 
points that Galligan makes about the proper way to determine optimal deterrence are 
useful in a context where “total cost internalization” damages would be permissible.  
See id. at 128-34 (proposing for the calculation of punitive damages the use of average 
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case, the Second Circuit had to decide whether punitive damages 
were permitted against municipalities engaged in unconstitutional 
misconduct—specifically, unwarranted strip searches of arrestees in 
New York City.  Bound by Supreme Court precedent,67 Judge Cala-
bresi wrote that the award of punitive damages in the court below re-
quired reversal.  Concurring with his own opinion, however, Judge 
Calabresi wrote separately to explain why extracompensatory damages 
should be available to encourage cost internalization—the idea that a 
defendant should pay for the social harms generated by its activities, 
regardless of whether all victims decide to bring individual suits.68
Under standard accounts, cost internalization is desirable because it 
will spur optimal amounts of precaution by the defendant, leading to 
potential harm—rather than the plaintiff’s actual harm—subject to a multiplier so that 
the plaintiff more accurately serves as a proxy for all who are damaged but do not sue).  
However, because of the way that Philip Morris makes “total cost internalization” consti-
tutionally problematic, see infra subsection II.A.2, I do not think that there is a constitu-
tionally permissible basis for structuring deterrence damages in the way that Professor 
Galligan suggests. 
67 See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-66 (1981) (affirm-
ing the common law absolute immunity of municipalities against punitive damages ac-
tions for the bad-faith misdeeds of their officials). 
68 Judge Calabresi wrote that
[c]osts may not be sufficiently reflected in compensatory damages for several 
reasons, most of which go to the fact that not all injured parties are in fact 
compensated by the responsible injurer.  For example, a victim may not real-
ize that she has been harmed by a particular actor’s conduct, or may not be 
able to identify the person or entity who has injured her.  Where the injurer 
makes active efforts to conceal the harm, this problem is of course exacer-
bated.  Moreover, even if a victim is aware of her injury and is able to identify 
its cause, she may not bring suit.  A person will be unlikely to sue if the costs of 
doing so—including the time, effort, and stress associated with bringing a law-
suit—outweigh the compensation she can expect to receive.  A victim is espe-
cially unlikely to sue, therefore, in cases where the probable compensatory 
damages are relatively low.  As a result, a harm that affects many people, but 
each only to a limited degree, will generally be given inadequate weight if only 
compensatory damages are assessed. 
 In addition, some victims will not sue even if the damages they could expect 
to receive would exceed the costs of suing.  Victims will differ greatly in their 
knowledge of and access to the legal process, and those who are relatively 
poor and unsophisticated, as a practical matter, are frequently unable to bring 
suit to redress their injuries even if those injuries are grave.  A harm that dis-
proportionately affects such victims, therefore, is also particularly likely not to 
be accurately reflected in compensatory damages. 
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243-44 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
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appropriate prices and levels of activity while ensuring that defendants 
do not thrust the costs of their tortious activities onto others.69
As a matter of policy prescription, there is much to recommend 
the cost internalization approach.  Broadly speaking, defendants 
should have to pay for the mess that they make; if they can exploit en-
forcement gaps by private and public parties, there will be an incen-
tive to take insufficient care, which will also arouse the risk of under-
deterrence.70
But because the cost internalization approach is nonpunitive in 
nature, we should refer to damages pursuing cost internalization as 
simply “deterrence” damages, not “punitive” or “retributive” dam-
ages.71  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, this approach does not require 
inquiry into the mens rea or reprehensibility of the defendant’s con-
duct to justify the augmentation of damages.72  All that matters is that 
69 According to their supporters, optimal deterrence damages 
should be set at a level such that the expected damages of defendants equal 
the harm they have caused, for then their damage payments will, in an average 
sense, equal the harm.  This implies a simple formula for calculating punitive 
damages, according to which harm is multiplied by a factor reflecting the like-
lihood of escaping liability. 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 954.  Some law and economics scholars have regis-
tered skepticism with the multiplier principle.  See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Deterrence and 
Damages:  The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2191-98 
(1999) (contending that the use of a static multiplier misapprehends the variable 
probabilities of punishment, which generally correlate with the seriousness of a crime); 
see also Sharkey, supra note 5, at 368-69 (raising concern that the Polinsky-Shavell ap-
proach doesn’t achieve adequate cost internalization).  I should note that my proposal 
largely brackets the skepticism towards the deterrence damages multiplier, but if 
economists converge on a different method of achieving cost internalization in a way 
that is compatible with Philip Morris, I am certainly open to it. 
70 See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in Torts,
70 MO. L. REV. 691, 692 (2005) (arguing that rules developed for individual actions do 
not deter effectively in the mass tort context). 
71 Again, I note that my use of “deterrence” damages may seem idiosyncratic to 
those who think of deterrence in terms of complete deterrence.  Here I simply mean 
to describe damages meant to realize cost internalization to the extent that I view per-
missible in a post–Philip Morris world. 
72 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 905-10 (arguing that deterrence damages 
should be calculated as the amount of the plaintiff’s harm multiplied by the reciprocal 
of the probability that the defendant will escape liability, and maintaining that the rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is irrelevant for deterrence damage purposes); 
Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 
(1996) (explaining that, under an optimal deterrence regime, one is “entitled to harm 
the victim so long as he pays for the harm (with the expectation that this entitlement 
will induce him to take optimal care)”).  But see Sharkey, supra note 5, at 405 (requiring 
a threshold finding of at least recklessness before such nonpunitive extracompensatory 
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the defendant caused tortious harm that was not otherwise internal-
ized and that such harm is not excused or justified on other 
grounds.73
2.  Deterrence Damages After Philip Morris
On account of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Philip Mor-
ris, proponents of the cost internalization approach now face substan-
tial difficulties.  Implicitly repudiating the language of its TXO deci-
sion,74 which permitted punitive damages awards to consider the harm 
or potential harm from the conduct as a whole,75 the Supreme Court 
reversed course in Philip Morris.  Writing for a five-to-four majority, Jus-
tice Breyer held that the Due Process Clause forbids punishing a de-
fendant for harms to nonparties to the instant litigation because the 
defendant would not have the ability to “defend against the charge,” 
thus depriving the defendant of notice and imposing a substantial de-
damages can be imposed).  For reasons explained elsewhere, Sharkey’s threshold re-
quirement of recklessness stands in tension with a better understanding of cost inter-
nalization. See Galligan, supra note 5, at 62-63 (arguing that augmented awards are in-
tended to deter and not to punish—therefore making focus on the defendant’s state of 
mind irrelevant to calculating these awards); Kelly, supra note 32, at 1440 n.36 (ex-
plaining that Sharkey’s proposal of limiting “societal” damages to instances where de-
fendants engage in conduct that is at least reckless “seems to move the justification 
back toward retribution, letting state of mind, not undercompensation, differentiate 
the cases where additional deterrence is needed”); Markel, Retributive Damages, supra
note 1, at 243 & n.9, 244 (explaining that the issue of reprehensibility is separate from 
the issue of whether a defendant has been forced to bear the costs of her actions). 
73 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 905-10.  To be sure, one might still have 
residual anxieties about whether deterrence damages would perform an adequate 
compensatory and norm-projection function–-especially in cases where the payment of 
deterrence damages will not readily be commensurable with the harm suffered.  In 
other words, there is a legitimate concern that “compensation never compensates” in 
the tort context because the plaintiff never wanted to “earn” that compensation.  See
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENTS: THE PARADOX OF PROPERTY 282 (2000).  But 
that concern indicates only why deterrence damages should not be the exclusive pur-
pose of extracompensatory damages. 
74 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).  For a discussion 
of the Supreme Court’s infidelity to precedent in this context, see Posting of Dan 
Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Philip Morris:  Up in Smoke?, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2007/02/philip_morris_u.html (Feb. 20, 2007). 
75 See TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460-62; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 582 n.35 (1996) (indicating, implicitly, that punitive damages awards might 
be permitted to reflect the harm caused to all in-state purchasers of BMWs and not just 
the harm caused to the individual plaintiff bringing suit); Kirkland v. Midland Mort-
gage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[P]unitive damages . . . [are] meas-
ured to reflect, not the wrong done to a single individual, but the wrongfulness of the 
conduct as a whole.”). 
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gree of arbitrariness and uncertainty in punishment.76  Therefore, in 
assessing the putative excessiveness of punitive damages in a given 
case, a court must scrutinize whether a jury’s punitive damages award 
included amounts based on harms suffered by strangers to the litiga-
tion.
By restricting the permissible scope of harm for punitive damages, 
the Philip Morris decision now raises questions about whether “total 
cost internalization” is forbidden.77  The ambiguity is subtle and has 
been introduced in Professor Colby’s recent article on the subject.78
Colby emphasizes that because damages designed for cost internaliza-
tion (optimal deterrence) need no finding of reprehensibility to war-
rant their imposition, they should not logically be thought of as part 
of the “punitive” damages constitutional analysis, regardless of their 
scope.79  Thus states could, on his view, constitutionally pursue dam-
ages meant only to achieve total cost internalization, so long as the 
state said there was nothing punitive to this cost internalization ap-
proach.80  Hence “deterrence” damages would essentially serve as a 
regulatory tool to facilitate total cost internalization, whereas “puni-
76 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007).  The jury had 
awarded the decedent’s wife $21,000 in economic compensatory damages, $800,000 in 
noneconomic compensatory damages, and $79.5 million in punitive damages.  Id. at 
350.  Recently, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon upheld the jury verdict, claiming that there was an adequate and independent 
state ground for the decision.  See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260-61 
(Or. 2008).  Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court agreed, once again, to 
rehear an appeal brought by Philip Morris—but only on the issue of whether the Ore-
gon Supreme Court failed to abide by the instructions of the remand, not whether the 
punitive damages in the case were constitutionally excessive.  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. 
Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008).  The Supreme Court, however, recently announced 
that its grant of certiorari on this issue was improvidently granted, leaving the decision 
by the Oregon courts to stand.  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, No. 07-1216, slip 
op. (U.S. Mar. 31, 2009). 
77 By “total cost internalization,” I mean the full scope of harm caused by a defen-
dant’s wrongdoing, and not just the harm caused to the plaintiff in the instant litigation. 
78 See Colby, supra note 5, passim.
79 Id. at 467-79.  Because cost internalization refers to a different kind of deter-
rence (optimal) than the one probably intended under the Court’s pronouncements 
(complete deterrence), Colby’s conclusion is plausible as a matter of theory and logic.  
But because I think that this conclusion is realistically at odds with the gravamen of the 
Philip Morris decision, I doubt that the Philip Morris Court meant that one could pursue 
statewide cost internalization with little to no constitutional oversight, for reasons I ex-
plain shortly. 
80 See id. at 476 (“Williams does not stand in the way of implementing an extra-
compensatory remedy that seeks optimal deterrence.”).  My sense is that Professor 
Sharkey’s social-damages proposal would similarly seek to restrain the reach of Philip 
Morris so that it would not apply to nonpunitive extracompensatory damages.
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tive” damages, on his analysis, would serve to advance the private inter-
est in victim vindication, not the public interest in retributive justice.81
My view is that Colby’s argument about the future of total cost in-
ternalization is wrong because of its cramped interpretation of Philip 
Morris.  His interpretation reads the case so narrowly as to render its 
holding an effective nullity, giving with one hand a right to a jury in-
struction that defendants have desperately sought and then stripping 
away the value of that right with the other hand.82  It is hard to believe 
that the Court and various litigants would be divided so sharply on an 
issue with such apparent lack of material consequence.  And unlike 
the notorious decision in United States v. Booker,83 which recognized an 
important right for the defendant only to demolish its significance, 
there are no separate opinions in Philip Morris regarding the “merits” 
and the “remedy.”84  As a single opinion, Philip Morris is therefore less 
susceptible to plausible charges of schizophrenic reasoning. 
To my mind, the better reading of Philip Morris finds that cost in-
ternalization’s future is impeded but not destroyed.  Cost internaliza-
tion remains feasible to the extent that jurisdictions make available 
class actions or other aggregative-litigation strategies that protect the 
rights of defendants; once a class is certified, the people who were 
previously nonparties become parties to the litigation.  Additionally, 
the prospect of deterrence damages outside of the class action survives 
Philip Morris to the extent that the defendant may have escaped having 
to compensate the instant plaintiff(s).  So whereas cost internalization 
prior to Philip Morris should plausibly have included all the harms 
caused by the defendant (and therefore something closer to what 
Judge Calabresi and Professor Sharkey advocated), it now should be-
81 Professor Colby posits that a public interest in retributive justice cannot consti-
tutionally be pursued outside the criminal law because of the absence of constitutional 
criminal procedural safeguards in civil suits.  Id. at 440-57.  For reasons I will explain in 
Part III, I find this view to be mistaken. 
82 Unsurprisingly, other scholars supportive of cost internalization damages have 
also suggested that the Supreme Court’s Due Process jurisprudence may not apply in 
its entirety to nonpunitive damages designed simply to compensate society for various 
harms to nonparties within state lines.  See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 5, at 428-33 (reject-
ing the argument that due process extraterritoriality and multiple-punishment con-
cerns would prevent the implementation of a societal-damages scheme); Ciraolo v. City 
of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 246 n.8 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (suggesting by 
implication that, in contrast to truly punitive damages, socially compensatory damages 
do not require additional procedural protections). 
83 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
84 See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665 (2006) 
(discussing the doctrinal chaos embedded in Booker’s two separate opinions). 
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come, I think, a more focused inquiry.  In other words, the operative 
questions are what harm did the defendant cause this case’s plaintiff(s), 
and what is the likelihood that the defendant would escape having to 
pay for that harm to this case’s plaintiff(s)?  Thus, using the Polinsky 
and Shavell multiplier method, if a jury believed a plaintiff had only a 
one-third chance of discovering that it was this defendant who caused 
the harm to the plaintiff, then that should permit the jury to impose 
deterrence damages that are double the compensatory damages.  On 
this view, Philip Morris permits a state to apply a multiplier, for exam-
ple, but it must be based solely on the likelihood that the harm to the 
plaintiff would not be compensated by the defendant.85
Regardless of whose reading of Philip Morris is correct, there can 
be little question that the Court would almost certainly still impose 
constitutional limits on deterrence damages to ensure that the state’s 
regulatory mechanism was not being used to regulate extraterritorial 
conduct that might have been lawful in other jurisdictions.86  Needless 
to say, jury instructions and a jury verdict form can reflect these vari-
ous considerations.  The Appendix to this Article makes an effort to 
craft such jury instructions based on my reading of Philip Morris’s im-
plications for cost internalization.87
3.  Standard of Review for Deterrence Damages 
Isolating the cost internalization function of extracompensatory 
damages suggests that the standard of review on appeal might require 
revision.  In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the 
Supreme Court announced that in federal cases the amount of puni-
tive damages should be reviewed de novo—a decision partially predi-
cated on the claim that determinations of punitive damages involve a 
morally evaluative component that has to be weighed against a defen-
85 Cf. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 592-94 (1996) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (discussing the use of a multiplier as a potentially constitutionally plausible 
limit on punitive damages). 
86 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) 
(“A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its own reasoned judg-
ment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State 
alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant 
who acts within its jurisdiction.”). 
87 I reiterate that I don’t have a dog in this particular fight; if it turns out that Pro-
fessor Colby’s reading of cost internalization after Philip Morris is correct, a view which 
seems similar to Professor Sharkey’s view articulated pre–Philip Morris, then I would be 
happy to have the jury instructions and potentially the procedural safeguards dealing 
with cost internalization adjusted accordingly. 
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dant’s due process rights.88  That holding seems applicable only with 
respect to the condemnatory part of extracompensatory damages.  By 
their nature, deterrence damages will involve matters of empirical es-
timation (i.e., the likelihood that the defendant would escape having 
to compensate this plaintiff) and thus are no different than compen-
satory damages.  If so, then determinations of deterrence damages de-
serve greater deference when reviewed on appeal.89
4.  Who Receives Deterrence Damages 
We must also consider to whom deterrence damages should be 
paid.  Prior to Philip Morris, the calculation of deterrence damages for 
cost internalization might require looking at all the tortious harm that 
the defendant caused and would thus counsel that deterrence dam-
ages be paid to a specific (state) fund to compensate harmed nonliti-
gants.90  That scheme would keep funds available to future claimants 
who were harmed by the defendant’s misconduct.  If I read Philip Mor-
ris correctly on the issue of cost internalization, however, the need for 
a public fund to distribute deterrence damages will diminish corre-
spondingly.  Since the post–Philip Morris inquiry for cost internaliza-
tion is likely to be restricted to a specific case’s plaintiff(s), the plain-
tiff(s) have a stronger claim to all deterrence damages than they did 
prior to Philip Morris, when harms to other nonparties could be con-
sidered by the jury in determining the amount of punitive damages.  
88 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432-36 (2001). 
89 Cf. Gore, 517 U.S. at 592-94 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alluding to the possibility of 
“more deferential review” of damages designed to perform a “constraining” role of cost 
internalization); Sharkey, supra note 5, at 446 (suggesting deferential review for com-
pensatory societal damages but stringent de novo review for “‘morally’-based retribu-
tive ‘punitive’ damages”).  I agree with Sharkey’s endorsement of deferential review for 
cost internalization, but I think that it is important to further decouple review of victim 
vindication from review of the public retributive function.  I say more about that infra
subsection III.B.2.  Also, since Sharkey’s proposal is for “total cost internalization,” 
whereas mine permits only what I might call Philip Morris–compatible cost internaliza-
tion, I think that deferring to the jury for these damages is a bit easier to justify because 
there are fewer challenges to jury competence when juries are limited to the inquiry of 
the likelihood that the defendant would have evaded compensation to the plain-
tiff(s)/victim(s) only.  See id. at 447-50 (raising and deftly addressing objections to ju-
ries’ competence to calculate compensatory societal damages). 
90 See Galligan, supra note 5, at 140-41 (discussing the potential use of placing “so-
cietal compensatory damages” in a public fund); see also Sharkey, supra note 5, at 402 
(suggesting the possibility of using “augmented damages” to establish a fund, for the 
benefit of nonparties to the case, “to offset the type of harm at issue in the case”); id. at 
392 (“Societal damages, as envisioned in this Article, would redress the harms inflicted 
by the defendant upon parties not before the court.” (emphasis added)). 
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In short, plaintiffs (who are victims) should receive deterrence dam-
ages.91
5.  Reconciling Deterrence Damages with Retributive Damages 
If a state adopted a pluralistic structure for extracompensatory 
damages, it would have to determine whether deterrence damages 
should offset retributive damages or vice versa.  Professors Polinsky 
and Shavell argue that the amount of deterrence damages awarded 
should offset the amount of damages awarded for the purpose of retri-
bution because, from their perspective, deterrence damages also serve 
to punish the defendant to some extent.92  This conclusion seems mis-
taken.  Deterrence damages are a purely nonstigmatic, “cool” cost in-
ternalization device.93  They do not “punish” a defendant any more 
than state incorporation fees “punish” a defendant. 
If defendant (D) causes harm to victim (V ) without justification, a 
prima facie reason for V ’s having an avenue of recourse for compen-
sation against D exists, but it is not a reason, in the absence of some 
culpable form of mens rea, to condemn D in the language of retribu-
tion.  So if cost internalization is the goal of deterrence damages, and 
there is no necessary threshold of a finding of a culpable mens rea, 
then accordingly, no offset for deterrence damages should be avail-
able against one’s retributive damages tab.94
91 Theoretically, cost internalization advocates might encourage a cost internaliza-
tion strategy that avoids conferring upon a plaintiff a monopoly to seek recourse or 
settle.  In other words, where underdeterrence is a concern because of victims who fail 
to bring sufficient cases, one might want to permit a private attorney general (or a 
public agency) to ensure that the defendant fully internalizes the costs of tortious con-
duct that a victim decides not to pursue (to the full extent).  The same desire to de-
couple deterrence from compensation might be true where one is concerned about 
overcompensation to plaintiffs or insufficient precautions taken by victim-plaintiffs.  
For examples of arguments in favor of decoupling compensatory damages awarded to 
plaintiffs from deterrence damages paid by defendants, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J.
ECON. 562 (1991), and David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Func-
tions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1873-74 (2002). 
92 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, app. (detailing model jury instructions that 
contend that the amount of cost internalization damages should offset the amount of 
damages for the purposes of retribution). 
93 See id. at 906 (“That a defendant’s conduct can be described as reprehensible is 
in itself irrelevant.  Rather, the focus in determining punitive damages should be on 
the injurer’s chance of escaping liability.”). 
94 Cf. Ciraolo v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 246 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., con-
curring) (“But a separate award of punitive damages would be allowed only in cases 
where the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to deserve punishment 
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Conversely, a defendant should not be able to credit the amount 
of retributive damages paid against a deterrence damages bill.  Even 
after a defendant pays her deterrence damages, she may in fact be in a 
better position than she was before the tort was committed.  In other 
words, the tortious activity might still be profitable if only the amount 
necessary for cost internalization has to be paid.  But if retributive 
damages are also warranted because the defendant’s activity was rep-
rehensible, then that residual gain needs to be stripped under the re-
tributive approach and the defendant must endure an additional set-
back.  Thus there is no sense in trying to credit retributive damages 
against deterrence damages.  It is as if a defendant is saying, “I would 
like to credit my fines against my tax bill.”  Allowing a defendant to 
reduce its deterrence damages award through a retributive damages 
award confuses the defendant (and society) about the nature of the 
reason for the extracompensatory damages.95
In sum, the prospect of deterrence damages should in principle 
be considered in any civil tort action.  One can imagine situations 
where either deterrence or retributive damages, or both, would be 
appropriate in light of the different purposes served by them and the 
different facts of the cases.  A jury determining extracompensatory 
damages should be instructed to separate its decisions about which 
damages are necessary.96  A special verdict form reflecting the various 
differences could achieve this goal in much the way that this Article’s 
Appendix suggests.  Such a separation of categories of damages on a 
jury verdict form would also facilitate proper appellate review of the 
extracompensatory damages.  Of course, such deterrence damages 
should be subject to the type of constraints articulated by various 
scholars of cost internalization,97 and, if applicable, the federalism 
concerns of the Supreme Court. 
apart from whatever assessment was required to compensate the individual victim or 
society as a whole.” (emphasis omitted)). 
95 By respecting the distinctive values associated with retributive justice and cost 
internalization, the proposal here departs from those of both Galanter & Luban and 
Polinsky & Shavell.  See Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1451 (arguing that decoup-
ling punitive awards and moral judgments “simply misses the point”); Polinsky & Shav-
ell, supra note 5, app. (presenting model jury instructions that advocate the subtraction 
of cost internalization damages from the amount of damages meant to achieve retribu-
tive punishment). 
96 See infra Section II.B for further discussion on the intersection of deterrence 
damages and aggravated damages. 
97 Economists disagree about the precise architecture for punitive damages.  Com-
pare Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 
(1982) (arguing that punitive damages should be used only in cases of gross, inten-
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B.  Aggravated Damages for Victim Vindication 
1.  Overview 
Aside from the public’s interests in cost internalization and re-
tributive justice,98 a third purpose of extracompensatory damages war-
rants special attention.  This third form of extracompensatory dam-
ages provides a remedy through which plaintiffs can seek recourse 
against defendants for the special dignitary harms caused by the de-
fendants’ misconduct.  I will call awards for these kinds of harms “ag-
gravated damages.”99
Interestingly, and contrary to the Supreme Court’s historical ac-
count in Cooper Industries, Professor Sebok argues that  
punitive damages have never served the compensatory function attrib-
uted to them by the [Supreme] Court in Cooper. . . . If punitive damages 
served a compensatory function, it would have been for a category of injury 
that is still not considered compensable by contemporary tort law, namely the in-
jury of insult that wounds or dishonors.100
If Professor Sebok is correct, then not all noneconomic awards re-
flected in compensatory damages today encompass the special nature 
of personal dignity harms.  This would suggest a reason for addressing 
these special injuries through aggravated damages meant to achieve 
what I am calling “victim vindication.” 
The victim vindication rationale has a number of supporters.101
For example, Professor Sebok interprets the availability of punitive 
damages as a way for victims to pursue “state-sanctioned revenge” by 
creating an avenue of recourse against the defendant.102  Recently, 
tional fault and should be determined based on the costs of compliance or benefits of 
noncompliance that motivated the violation), with Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 5 
(advocating the multiplier approach). 
98 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 257-66. 
99 My inspiration for this term came from two commonwealth scholars.  See Chap-
man & Trebilcock, supra note 5, at 746-47 (discussing an English case, Rookes v. Bar-
nard, [1964] All E.R. 367, 407 (Eng.), that distinguished aggravated from punitive 
damages).  I am not claiming that my proposed use of the term “aggravated damages” 
captures historical, extant, or emerging practices in Canadian and English cases.  
However, for illuminating descriptions of aggravated damages in comparative perspec-
tive, see Anthony J. Sebok & Vanessa Wilcox, Aggravated Damages, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., forthcoming 2009). 
100 Sebok, supra note 15, at 204-05 (emphasis added). 
101 See supra subsection I.A.2. 
102 Sebok, supra note 5, at 1023-29. 
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Professor Colby has embraced this rationale as well.103  These victim 
vindication models empower plaintiffs to vindicate particular harms to 
their dignity, but they also give plaintiffs the power to waive such re-
course, satisfying themselves with “mere” compensatory damages or 
no damages at all. 
There are merits to these victim vindication accounts as interpre-
tive reconstructions of the constitutional architecture of tort law and 
particularly of punitive damages, but the reconstructions are not flaw-
less.104  That said, the bigger problem is that the victim vindication ac-
counts fail to explain from a normative perspective why they represent 
the best structure, all things considered.  For one thing, if embraced, 
these accounts would fail to meaningfully realize the public’s interest 
in retributive justice even if they plausibly serve to vindicate the 
autonomy or dignity of the particular victim by conferring upon her 
some control over her legal rights.  Victims who, because of mercy or 
frustration with the legal process, forego recourse are creating Type II 
errors about which retributivists and the public should be concerned.  
The same can be said of settlements that satisfy plaintiffs but leave 
grave misconduct concealed and unpunished by some form of public 
rebuke. 
Of course, merely because a victim vindication account fails to re-
alize retributive justice does not mean that the goal of empowering 
victims cannot be accommodated within a pluralistic account of extra-
compensatory damages.  One potential benefit of a victim vindication 
model that goes beyond facilitating a right to state-sanctioned revenge 
is that it serves as a way to achieve compensation for plaintiffs (or their 
lawyers) who bring suits against the perpetrators of antisocial conduct 
for which compensatory damages alone would not suffice.105  That 
103 See Colby, supra note 5, at 423-40 (arguing that punitive damages are best un-
derstood as a form of punishment for “private wrongs”). 
104 For example, as a descriptive matter, Sebok’s account acknowledges the diffi-
culty of incorporating the State Farm Court’s presumptive single-digit ratio into his the-
ory.  See Sebok, supra note 5, at 1029-36 (criticizing Justice Kennedy’s opinion that 
“[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process,” State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003), as lacking a “principled 
foundation,” as justified merely by a desire for simplicity, and as “impossible to square 
with a post-Lochner theory of due process”). 
105 Of course, to the extent that victim vindication models do supplement insuffi-
cient compensatory damages, punitive damages are not the appropriate way to remedy 
these problems; instead, we should address the problematic rules of lawyer compensa-
tion.  See Kelly, supra note 32, at 1441 (arguing that punitive damages merely “dodge” 
problems with class actions and other difficulties of litigation, while also “under-
min[ing] efforts to correct these problems”). 
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function, however, is largely incidental to the underlying purpose:  to 
give a plaintiff access to a mechanism that promises to offer some re-
pair to the plaintiff’s injured dignity. 
One final issue bears mention here.  In what follows, I sometimes 
address the damages sought under the victim vindication model as 
aggravated damages that compensate the plaintiff for the injury to the 
victim’s dignity.  These are terms that some of the model’s adherents 
might reject because labeling the vindication of the victim’s dignity in 
compensatory terms may distort the underlying spirit of revenge or vin-
dication animating this conceptual approach.106  I accept the point be-
ing made here, and I do not want to crudely mischaracterize these 
other views. 
From an external perspective, however, the victim vindication 
model and what I call aggravated damages are interested in the same 
thing:  giving the plaintiff unfettered control over the choice to seek a 
remedy, usually in the form of money that would go directly to the 
plaintiff, designed to repair the injury to her dignity.  Moreover, de-
scribing the victim vindication damages in compensatory terms may 
broaden their appeal beyond enthusiasts of revenge.107  Saying that 
aggravated damages will give the victim control over a remedy de-
signed to repair a harm not otherwise captured by compensatory 
damages makes intuitive sense.  By contrast, saying that victims should 
have a form of revenge when we already have a criminal justice system 
(or a retributive damages scheme) might not make sense to many 
people.  Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, the more the victim 
vindication proponents characterize aggravated damages as revenge 
or punishment, rather than as a form of compensation, the more they 
will invite the kind of constitutional scrutiny that they probably hope 
to avoid. 
106 Indeed, scholars like Arthur Ripstein, Sebok, and now Colby specifically reject 
the equation between “vindicating” the plaintiff’s interest in dignity repair and “com-
pensating” the plaintiff for the injury to her dignity, claiming that dignity is not some-
thing that is “compensable.”  See, e.g., Colby, supra note 5, at 435-36, 436 n.187 (citing 
Ripstein and Sebok with approval).  But see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorge-
ment as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 91 (2003) (“The courts properly re-
gard such [aggravated] damages as compensatory rather than punitive, since they re-
pair a loss, albeit an intangible one.”). 
107 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 270-71 (explaining the differ-
ences between retributive justice and revenge). 
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2.  Possible Limits on Aggravated Damages 
To be clear, I urge the use of an aggravated damages scheme only 
if dignitary harms are not already covered under traditional compensatory 
damages in the particular jurisdiction.  Moreover, if the purpose of aggra-
vated damages is to repair the harm to an individual’s dignity, one 
might plausibly entertain whether juries (or victims) could instead re-
quire the defendant to apologize to the plaintiff if juries (or victims) 
believe that an apology or some other remedial sanction—such as an 
injunction or a restorative justice process involving a victim-defendant 
mediation or circle of concern and care108—sufficiently substitutes for 
(or ought to supplement) money damages.  The discussion below will 
assume arguendo that some gap exists to warrant the need for aggra-
vated damages in the form of money. 
Some might fear, however, that every injury to a victim will seem 
to be an invitation to a jury to award aggravated damages.  Insofar as 
this fear is justified, jurisdictions might consider limiting aggravated 
damages only to cases satisfying two conditions.  First, jurisdictions 
might decide that corporate plaintiffs or other entities should not be 
able to collect aggravated damages because they lack the kind of dig-
nity or autonomy interest that we find necessary to vindicate through 
the use of aggravated damages.109  A second limit, about which I am 
somewhat ambivalent, would restrict such damages only to those cases 
where the plaintiff is suing a defendant on the basis of a tort focused 
on denigrating the status of the individual qua that individual.  Thus, 
mass-products-based disputes, such as those in BMW v. Gore or Philip
Morris, would exclude aggravated damages on these grounds because 
the purpose of the conduct in those situations was not to make false 
108 See, e.g., Circles—Restorative Justice, http://www.restorativejustice.org/intro/ 
tutorial/processes/circles (last visited Mar. 15, 2009) (explaining the use of “healing 
circles” as a way to address harm to a victim caused by an offender); see also Dan 
Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative Sanctions:  Reflections on the Future of Sham-
ing Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2007). 
109 In the successor article to this one, Punitive Damages and Complex Litigation, su-
pra note 9, I discuss the intelligibility of punishing a corporation for its misconduct.  As 
a result, it might seem inconsistent to deny corporations access to dignity-based aggra-
vated damages while at the same time thinking that they have sufficient independent 
identity to warrant retributive condemnation.  I think that one can reduce this incon-
sistency by looking at the nature of the misconduct:  for example, it might be that the 
insult to dignity is defamation of the corporate plaintiff (e.g., “the managers of X Cor-
poration intentionally sell spoiled food”).  There, the misconduct injures the dignity of 
the entity as a team, in which case the team arguably should be able to collect aggra-
vated damages on top of other losses. 
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claims about the worth of the victim as such, but rather to undertake 
profit-seeking conduct that was insufficiently mindful of the legal 
norms protecting citizens.  While this limit is controversial because 
some people might feel insulted even by mass-market misconduct—
“the airline’s general policy treated all of us with so little regard!”—
that kind of misconduct is perhaps better addressed through the use 
of retributive damages, as that kind of misconduct should fall within 
that scheme’s reprehensibility determination.  To be sure, there will 
be hard cases at times, but judges and juries could decide that those 
are situations where the defendant must face both aggravated and re-
tributive damages. 
3.  Reconciling Aggravated Damages and Retributive Damages 
If jurisdictions permitted both aggravated and retributive dam-
ages, how would they work alongside each other?  Plaintiffs would 
have control over aggravated damages.  They could settle or not seek 
aggravated damages—the same as with compensatory damages.  If the 
plaintiff sought aggravated damages and retributive damages, the jury 
would decide what amount (or other remedy) should go to the plain-
tiff for the sake of vindicating the victim’s interest in her dignity.  The 
jury would also decide whether the defendant’s misconduct warranted 
retributive condemnation of the sort targeted by the reprehensibility 
scale.  Having both kinds of damages available facilitates sharpened 
jury decision making about which damages are achieving which pur-
poses.  Without such a pluralistic structure, juries cannot ensure that 
the appropriate remedy is imposed, and they therefore risk providing 
an unnecessary windfall to the plaintiff (or to the state).110
110 I therefore find myself likely to disagree with those jurisdictions that have pro-
hibited juries from finding out what portion of the extracompensatory damages goes 
to the state on account that such information will invariably and unduly inflate the 
amount of damages awarded. See Sharkey, supra note 5, at 438-39 & nn.358-60 (citing 
cases and statutes establishing that jurors are not informed of the division of extra-
compensatory damages).  At least under my scheme, however, there are a number of 
robust safeguards and review mechanisms to ensure that this undue inflation of dam-
ages is less likely to occur.  I share Professor Sharkey’s skepticism toward the rationales 
for keeping juries in the dark about allocation.  See id. at 439-40, 440 n.366 (citing Mi-
chelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of 
Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 320-22 (1999) (finding 
both that jurors were actually more likely to award punitive damages when those dam-
ages went directly to plaintiffs, rather than to the government, and that the amount of 
damages was unaffected by the recipient of the award)). 
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4.  Reconciling Aggravated Damages and Deterrence Damages 
Aggravated damages and deterrence damages both assist in ensur-
ing cost internalization.  In theory, when determining deterrence 
damages, we should consider having juries use a multiple of the ag-
gregated amount of compensatory and aggravated damages.  In prac-
tice, however, it is unlikely that there will be many cases involving both 
aggravated and deterrence damages.  That’s because when there is a 
vivid injury to one’s personal dignity, it is less likely that the defendant 
will escape having to compensate the plaintiff for the harm.  For ex-
ample, defamation might warrant aggravated damages, but, because 
of its public features, it is unlikely that deterrence damages would be 
appropriate, unless the plaintiff could show a strong likelihood that 
the defendant would not have to pay in full for the harm that the de-
fendant caused. 
5.  Standard of Review for Aggravated Damages 
To the extent that a jurisdiction characterizes aggravated damages 
as serving a truly compensatory or reparative role, these damages, like 
deterrence damages, should not be viewed as subject to the height-
ened review in federal cases called for by the Court in Cooper Indus-
tries.111  Rather, aggravated damages should be subject to the same 
kind of review applied to other damages designed to compensate a 
plaintiff’s injury.  That standard of review would not mean that due 
process review is unavailable.112  But it does suggest that judicial review 
of aggravated damages that go exclusively to the plaintiff should be 
somewhat deferential and thus similar to the judicial review extended 
to compensation for injuries generally.  And, of course, to the extent 
that aggravated damages are excessive because they seem to figure in 
amounts to noninjured parties, they ought to be subject to some of 
the same limits appearing in State Farm and Philip Morris:  namely, evi-
dence of harms to nonparties, especially outside the state, is only 
permitted if it helps prove and assess the nature and scope of the in-
111 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 
(2001) (requiring de novo review of the amount of punitive damages awarded in fed-
eral cases). 
112 And, of course, legislatures may decide to impose caps or multiplier limits on 
aggravated damages in the way that some jurisdictions do for other damages.  See Rus-
tad, supra note 29, at 1300 (listing different types of “tort reform”).  But see Markel, Re-
tributive Damages, supra note 1, at 330-32 (providing a critique of the use of caps and 
multipliers in various cases). 
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jury to the dignity of the plaintiff, and not if the evidence is used to 
punish the defendant based on harms to others or to regulate a de-
fendant’s out-of-state conduct.113
C.  A Pluralistic Extracompensatory Damages Scheme:  Applications 
As mentioned above, this Article endorses a pluralistic approach 
to extracompensatory damages.  In some situations, the retributive 
function of extracompensatory damages is appropriate, even when 
aggravated or deterrence damages are not.  Likewise, it may be the 
case that deterrence damages are warranted, even when aggravated or 
retributive damages are not.  (It is less likely that aggravated damages 
would be warranted in the absence of some amount of retributive 
damages since that which would insult the dignity of a plaintiff would 
also tend to register on the reprehensibility scale.)  And, of course, it 
might be that all three kinds of damages are warranted in a given case. 
How might such a trifurcated structure work?  It might be helpful 
to look at some of the fact patterns of major punitive damages cases to 
get a sense of how this structure would operate.  If we use the facts of 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill as an example, aggravated damages against 
the company would be unavailable since the conduct of the company 
was reckless regarding the harm caused114 and was not directed at any 
one individual or collective victim.  Exxon’s direct misconduct (inde-
pendent of vicarious liability for its drunk captain’s misconduct) grew 
out of its management’s knowing retention of an alcohol-abusing ship 
captain in a high-risk endeavor.115  This is not the kind of harm that 
would, in my view at least, trigger a need to compensate the injury to a 
particular plaintiff’s dignity.  As to deterrence damages, the operative 
question would be whether, and how likely, it is that Exxon would 
have escaped having to pay for the harm it caused to these plaintiffs.  
Because of the vividness and magnitude of the harm, as well as the ca-
113 This limited use of the evidence of wrongs to other persons makes sense in 
situations where the plaintiff needs to show that the misconduct in question was not an 
accident or mistake, but rather a malicious denigration of the plaintiff’s dignity interests. 
114 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 (2008). 
115 See In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004) (“Exxon 
officials knew that it was dangerous to have a captain with an alcohol problem com-
manding a supertanker . . . [and] knew that carrying huge volumes of crude oil 
through Prince William Sound was a dangerous business, yet they knowingly permitted 
a relapsed alcoholic to direct the operation of the Exxon Valdez . . . .”), vacated and re-
manded, 490 F.3d 1066 (2007), vacated and remanded sub nom., Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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pacity of the defendant to pay for the harm, it was unlikely that Exxon 
would not face suit for its misconduct, and thus deterrence damages 
would be inappropriate.  On the other hand, the recklessness of 
Exxon’s managerial misconduct would warrant some finding of rep-
rehensibility and therefore an award of retributive damages toward 
the low end of the scale.  If we assume, for sake of argument, that 
Exxon’s reprehensibility was a two on a scale of one to twenty (with 
twenty being the most reprehensible), and that a finding of two en-
tailed a one percent of net value penalty, then a multibillion dollar 
award in retributive damages against Exxon would not be inappropri-
ate under the retributive damages scheme.116  (Some might suggest 
that Exxon’s size is being taxed unfairly under this model.  I address 
this criticism at length in Retributive Damages.117)
By contrast, consider the facts in BMW v. Gore.  Dr. Gore sued 
BMW because BMW failed to disclose that it had repainted the car Dr. 
Gore purchased, in an effort to obscure the fact that the car had suf-
fered minor damage in the manufacturing or transportation proc-
ess.118  This nondisclosure was pursuant to a policy that was lawful in 
many states but not in Alabama, where Dr. Gore lived.119  Applying the 
pluralistic framework, we note first that because the economic harm 
that Dr. Gore endured was associated with the mass production of 
goods, there was no real individualized dignitary harm worth vindicat-
ing (assuming that the second limit on aggravated damages that I sug-
gested is applied120).  But because of the nondisclosure and the rela-
tively obscure nature of the harm, there was a relatively low likelihood 
that Dr. Gore—or others similarly positioned—would have discovered 
116 There are some interesting questions relating to time and punishment.  The 
penalty could be based on the net financial condition of the individual/entity at the 
time of the misconduct (adjusted for inflation) in order to deter the defendant from try-
ing to reengineer its finances to its apparent detriment at adjudication.  The goal be-
hind benchmarking the defendant’s value or financial condition this way is to ensure 
that the defendant is not penalized for growth or wealth independent of the tort.  On 
the other hand, if there is a reason to suspect that the defendant’s growth or current 
wealth is driven by the results of the underlying misconduct—say a person profits from 
wrongfully accessing another’s trade secrets—that would be a good reason for instead 
using the defendant’s financial condition at the time of adjudication, assuming it is 
higher than at the time of the commission of the tort. 
117 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 290-96. 
118 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563-64 (1996). 
119 See id. at 570-73. 
120 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
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the harm, suggesting a need for deterrence damages.121  As to retribu-
tive damages, the appropriate reprehensibility score would be quite 
low in BMW v. Gore because the nondisclosure of the policy regarding 
retouched cars was lawful in some jurisdictions and because BMW’s 
failure to disclose a material, but not life-threatening, fact about its 
cars should be viewed with disfavor but not serious outrage, moral or 
otherwise.122
Having explored the basic structure of a pluralistic approach to 
extracompensatory damages, let’s now turn to one of the most impor-
tant aspects of implementation:  whether and which procedural safe-
guards should attach and on what rationale. 
III. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS, PLURALISM, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As described earlier in Section I.B, the retributive damages struc-
ture already entails a number of limits on the amount of retributive 
damages that a defendant would face in any given case:  the guidelines 
and commentary would provide much more notice than currently ex-
ists in common law jurisdictions,123 while the use of a scale that tracks 
reprehensibility would reduce the arbitrariness of the punishments 
doled out to similarly situated defendants who commit the same mis-
conduct.  This Part examines, albeit in a relatively preliminary man-
ner, which additional safeguards may be warranted for “simple” civil 
121 Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 433-43 (2003) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how the defendant targeted the “‘weakest of the 
herd’—‘the elderly, the poor, and other consumers who are . . . most vulnerable to 
trickery and deceit,’” including persons like the Campbells and those “unlikely to de-
fend themselves” and therefore unlikely to take action that would force the defendant 
to compensate them). 
122 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1991), the de-
fendant was vicariously liable for the embezzlement of plaintiffs’ insurance payments, 
but the company also was on notice that it had a rogue agent, much like in Exxon.  The 
defendants in Haslip and Exxon could plausibly be said to have exercised manifestly 
insufficient care to ferret out misconduct by their agents.  However, those cases would 
warrant lower reprehensibility scores than the defendants in TXO Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), and State Farm, where the wrongs by the 
tortfeasors were purposeful and deceitful.  Those four cases involved economic torts, 
however, and should be considered less reprehensible than the misconduct perpe-
trated by the defendant in Philip Morris, where the defendant’s outrageous misconduct 
years ago effectively amounted to mass manslaughter. 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57 (proposing that states create guide-
lines that would allow juries to measure reprehensibility more objectively). 
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litigation involving the potential for retributive and nonretributive ex-
tracompensatory damages.124
Section A begins with some background to the debate over proce-
dural safeguards.  Some scholars think that punitive damages require 
virtually no procedural safeguards, while others argue that the full 
panoply of constitutional criminal procedural safeguards should ap-
ply.  Contrary to both views, I argue that the determination of whether 
and which procedural safeguards should apply depends on which 
purposes are being advanced.  I first detail the procedures that would 
be warranted for aggravated and deterrence damages, which are 
largely compensatory in nature and therefore require a less searching 
review for abuse.  Then, for cases involving retributive damages, I ar-
gue that an intermediate level of procedural safeguards is warranted. 
Section B applies this logic to a cluster of specific issues, including 
standards of proof, jury trial rights, access to counsel, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, bifurcated proceedings, standards of appel-
late review, and double jeopardy matters associated with exposure to 
multiple punishments for the same misconduct.  The double jeopardy 
discussion also examines the interactive effects that retributive dam-
ages should have vis-à-vis the criminal justice system. 
A.  The Debate over Punitive Damages and Procedural Safeguards 
1.  Some Background 
Few things have divided scholars of punitive damages law more 
than the issue of procedural safeguards and whether they are constitu-
tionally and normatively required.  Some scholars, such as Professors 
Galanter and Luban, argue that defendants in punitive damages cases 
warrant no additional procedural safeguards because the safeguards 
that the accused enjoy in criminal cases are to protect against govern-
mental, not private-party, overreach.125  On their view, criminal defen-
dants need additional procedural safeguards because of “two con-
cerns—-about the centralized power of the state and about state abuse 
of prisons and physical violence.”126  Because they believe that neither 
concern is implicated by punitive damages—actions for punitive dam-
ages are brought by private parties who cannot obtain relief in the 
124 For a discussion of safeguards primarily related to wrongs involving torts and 
complex litigation, see Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 9. 
125 Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1457-58. 
126 Id. at 1457. 
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form of physical punishment—there is no need for increased proce-
dural safeguards with respect to punitive damages claims.127
By contrast, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s efforts to regu-
late punitive damages under the Constitution over the last fifteen 
years, some scholars and courts maintain that punitive damages are 
improper either because or to the extent that they are being used to ad-
vance public goals such as retributive justice.128  Joining this chorus 
more recently, Professor Colby argues that using punitive damages to 
punish public wrongs violates procedural due process in the absence 
of the criminal procedural safeguards afforded under the Constitu-
tion.129  Colby’s view instead is that punitive damages are permitted 
under the Constitution only to vindicate the private wrong against the 
plaintiff and thus operate as a “form of legalized private revenge.”130
Additionally, as discussed earlier, Colby argues that extracompensa-
tory damages for the sake of cost internalization are constitutionally 
permissible, even after Philip Morris, so long as they are not deemed 
“punitive.”131  Using the nomenclature of this Article, Colby endorses 
both aggravated and deterrence damages as constitutionally permissi-
ble but views retributive damages as constitutionally problematic be-
cause they serve the public interest in retributive justice without all of 
the procedural protections that one receives in criminal cases. 
2.  Pluralism and Procedural Safeguards 
To my mind, both sets of views on the safeguards issue are mis-
guided because the answer to which procedural safeguards are consti-
127 Id. at 1457-58. 
128 See Grass, supra note 7 (concluding that punitive damages are penal in nature 
and therefore are essentially criminal law sanctions); Redish & Mathews, supra note 12 
(arguing that the seeking of punitive damages is, in effect, a state function that de-
mands constitutional protections); Wheeler, supra note 7 (contending that where the 
government authorizes private individuals to seek damages for the purposes of pun-
ishment—punitive damages—the Constitution requires that criminal law constitu-
tional protections apply); see also Colby, supra note 7, at 606 n.73 (providing citations to 
courts and commentators noting that defendants subject to punitive damages lack the 
protections provided in criminal trials). 
129 Colby, supra note 5, at 415-16. 
130 Id. at 396. In this respect, Professor Colby is basically embracing the approach 
endorsed by Professor Sebok, supra note 5. 
131 See Colby, supra note 5, at 396 (“Williams thus allows the states to address the 
underdeterrence concern by implementing the recommendation of law and econom-
ics scholars to create a category of extracompensatory damages designed to ensure op-
timal deterrence.”). 
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tutionally necessary and normatively desirable depends on which pur-
pose of punitive damages is being pursued. 
a.  Aggravated Damages and Deterrence Damages 
Earlier in Part II, I discussed the standard of review associated with 
both aggravated and deterrence damages.  That discussion foreshad-
ows the proper approach to thinking about procedural safeguards.  
Let’s start with aggravated damages, which, like compensatory dam-
ages, the plaintiff should be able to seek or forbear from seeking in 
trial, or settle privately without the regulation of the state.  The same 
power of the victim should apply to deterrence damages in a post–
Philip Morris world because the focus for such damages must train on 
the likelihood of the defendant’s evading compensating the plaintiff 
for the harm caused.  In both situations, the plaintiff has the right to 
seek payment from the defendant for the full harm that she caused to 
the plaintiff.  And because aggravated and deterrence damages are 
not assigned for the purpose of punishment, there would be little 
need for them to have procedural safeguards vastly different from 
those that should attach to cases in which only compensatory damages 
are sought.132
That does not mean that courts should not review the amount of 
aggravated or deterrence damages.  Cases like State Farm and Philip
Morris should still apply insofar as they provide assistance in limiting 
potential federalism concerns in cases involving the resolution of 
complex wrongdoing across jurisdictions.  In other words, those cases 
might still provide guidance on how to reduce the incidence of states’ 
using a tort plaintiff to regulate a defendant’s conduct in another 
state, especially when that conduct may be lawful.133  The Court would 
almost certainly want to ensure that suits involving aggravated and de-
terrence damages did not run afoul of this federalism principle. 
However, whether other constitutional restrictions apply to aggra-
vated damages is hard to say.  Professor Colby suggests that the Court 
might wish to apply all current punitive damages due process rules to 
132 Some scholars have questioned whether we in fact need more due process pro-
tection for the review of compensatory damages awards.  See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, 
Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
331 (2006) (arguing that constitutional due process constraints on punitive damages 
should also apply to pain and suffering damages). 
133 See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 21-25 (2004) (reading State Farm through a federalism lens and 
finding that the holding rests upon respect for state sovereignty). 
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aggravated damages.134  Professor Sebok, by contrast, is adamantly op-
posed to the use of the presumptive single-digit multiplier established 
in State Farm.135  My view is that review of aggravated damages should 
be relatively deferential, especially when the jury is informed about 
the nature and recipient of aggravated damages as compared to the 
nature and recipient of retributive damages.  That said, if aggravated 
damages were required (by courts or legislatures) to be set at a fixed 
ratio of compensatory damages, this requirement would logically trig-
ger the same inegalitarian and troubling effect of stating, in cases tied 
to variable economic losses, that an encroachment against a poor per-
son’s dignity is worth less than an encroachment upon a richer per-
son’s dignity.136  Using a multiplier approach would, in many cases in-
volving risk of injury, just exacerbate much of the extant arbitrariness 
in the context of compensatory damages.137
As to deterrence damages, the procedural safeguards that one 
might advocate would depend on one’s reading of Philip Morris.  Un-
der my view of Philip Morris, the permissible inquiry is limited to only 
the likelihood that the defendant won’t have paid compensation to 
the plaintiff in the case.138  That limit substantially reduces the scope 
of potential abuse by juries, especially in the simple litigation context 
and, accordingly, creates substantially less need to impose a very strin-
gent set of regulations or safeguards.  On the other hand, if Professor 
Colby is correct in his reading of Philip Morris, I would imagine that 
there would be a number of other procedural protections that a de-
fendant would plausibly desire and that the Court would apply.139  The 
134 See Colby, supra note 5, at 455-56 n.281.  Somewhat relatedly, Professor Romero 
argues that legislatures should impose limits on all punitive damages.  Leo M. Romero, 
Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality:  The Importance of Legislative 
Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109 (2008). 
135 See Sebok, supra note 5, at 1029 (describing the ratio rule as regrettable and 
lacking in principle). 
136 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 290-91 (explaining that such 
income-based practices undermine commitments to human equality). 
137 See Geistfeld, supra note 132, at 342 (noting that plaintiffs “with similar pain-
and-suffering injuries often are awarded significantly different amounts of damages”). 
138 For references to other scholars who share my view on Philip Morris’s implica-
tions, see Colby, supra note 5, at 469 n.337, and sources cited therein. 
139 Specifically I’d imagine that such a reading of Philip Morris would warrant ap-
plying the kind of searching appellate review that the Court employed in BMW v. Gore
and State Farm, though with less attention to concerns about reprehensibility and more 
focus on fidelity to the federalism and fair-notice concerns.  Colby himself is expressly 
noncommittal on what constitutional limits would apply to deterrence damages under 
this scenario.  Id. at 476 n.371.  If Professor Sharkey’s proposal for nonpunitive com-
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scope of such protections might draw inspiration from the discussion 
below regarding procedural safeguards for retributive damages. 
b.  Retributive Damages 
As to retributive damages, the questions about procedural safe-
guards are more complex.  Recall Colby’s view that “it is unconstitu-
tional to punish for public wrongs without criminal procedural safe-
guards.”140  By contrast, others like Galanter and Luban have argued 
that there really is no need to apply the procedural safeguards com-
monly used in criminal cases because, in punitive damages cases, it is a 
private party who is instigating the punishment against the defendant.141
How would these views apply to the proposed retributive damages 
framework?  Colby initially appears to dismiss my normative proposal 
as unconstitutional, based on the idea that retributive damages serve 
the public interest in retributive justice and yet are not criminal sanc-
tions.142  As I argue below, the mistake that Colby—along with oth-
ers143—makes is in concluding that punitive damages for public re-
tributive purposes cannot pass constitutional muster if they are 
designed to serve as an intermediate sanction that would be accom-
panied by a proportionate level of procedural protections.  For rea-
sons that follow from the “intermediate” nature of the sanction, Gal-
anter and Luban are also mistaken to shield punitive damages from 
increased scrutiny. 
pensatory societal damages is compatible with Philip Morris, then it is also a useful place 
to look for guidance on some of the constitutional issues regarding what I have called 
deterrence damages.  See Sharkey, supra note 5, at 428-40. 
140 Colby, supra note 5, at 469. 
141 Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1454-60. 
142 See Colby, supra note 5, at 445-46 (raising the concern that my view of retribu-
tive damages basically creates an end-run around the Constitution). 
143 See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 121 (Colo. 1884) (criticizing a judge’s pu-
nitive damages instructions to a jury on the grounds that, inter alia, “punishment by 
fine is inflicted” without the defendant being afforded the protections of criminal pro-
cedure); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891) (“It 
seems to us that there are many valid objections to interjecting into a purely civil ac-
tion the elements of a criminal trial, intermingling into a sort of a medley or legal 
jumble two distinct systems of judicial procedure.”); Grass, supra note 7 (arguing that 
punitive damages perform the same function as criminal law and therefore demand 
the same constitutional protections); Wheeler, supra note 7, at 322-51 (outlining the 
constitutional provisions suggesting that punitive damages should trigger the protec-
tions of criminal procedure). 
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i.  Colby’s Error 
The conclusion that Colby draws about my proposal is mistaken 
for two reasons.  First, it is wrong because retributive damages would 
do exactly what the Supreme Court thinks that punitive damages may 
lawfully do now:  serve as “quasi-criminal” sanctions to advance the 
public interest in retributive justice.144  Colby’s argument, notwith-
standing its ingenuity, is by today’s standards a radically external cri-
tique of the Supreme Court’s understanding of the goals achieved by 
punitive damages.  Indeed, from a constitutional perspective, my own 
account—proposing retributive damages as an intermediate sanc-
tion—demonstrates a far better “fit” with the Court’s own statements 
on punitive damages.  For decades now, the Supreme Court has de-
scribed punitive damages as “private fines levied by civil juries”145 that 
“advance governmental objectives” of retribution.146  This point of 
view found expression again in the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
in Exxon and Philip Morris.147  And, notwithstanding the quasi-criminal-
punishment nature of the punitive damages sanction and its further-
ance of retribution, the Court has repeatedly declined the invitation 
by defense counsel to insist upon any, let alone all, of the Constitu-
tion’s criminal procedural safeguards.  That seems an important, if 
not decisive, point as a matter of constitutional interpretation. 
Of course, Colby’s argument is not predicated on precedent so 
much as logic.  The basic idea shared by Colby and like-minded critics 
of punitive damages is that punitive damages levied in the public’s in-
terest are no different than criminal penalties and thus deserve the 
same safeguards that the Constitution affords in that context.  But a 
144 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 
(2001) (acknowledging that punitive damages have been labeled “quasi-criminal” (cit-
ing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991))); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating that punitive damages “punish reprehensible 
conduct” and “deter its future occurrence”). 
145 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. 
146 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
350); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
275 (1989) (“[P]unitive damages are imposed through the aegis of courts and serve to 
advance governmental interests . . . .”). 
147 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“The consensus 
today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution 
and deterring harmful conduct.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 
(2007) (“This Court has long made clear that ‘[p]unitive damages may properly be 
imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and 
deterring its repetition.’” (quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 
(1996))).
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problem with this line of argument is that it seems to assume that 
there is an identifiable and fixed basket of criminal procedural safe-
guards that applies to all cases of criminal punishment.148  The truth 
of the matter is more complex.  The Supreme Court and state legisla-
tures and courts have extensively scaled the amount and intensity of 
both constitutional and statutory procedural safeguards to the severity 
of the punishment.149  Importantly, under the Federal Constitution, a 
defendant facing the death penalty receives more protections than 
one facing incarceration.150  Similarly, a defendant facing six months 
148 After I showed Colby a draft of this paper, he revised his paper, supra note 5, to 
clarify that punitive damages for public wrongs (i.e., retributive damages) should re-
ceive only the amount of procedural protections that criminal fines receive, which is a 
more nuanced position than the claim that public-minded punitive damages require 
all procedural safeguards from the criminal context.  Importantly, Colby’s final posi-
tion is still different from mine.  I see retributive damages as a civil sanction that is 
qualitatively different from criminal penalties because such damages entail no result-
ing conviction, less of a stigma, and no intended collateral consequences.  Nonetheless, 
Colby sees such “retributive damages” as constitutionally equivalent to criminal fines. 
 Significantly, Colby is not alone in claiming that such retributive damages (or pub-
licly minded punitive damages) would likely equate to criminal penalties warranting 
criminal procedural safeguards.  See, e.g., Redish & Mathews, supra note 12, at 20 (“Fi-
nancial penalties imposed for no purpose other than to punish are appropriately cate-
gorized as coercive, just as imprisonment is.  This conclusion is reinforced by the sim-
ple fact that the same special constitutional protections apply in criminal cases seeking 
only the imposition of financial penalties as apply in cases in which imprisonment is at 
issue.”); Wheeler, supra note 7, at 337 (“Either the purpose of the sanction is punitive, 
in which case all of the procedural safeguards apply, or the purpose is not punitive, in 
which case none applies.”).  But these views are, to my mind, incorrect.  As illuminated 
in the text, there is no right to counsel for criminal fines, nor is there a right to a jury 
trial in that context.  See generally Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that 
counsel is only required where actual imprisonment results); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (holding that a jury trial is not constitutionally required for cases 
where the maximum penalty is incarceration of less than six months).  Moreover, these 
accounts similarly fail to contemplate the possibility, developed in the text, that re-
tributive damages could serve as a designated civil and intermediate sanction, thus 
warranting a smaller or otherwise different bundle of safeguards than would exist if 
criminal fines were applied. 
149 Some constitutional safeguards may also be scaled to the severity of the mis-
conduct involved.  See Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004) (outlining potential approaches to balancing the strength of 
constitutional protections against the crime that the government actor is seeking to 
prevent).
150 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(e) (3d ed. 
2008) (discussing special constitutional rules in the capital punishment context); Stuart 
P. Green, Rationing Criminal Procedure:  A Comment on Ashworth and Zedner, 2 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 53, 54 (2008) (“[D]efendants charged with capital offenses are entitled to addi-
tional protections not generally available to defendants in non-capital cases, including 
a bifurcated trial at which guilt and sentencing are decided separately, special jury se-
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or more in prison enjoys more constitutional protections than a de-
fendant facing less than six months.151  And a defendant receiving any 
incarceration receives more constitutional protections than one re-
ceiving a noncarceral sentence.152  This last point is particularly rele-
vant to retributive damages because criminal fines can be levied on 
someone without a right to appointed counsel or to a jury trial.153
Moreover, the Supreme Court has contracted the scope of a number 
of procedural safeguards in cases involving relatively minor crimes.154
Thus, if criminal fines can be levied without jury trials and coun-
sel, it should follow that the intentionally less severe penalty of re-
tributive damages could also have a different and perhaps smaller 
basket of procedural safeguards.  Remember that retributive damages 
are situated as an intermediate sanction falling on the civil side be-
tween criminal fines and compensatory damages.  Consequently, de-
terminations of retributive damages against someone would not serve 
as predicates for impeaching that person’s testimony in a future trial 
or as a basis for enhancing one’s punishment in a subsequent criminal 
trial for the same or different conduct.  Nor would they trigger any 
disqualifications professionally (e.g., debarment) or civically (e.g., jury 
service or voting).  With retributive damages cases, the defendant 
faces no collateral consequences.155  Moreover, the condemnatory 
stigma associated with retributive damages is designed to be interme-
lection procedures, special rules regarding the introduction of aggravating and miti-
gating evidence, and an automatic right of appeal.”). 
151 See generally 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 150, § 1.8(c) (discussing special consti-
tutional rules applying only to crimes involving a certain period of time in prison). 
152 See Scott, 440 U.S. 367 (holding that defendants may not be imprisoned absent 
the enjoyment of a right to counsel but that no right to counsel exists for less severe 
punishments); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (guaranteeing a jury trial only for 
nonpetty criminal offenses); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351 (1885) (requir-
ing a grand jury indictment for crimes punishable by imprisonment); 1 LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 150 (discussing special constitutional rules applying only to crimes involving 
some time in prison). 
153 Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74 (appointed counsel); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 
U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ( jury trial); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159 ( jury trial). 
154 See Green, supra note 150, at 57 n.13 (citing cases where, inter alia, the Court 
either has given the government more leeway in construing what counts as a search or 
seizure in cases involving relatively insignificant offenses or has limited the obligation 
to read a defendant her Miranda rights in minor cases). 
155 See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences 
of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002) (providing an overview of 
the range of collateral consequences). 
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diate in nature.156  The defendant will not be branded “a criminal” 
with a conviction that trails forever after.  These aspects of retributive 
damages distinguish them from criminal fines and justify their status 
as a civil penalty, notwithstanding the fact that they are intended as a 
sociolegal rebuke for wrongful misconduct and carry with them a pen-
alty meant to advance a public interest.157
156 Cf. Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 408, 411-12 (1967) (arguing that the stigma from a criminal fine is more ap-
parent than the reputational loss from punitive damages even though the amount of a 
punitive damages award might exceed that of a fine for comparable conduct).  Admit-
tedly, some criminal offenses are “strict liability” in nature and thus might not be 
viewed as conveying as much condemnation as a retributive damages finding that says 
that one acted with malice or recklessness, but the broader point still holds that crimi-
nal sanctions are generally viewed as more condemnatory than those currently associ-
ated with punitive damages (or retributive damages, per this proposal). 
 If retributive damages are truly going to be intermediate in nature, then jurisdic-
tions adopting retributive damages schemes may also have to adjust fines in the crimi-
nal context to always be some amount greater than the amount awarded in retributive 
damages for similar misconduct.  But it is not clear that a conventional fine needs to 
be higher than a retributive damages award in order to signal that it is a steeper pen-
alty; the mere fact of a criminal conviction (and the process leading to and conse-
quences flowing from that conviction) may do the work of ensuring that the social 
meaning of a fine remains more distinctively condemnatory than the intermediate 
sanction associated with a retributive damages award. 
157 The Supreme Court extends great deference to a legislative determination that 
a penalty is civil or criminal, but occasionally, a multifactor test is used to illuminate 
(but not decide dispositively) whether a civil law intends and effects a criminal pun-
ishment instead: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether 
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradi-
tional aims of punishment-–retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior 
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which 
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears ex-
cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the 
inquiry . . . . 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted).  Un-
der this test, retributive damages would likely qualify as some form of punishment, but 
they do not involve the “affirmative disability or restraint” typically associated with 
criminal punishment through incarceration.  See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 
104 (1997).  Nonetheless, retributive damages do share many characteristics with 
criminal sanctions:  they are only assessed upon a finding of malice or recklessness; 
they promote the distinct end of retribution; they involve conduct that is frequently 
the trigger of criminal sanction; and they have no alternative purpose as compensa-
tion, first, because the structure for extracompensatory damages specifically contem-
plates the plaintiff’s receiving compensation for traditional and aggravated damages, 
and second, because the only money that a defendant pays in retributive damages to 
the plaintiff, per my proposal, is a small “reward” (not compensation) for channeling 
awareness of undetected misconduct into the public eye.  With all of that said, in Hud-
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In short, under the Constitution and by widespread legislative and 
state judicial practice, procedural protections are largely scaled ac-
cording to the severity of the penalty.158  Once this pattern is recog-
nized, its implications for a noncriminal publicly minded penalty must 
be appreciated.  As indicated earlier, the amount and nature of the 
procedural safeguards should reflect the intermediate nature of the 
sanction.  Saying the word “intermediate” does not tell us, of course, 
where exactly on the continuum between compensatory damages and 
criminal fines to draw the line, but the safeguards should be enough 
to ensure additional confidence in the verdict than what would typi-
cally result from attempts to force the defendant to internalize her 
costs and to compensate her victims while still not equaling the 
amount required for a traditional criminal prosecution involving a 
fine.  Moreover, if we want to remain faithful to a retributive vision of 
fair, accurate, modest, and humane punishment, it is important to 
show not only why Colby (and his like-minded predecessors) are 
wrong, but also why Galanter and Luban are mistaken—for taking the 
opposite view that effectively no additional procedural safeguards are 
necessary or desirable for punitive damages imposed for public re-
tributive ends.159
son the Court nevertheless found that the civil penalties of both fines and debarment 
were not sufficiently “criminal” in nature to trigger the double jeopardy protection 
against multiple criminal punishments for the same conduct.  Id. at 105.  If Hudson is 
still good law, retributive damages would permissibly operate as only a moderate form 
of civil sanction for several reasons:  first, the legislature’s explicit characterization of 
the sanction as civil will carry great weight; second, the liability for retributive damages 
will not be equivalent to the status of a conviction; and third, per my proposal, they 
would not be intended to trigger any collateral consequences.  For an earlier instruc-
tive overview of punitive-civil-sanctions jurisprudence focusing primarily on agency-
initiated civil punishment, see Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middle-
ground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1800 (1992).  See also Jona-
than I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil 
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:  Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-
Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991). 
158 See 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 150, § 1.8(c); see also Mann, supra note 157, at 
1870 (noting the constitutional idea that “the more severe the sanction, the more the 
procedure must protect against the sanctioning of the innocent”). 
159 See Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1461 (“The appropriate measure to con-
trol punitive damages consists of a requirement that juries provide a plausible rationale 
for the size of punitive awards, coupled with a large dollop of judicial deference to the 
retributive sentiments jurors express in those awards.”). 
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ii.  Galanter and Luban’s Errors 
Recall that Galanter and Luban argue that virtually no safeguards 
are warranted because punitive damages involve privately instigated 
lawsuits and no incarceration or state violence.160  To the extent that 
their second point about prisons and violence is true,161 the point 
stems from a larger concern that requires articulation.  With due re-
spect to Galanter and Luban, the reason to consider procedural safe-
guards is not simply that we’re concerned with limiting the centralized 
power of the state, but also that we’re largely concerned with what the 
state may do with that power.  Indeed, framed this way, Galanter and 
Luban’s concern about state abuse of prisons and physical violence 
makes more sense—it is not that we’re unconcerned with violence or 
prisons as such, but rather that we’re properly worried about the 
state’s use of coercive measures against individuals’ autonomous 
choices more generally. 
And that fear of state coercion (and condemnation) makes re-
tributive damages eligible for concerns about due process, just as any 
other sanction that works a coercive condemnatory deprivation.  To 
be sure, the intensity of the concern will vary, but the fact of concern 
that the penalty might be abusively or arbitrarily imposed remains.  
Nonetheless, Galanter and Luban state that “[t]he most important 
point is that punitive damages are sought by individual plaintiffs:  they 
involve a totally decentralized use of the legal system to impose pun-
ishment, and they raise none of the classical liberal worries about ag-
grandizing state power.”162
To my mind, the problem with Galanter and Luban’s argument is 
that they fail to separate sufficiently the functions of detection, prose-
cution, adjudication, and punishment.  In any punitive damages 
claim, it is still the court that adjudicates and the state that enforces 
the judgment against the defendant, regardless of who detects and 
160 Id. at 1457-58; cf. Darren Weirnick, Punitive Damages Against Corporations:  
Functionalist Retributivism (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(“Because punitive damages exact only monetary penalties and are filed by private 
plaintiffs, it is not at all obvious that a higher standard of proof, or constitutional 
rights . . . should apply even when individuals are the defendants in punitive damages 
cases. . . . When corporations are the defendants, the parallels are even less obvious.”). 
161 The violence might also apply to criminal fines or forfeitures if the defendant’s 
noncompliance triggers a court’s contempt—the same outcome that might occur in 
the context of civil punitive damages. 
162 Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1457-58. 
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prosecutes the claim.163  And from the defendant’s perspective, she 
will surely observe that abusive awards of retributive damages deplete 
her bank account much the way that abusive criminal fines do, mak-
ing the purported “decentralization” of punishment through punitive 
damages of dubious significance,164 and of even more dubious signifi-
cance when the government sues for punitive damages in its own 
right.165  A defendant reasonably wants procedural safeguards to avoid 
the mistaken assignation of censure and accompanying harsh treat-
ment, regardless of whether the person who detects the underlying 
wrong is a public prosecutor or a private plaintiff.166  Thus, the scope 
of the protections we want does not really turn on who is the source of 
information regarding the misconduct so much as on the nature of 
the sanction itself.  Galanter and Luban make the contrary claim but 
never convincingly explain why. 
163 A judge presides over and rules on matters of law (and, in some cases, fact), 
and appellate courts subject damages awards to searching review.  Moreover, it is the 
state that enforces the judgment against the losing party.  So the state’s role is by no 
means insignificant or radically different from the role that the state plays in a criminal 
law case; this overlap was even more pronounced during the hundreds of years in 
which private litigants prosecuted criminal cases and would even capture the fines im-
posed against a defendant.  See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
127-28 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining the historical role of private parties 
in the criminal justice system). 
164 See Zipursky, supra note 5, at 146 (“If the private plaintiffs are really delegees of 
state power, then the awesome power of the state is being used, albeit in a decentral-
ized way.”). 
165 E.g., United States v. Ely, 142 F.3d 1113, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the government could still criminally prosecute the defendants, even though the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC), acting as receiver for a failed bank, had 
already sued for punitive damages). 
166 An analogy might be found by reference to privacy intrusions.  If a private in-
vestigator for a plaintiff comes rummaging (with no notice or temporary authoriza-
tion) through my garage, I am reasonably upset or resentful.  I can imagine I may rea-
sonably be even more upset when the government is the intruder instead of a private 
investigator for a third party–-after all, the government purports to act in my name.  
But to the extent that my choice is to shield something from exposure to public view, 
the legitimacy of the interest that I have in keeping that information private doesn’t 
hinge simply on whether the intruder wears a government badge.  Galanter and Luban 
seem to think that the Bill of Rights is normatively relevant only in actions where the 
state is also the prosecutor (and not just the punisher) and they rely for support on the 
expressly political fears that classical liberals had about the government’s capacity to 
use its prosecutorial force to marginalize or attack political dissidents.  Galanter & 
Luban, supra note 3, at 1457.  That might be a basis for limiting the government’s in-
vestigative powers through something like the Fourth Amendment, but it is not a basis 
for limiting the reach of procedural safeguards during trial or punishment where the 
fear that a person has about abuse is predicated on what the government does as judge 
or enforcer of punishment. 
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iii.  Why an Intermediate Compromise? 
Contra Galanter and Luban, we can see why some procedural 
safeguards are necessary:  because in the context of retributive dam-
ages, the state has the power, through its courts and enforcement 
agencies, to impose a coercive condemnatory sanction.  In other 
words, many of the same concerns of error and abuse that motivate 
procedural safeguards in the criminal context also arise in the retribu-
tive damages context, though to a lesser extent because the penalties 
and consequences are less condemnatory and severe.  On the other 
hand, contra Colby, retributive damages awards (unlike criminal pun-
ishments) bring no designation of the defendant as a criminal who 
will subsequently endure a welter of collateral consequences.167  Cor-
respondingly, under current law, a defendant may be found liable for 
punitive damages on weaker standards of proof than if convicted for a 
crime; moreover, defendants in a civil case enjoy no privilege against 
self-incrimination vis-à-vis punitive damages liability, no constitutional 
right to appointed counsel, and no constitutional right against double 
jeopardy. 
These differences give us a compelling reason to accept the desig-
nation of the retributive damages sanction as civil and intermediate.  
Indeed, it makes further sense to disallow certain safeguards precisely 
because the defendant enjoys various benefits in the civil context that 
she does not in the criminal context.  In the criminal context, for ex-
ample, the government can hold a defendant for pre-trial detention 
or make her pay bail; civil plaintiffs lack this power.  Moreover, in 
criminal cases, the government can also gain pre-trial discovery 
against a defendant through grand jury investigations that seek testi-
mony and documents from others without the defendant’s enjoying 
reciprocity against the government.  Because the defendant enjoys 
these advantages in the civil case, it makes sense to distinguish, from a 
constitutional and normative perspective, those scenarios where society 
seeks to punish a defendant through a moderate civil penalty and 
those where society wants to punish through a criminal penalty by 
167 I should note that collateral consequences are sometimes products of regula-
tory decisions as opposed to “punitive” ones, and in some contexts, they appear as a 
result of proof of misconduct, not of conviction.  However, the dominant recent ap-
proach to the imposition of collateral consequences is to look at the defendant’s con-
victions, rather than other sources of evidence regarding the defendant’s misconduct.  
See Gabriel J. Chin, Are Collateral Sanctions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?:  The Case of 
Abortion Doctors, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1685 (2003). 
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bringing the full force of social condemnation associated with those 
punishments. 
In what follows, I address (albeit in an admittedly preliminary 
fashion) which additional procedural safeguards are appropriate in a 
retributive damages case (involving simple litigation).168  Although 
“the full panoply” of criminal procedural safeguards does not consti-
tutionally apply,169 I explain why some heightened level of safeguards 
is normatively desirable.  In short, for retributive damages we should 
strive to exhibit more concern for Type I error reduction than is war-
ranted in suits involving mere compensatory damages but less concern 
for Type I error reduction than is warranted in criminal prosecutions 
of defendants in cases involving fines. 
B.  Retributive Damages as Intermediate Sanction:  Applying the 
Logic to Procedural Safeguards 
This Section contends that certain legislative safeguards should be 
applied to retributive damages understood as an intermediate sanc-
tion.  Before proceeding further, it bears emphasis that Retributive 
Damages already provides a number of limits regarding the amount of 
retributive damages.170  The limits that follow would stand in addition 
to the ones already discussed. 
1.  Standard of Proof 
Under the traditional rule, punitive damages in a civil suit can be 
awarded if the plaintiff is able to establish a defendant’s liability for 
punitive damages (specifically the heightened mens rea of reckless-
ness or malice) by a mere preponderance of evidence.171  This stands 
in contrast to the criminal cases that require evidence proving the de-
168 See also Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 9 (addressing the appropriate 
safeguards for complex litigation). 
169 Cf. Sebok, supra note 5, at 1002 (discussing the claim that the full panoply of 
constitutional safeguards should apply to punitive damages). 
170 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 287-89 (calling for sentencing 
guidelines and commentaries to inform the finding of a defendant’s reprehensibility 
on a scale, which would ensure that determinations of the amount of retributive dam-
ages are not made on an ad hoc basis, jury by jury). 
171 See id. at 250-51 (noting this traditional rule but also explaining that most states 
now require proof of mens rea by clear and convincing evidence).  The Supreme 
Court has not yet required a heightened standard of proof for punitive damages.  See
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 n.11 (1991). 
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fendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.172  Over the last two dec-
ades, many states have adopted the intermediate standard of “clear 
and convincing” evidence to govern the awards of punitive damages.173
The embrace of a heightened, yet still intermediate, standard of 
proof (something like clear and convincing evidence) is more consis-
tent with the view that retributive damages are an intermediate sanc-
tion that warrant an intermediate evidentiary standard of proof.  More 
importantly, it is also consistent with the retributivist concern for strik-
ing the correct balance between Type I and Type II errors.  As a sanc-
tion’s severity increases, we worry more about its misapplication.  The 
clear and convincing standard will theoretically create more Type I er-
rors than “beyond a reasonable doubt” but fewer Type I errors than 
“preponderance of the evidence.”174
Notwithstanding the views of those who, like Galanter and Luban, 
believe that “preponderance of the evidence” is sufficient,175 this re-
cent trend toward “clear and convincing” makes good sense once re-
tributive damages are understood as an intermediate sanction to ad-
vance the public interest in retributive justice.  However, as 
mentioned in Part II, where the awards to the plaintiff are simply de-
signed to ensure full cost internalization by the defendant in the form 
of aggravated and deterrence damages, a preponderance of the evi-
dence should be sufficient even though jurisdictions do no grievous 
wrong in asking for heightened review as well.176
2.  Availability and Standard of Appellate Review 
In order to facilitate notice to citizens and evenhandedness across 
cases, my retributive damages proposal involves a rebuke by the public 
172 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (confirming that due process man-
dates the beyond a reasonable doubt standard). 
173 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES, § 5.3 
(H)(2) (5th ed. 2005).  One state, Colorado, requires juries to find that the proof es-
tablishes culpability beyond a reasonable doubt for punitive damages to attach.  COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2008). 
174 Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (discussing the use of the 
clear and convincing evidence standard for civil cases involving the potential imposi-
tion of stigma or deprivation of liberty).  Whether all jurors differentiate among the 
different standards is hard to know, but inasmuch as it is a problem, clear instructions 
about the different standards along with examples may help. 
175 See Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1459-60; Weirnick, supra note 160. 
176 Those who view aggravated damages as “private punishment,” rather than as 
compensation for uncompensated injuries to dignity, may welcome a higher standard 
of proof, though they have not all said as much. 
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to be made consistent with the scale of punishment provided by the 
sentencing guidelines and commentaries.  Because of the public na-
ture and the significance of the interest being vindicated, appellate 
courts should apply a more searching standard of review (de novo or 
“hard look”) to the defendant’s score on the reprehensibility scale 
discussed in Section I.B.  Since the determination is chiefly a legal 
one—whether the finding is consistent with the scale established by 
the legislature—appellate courts are institutionally competent to as-
sert their interpretive authority.  On the other hand, appellate court 
deference should extend to the findings of fact that serve as a predi-
cate for the reprehensibility determination.  Those underlying facts—
e.g., the amount of money involved in the fraud or whether the de-
fendant lied to the plaintiff—should be reviewed for clear error.  Ap-
pellate court deference would also properly extend to the factual de-
termination, if necessary, of the defendant’s financial condition or 
value, as well as determinations of reasonable lawyers’ fees or the de-
fendant’s net gains exceeding compensatory damages.  These are all 
fact-bound matters that invite deference to the initial factfinder’s rela-
tively “local” knowledge.177  Thus, a differentiated standard of review is 
required for the component parts of a retributive damages award. 
By contrast, as mentioned earlier, aggravated and deterrence 
damages are really wrinkles associated with ensuring that the defen-
dant internalizes the full costs of its activities to the extent consistent 
with Philip Morris.  Those damage awards should be reviewed deferen-
tially by appellate courts since they involve basically factual matters 
that juries or trial court judges are in an institutionally superior place 
to make vis-à-vis appellate courts.  Here the standard might be some-
thing like the following:  could a rational factfinder reasonably deter-
mine the amount of (aggravated/deterrence) damages that the lower 
court (or jury) found here? 
3.  Is a Unanimous Jury Required? 
a.  Judges or Juries 
In most jurisdictions, juries are charged with determining the 
amount of punitive damages.178  In a few states, such as Connecticut 
177 See generally Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 
1085-90 (2008) (analyzing epistemic superiority as the basis for deference). 
178 See Rustad, supra note 29, at 1305 (labeling as “radical” the idea of allowing 
judges to assess punitive damages). 
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and Kansas, juries decide whether to award punitive damages and 
judges decide the quantum of such damages in separate proceedings 
considering various aggravating and mitigating factors.179  Some tort 
scholars have supported this division of labor as a rationalizing force, 
while others have disagreed because they view the jury’s assessment of 
punitive damages as a historical legal right that facilitates a popular 
check on powerful and wealthy individuals or entities.180
Truthfully, the account of retributive damages that I defend is less 
concerned with the identity of the decision maker than with the ac-
curacy, modesty, and fairness of such decisions.  My proposal com-
ports with either juries or judges, or both, playing a role.  From a Type 
I or Type II error-reduction perspective, there seems to be relatively 
little added value in having a jury decide the defendant’s reprehensi-
bility score, since that score is, by hypothesis, determined in large 
measure by reference to judgments that the polity has made regarding 
reprehensibility. 
Having a jury involved, however, may have other benefits.  First, 
the judgment of one’s “peers” rendered on behalf of the state may 
enhance the probability that the defendant will internalize the con-
demnation issued through retributive damages.  Second, in a legal 
culture where the jury’s role is viewed as significantly involved in the 
meaning of punishment,181 a defendant may decide that making a case 
before a jury of one’s peers is vitally important.  These two considera-
tions, of course, stand in some tension with each other.  The first 
point of view suggests requiring that the jury determine punitive dam-
ages in order to “enrich” the social norm that retributive damages in-
179 See id. at 1305-06. 
180 Compare David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1320-22 (1976) (suggesting that the trial judge, rather than the 
jury, should measure awards of punitive damages, in order to protect against excessive 
awards), with Partlett, supra note 38, at 1411-12 (defending a robust role for juries in 
punitive damages cases on the basis of republican theory), and Wenger & Hoffman, 
supra note 37, at 1148 (arguing that juries should continue to measure punitive dam-
ages awards). 
181 See Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction:  Recognizing the Jury as 
Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 96-108 (arguing that criminal juries already play 
a significant role, through their determinations of guilt or innocence, in the punish-
ment process and that this role in punishment should be made more explicit); Richard 
E. Myers II, Requiring a Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009) (proposing, as a means of reinforcing criminal law’s condemnatory role, a re-
quirement that juries vote to “censure” a defendant before convicting her). 
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volve a condemnation by one’s peers on behalf of the state.182  The 
second point, however, entails giving the defendant a waivable right to 
a jury trial. 
As noted in the previous Section, however, defendants do not en-
joy an unfettered constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal cases.  
Though state constitutions or statutes might afford more rights, the 
federal constitutional floor is established when the offense is punish-
able by more than six months in prison or when the offense bears 
other indicia of being deemed constitutionally “serious.”183  In civil 
cases, a defendant in federal court has a right under the Seventh 
Amendment to a jury trial for cases involving issues that were triable 
under common law in 1791.184  But the federal right is not incorpo-
rated against the states except in cases involving a federally created 
right.
That rule should leave states a good bit of discretion, constitu-
tionally speaking.  From a normative point of view, the retributive 
damages aspect of the extracompensatory damages is an intermediate 
civil punishment, so it is not unreasonable to err on the side of the de-
fendant’s preferences.  This vector is also consistent with, though not 
entailed by, the normative justifications for the Supreme Court’s hold-
ings in Apprendi v. New Jersey185 and Blakely v. Washington.186  The re-
tributive damages scheme contemplates a jury’s making the deci-
sions—with respect to the reprehensibility of the conduct and the 
financial condition of the defendant—that are critical to the maxi-
mum amount of penalty that the defendant will face.  But those de-
fendants who fear “grabby” juries with redistributive inclinations 
182 This view might underlie the rule adopted in federal criminal cases that re-
quires both the prosecution and the court to consent to a defendant’s waiver of a jury 
trial.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). 
183 Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989); see also United 
States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1993) (per curiam) (holding that an offense was 
not constitutionally “serious” even though it carried a penalty of up to six months’ in-
carceration, a $5,000 fine, a five-year term of probation as an alternative to incarcera-
tion, and other penalties). 
184 See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 
573-74 (1990) (holding that the monetary damages sought were “the type of relief tra-
ditionally awarded by courts of law” and that the Seventh Amendment therefore cre-
ated an entitlement to a jury trial). 
185 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  The Apprendi Court held that, outside of a prior con-
viction, any factual finding that increases the statutory-maximum penalty for an offense 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
186 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).  Blakely affirmed and extended Apprendi’s holding. 
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should be able to rely on judges for a (possibly more) impartial de-
termination of their liability. 
It goes without saying that it would be somewhat odd if a state ex-
tended a jury right to a defendant in a retributive damages case, but 
not to one in a criminal case with comparatively low stakes; nonethe-
less, that would be a permissible choice under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
b.  Unanimity 
According to some scholars, one of the safeguards that a publicly 
minded retributive damages sanction should entail is a right to a 
unanimous jury.187  But this is an odd assertion.  As is true of the right 
to counsel, or even a right to a jury at all, there is no unwavering con-
stitutional commitment to a unanimous verdict in a criminal trial.  In 
Apodaca v. Oregon188 and Johnson v. Louisiana,189 the Supreme Court 
permitted states to punish someone on the basis of 10-2 and 9-3 ver-
dicts, respectively, in noncapital cases.  The Court has also allowed 
smaller juries to decide other important criminal cases involving in-
carceration as a punishment.190  Thus, there is no constitutional basis 
for assuming that impositions of retributive damages require a right to 
a jury verdict, let alone a right to a unanimous jury verdict. 
From a normative perspective, rules requiring unanimity for ac-
quittals are problematic for a variety of reasons and therefore should 
not be adopted.191  Unanimity rules for determinations of criminal 
guilt make more sense, much like the rationales for the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt rule for the standard of proof.  But for the intermedi-
ate sanction of retributive damages, a supermajority of the sort per-
mitted in criminal cases by the Supreme Court would be an 
appropriate compromise between reducing Type I and Type II errors. 
187 See, e.g., Grass, supra note 7, at 243 n.13. 
188 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
189 406 U.S. 356 (1972). 
190 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (holding that a six-person jury is 
sufficient).  The Court did later clarify that, in cases involving nonpetty crimes, if a six-
person jury were used, it would have to reach a unanimous verdict to convict.  Burch v. 
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979). 
191 See Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 142-45 (2006) (arguing against “the obsession with unanimity” 
in the criminal justice system’s decision rules). 
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4.  Procedural Bifurcation 
With respect to retributive damages, defendants in jury trials 
should have a waivable right to bifurcate the evidence associated with 
their financial condition from the evidence associated with liability.  
This rule would preserve the factfinder’s ability to make a determina-
tion of the defendant’s liability and reprehensibility without the “pol-
luting” effects associated with evidence of one’s financial condition.  
Conversely, during the liability phase, plaintiffs should be able to 
thwart the introduction by the defense of any evidence of their al-
leged penury to try to generate sympathy from the jury.  These rules 
would facilitate the reduction of Type I errors without the concomi-
tant cost of raising Type II errors. 
Moreover, in some cases, defendants might wish to trifurcate the 
proceedings among (1) basic liability and compensatory damages, (2) 
liability for retributive damages, and (3) the defendant’s financial con-
dition.  To my mind, there is nothing wrong with this division, but it 
may be unnecessary if the proof that shows the need for liability and 
compensatory damages also shows with clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant acted maliciously or recklessly. 
Courts might decide, upon a defendant’s motion, to have the jury 
hear evidence for aggravated or deterrence damages at the same time 
as the proof offered for retributive damages, since, in many cases, evi-
dence of malice is relevant to both retributive and aggravated dam-
ages and evidence of concealment is relevant to all three kinds of ex-
tracompensatory damages.  And, of course, defendants can always 
stipulate to some matters and litigate others if that would resolve dis-
putes more expeditiously. 
5.  Confrontation of Adverse Witnesses and Compulsory Process 
As a general matter, one doesn’t see too much litigation in puni-
tive damages cases over the defendant’s rights to confront adverse 
witnesses or to compel favorable witnesses to appear before the court.  
One reason is the language of the Sixth Amendment, which restricts 
these rights to “criminal prosecutions.”192  But the other reason for 
this litigation void is that the defendant already has access to these wit-
nesses in civil tort actions.  With respect to Confrontation Clause is-
sues, the plaintiff is usually the adverse witness against a punitive dam-
192 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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ages defendant, and the plaintiff is typically quite keen to testify at 
trial.  If the plaintiff testifies, the defendant has the ability to cross-
examine. 
Though it needs no further argument, the ability to defend 
against a sanction imposed by the state requires that a defendant have 
the right to present a defense on her behalf, both by examining the 
weaknesses of hostile testimony and bringing her own favorable wit-
nesses and evidence to light.  To the extent that this rule requires spe-
cial articulation, defendants should be given the requisite assurances. 
6.  Access to Counsel 
Civil defendants enjoy no constitutional right to appointed coun-
sel, as the Supreme Court has bestowed that right only upon criminal 
defendants who have prison time imposed on them.193  Because a de-
fendant is not constitutionally entitled to counsel if she faces only a 
criminal fine, there is no precedential need to extend counsel to de-
fendants facing the less severe sanction of retributive damages.  But 
states and Congress are free to go above the floor provided by the U.S. 
Constitution.  As with jury trials, however, it would be odd for a state 
to provide appointed counsel for retributive damages while not doing 
so for criminal cases involving only fines. 
As a normative matter, whether to have a right to appointed coun-
sel for retributive damages raises interesting questions.  After all, there 
is a long-running dispute over whether defense lawyers protect inno-
cent persons from mistaken punishment or simply make it easier for 
more offenders to escape condign punishment.194  But the answer to 
this virtually irresolvable empirical question is not readily ascertained, 
in part out of a commitment to the idea that if a person was legally 
found not to have committed any illegal wrongdoing, then no adverse 
inferences ought to be drawn against her.  The Supreme Court has 
long grappled with this trade-off in this and other contexts, though 
193 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that counsel is only 
required under the Constitution if the defendant had “actual imprisonment” im-
posed).  For the most part, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in the 
civil context, but some states do provide appointed counsel in some civil contexts, such 
as where indigent parents face termination of their parental rights.  E.g., In re K.L.J., 
813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991). 
194 Compare, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (describing con-
tributions of lawyers to truth seeking), with WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE:
BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 75-79 (1985) (describing Bentham’s view that lawyers impede 
the factfinding mission of courts). 
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not altogether satisfactorily, often simply emphasizing the Blackstone-
inspired preference for reducing errors involving false convictions 
over false acquittals.195
Access to appointed counsel is now regarded primarily as an unal-
loyed good in our legal culture instead of the more mixed assessment 
extended to lawyers a couple centuries back, when their presence was 
viewed with greater suspicion and as an intrusion into the achieve-
ment of a just outcome.196  If it turns out that the modern view is cor-
rect, and that lawyers are in fact a boon to truth, then the failure of 
the criminal justice system to provide counsel to all indigent defen-
dants is one that should be repaired, not reproduced, in the context of 
retributive damages. 
A more modest measure might involve legislatures authorizing 
and funding systems of indigent defense for defendants in retributive 
damages cases, but only after a court’s staff attorney or judicial officer 
performs some screening of the plaintiff’s complaint.  This measure 
might be more consistent with the view that when there are trade-offs 
to be made, society may wish to consider the Laplace-Nozick principle 
that seeks to minimize the aggregate of the risk of false liability de-
terminations (or in the criminal context, false determinations of guilt) 
and the risk of being a victim of serious wrongdoing.197
A decidedly worse mode of reasoning would be to deny all defen-
dants publicly funded counsel simply on the grounds that judgment-
proof defendants can always be prosecuted in a criminal court.  This 
argument problematically raises concerns that the poverty of a defen-
dant provides a reason to bring the power of the state and the con-
195 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (“[I]t is better that ten guilty 
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (relying on the “fundamental value determination of 
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go 
free”).
196 See, e.g., TWINING, supra note 194, at 75 (identifying, as one of Bentham’s pri-
mary concerns, “the sinister interests of the legal fraternity”). 
197 See Larry Laudan, The Social Contract and the Rules of Trial:  Re-Thinking 
Procedural Rules 31-43 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1075403 (noting that the social contract requires the state to re-
duce aggregate risk under the Laplace-Nozick thesis).  But see Posting of Dan Markel to 
PrawfsBlawg, “Legal Epistemology Is Ninety Per Cent Quantitative.  The Other Half Is 
Qualitative.,” http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/08/legal-epistemol.html 
(Aug. 10, 2008) (urging greater granularity in the comparisons that Laudan makes and 
more mindfulness toward the potentially unjust distributive patterns associated with 
who bears the consequences of tradeoffs between Type I and Type II error-reduction 
strategies).
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comitant collateral consequences of convictions against that defen-
dant, whereas a wealthier defendant might be able to persuade a 
prosecutor to forbear from subsequent prosecution by pointing to a 
prior intermediate sanction through retributive damages. 
As a practical matter, failure to provide counsel to indigent de-
fendants facing retributive damages may not arouse any sense of ur-
gency.  After all, a civil defendant who cannot afford counsel often 
lacks the deep pockets that motivate a plaintiff to seek substantial 
compensatory damages.  Moreover, if a defendant is poor and unin-
sured, the plaintiff will often have difficulty finding counsel to bring 
the case, which makes the problem even less significant.198  That said, 
counsel may decide to take the case against poor defendants if there 
are provisions for reasonable attorneys’ fees provided by the state to 
subsidize access to judgments of retributive damages against defen-
dants of all sizes.  Alternatively, as described in my earlier companion 
article, the legislature may decide to limit access to retributive dam-
ages by insisting on a minimum amount in controversy or by making 
the loser pay the costs and fees of the opposing side’s counsel.  Both 
requirements would screen out many weak or low-value cases 
brought by pro se or vexatious plaintiffs.199
7.  Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination states 
that no one “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”200  The privilege permits an individual (but not a 
corporation) to refuse to answer any questions put to her during any 
proceeding if she in good faith believes that the testimony will either 
“support a conviction” against her or “furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence” against her.201  A person can invoke the privilege during any 
kind of proceeding—including in a civil trial for punitive damages 
198 See generally Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort 
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001) (analyzing the incentives of plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in tort cases). 
199 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 297-300 (suggesting various per-
mutations for institutional design that would reduce Type I and Type II errors). 
200 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
201 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see also Carlson v. United 
States, 209 F.2d 209, 214 (1st Cir. 1954) (stating that a person invoking the privilege in 
bad faith may be found guilty of perjury). 
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and in the discovery process of such a trial.202  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has held that if persons feared that their statements would trig-
ger some substantial sanctions aside from fines or imprisonment, then 
that too would suffice to permit the privilege to be invoked.203
Nonetheless, the Court has also limited the reach of what counts 
as “coerced” self-incrimination by stating that not all civil penalties can 
trigger the privilege—in other words, merely facing sanction has not 
been deemed a sufficient basis to refuse to answer questions.204  More-
over, in civil cases where the privilege is invoked, the factfinder is 
permitted to draw an adverse inference against the person.205  Addi-
tionally, a person invoking the privilege during any civil proceeding 
who is later granted immunity from the sanction in question could be 
required to testify.206
The scope of the privilege has long been a source of controversy 
and puzzlement.207  The text of the Fifth Amendment indicates that 
the privilege is “expressly limited to ‘any criminal case.’”208  Further-
more, the Supreme Court has never held that fear of punitive dam-
ages alone, despite their “quasi-criminal” nature, permits an invoca-
tion of the privilege. 
Because of the lack of consensus regarding the privilege’s ration-
ale, it is hard to understand what its proper scope should be as a con-
stitutional matter.  And unlike the standard-of-proof issue, there is no 
202 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (“The [Fifth] Amendment . . . 
privileges [the individual] not to answer official questions put to him in any other pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal . . . .”). 
203 See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1967) (finding a threat of disbar-
ment sufficient to invoke privilege). 
204 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251-55 (1980) (finding that in estab-
lishing a civil penalty, Congress did not impose a scheme that was so punitive as to al-
low invocation of the privilege). 
205 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (declaring “the prevailing 
rule” to be that “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against par-
ties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered 
against them”). 
206 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906); see also 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2006) 
(providing the procedure for granting immunity). 
207 See Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination,  30 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 
730-39, 734 n.25 (2008) (canvassing much of the literature and demonstrating why 
most efforts to explain or justify the privilege against self-incrimination are “uniformly 
unconvincing”); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1227, 1228 (1988) (“It is probably fair to say that most people familiar with the doc-
trine surrounding the privilege against self-incrimination believe that it cannot be 
squared with any rational theory.”). 
208 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
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obvious middle ground appropriate for an intermediate sanction, so 
we must muddle through a different way.  From the normative per-
spective of whether a jurisdiction should extend the privilege to de-
fendants fearing retributive damages liability, we have to consider 
whether the privilege advances or hinders retributive justice interests.  
If the privilege is anti-retributive, then that is a good basis for limiting 
the safeguard generally and permitting, but not requiring, an adverse 
inference from any defendant’s silence.  If the privilege is pro-
retributive, then that is a good basis for extending the safeguard to a 
defendant facing retributive damages and not allowing the factfinder to 
make an adverse inference.  Turning to that precise issue, we need a 
sense of how the privilege affects the incidence of Type I and Type II 
errors.209
Unfortunately, it is hard to reach a conclusive determination.  The 
primary argument against the privilege is that it deprives the court 
and the jury of the accused party’s testimony when that party is often 
in the best position to verify or credibly deny the accusations made 
against her.  As Jeremy Bentham wrote, “Evidence is the basis of jus-
tice:  exclude evidence, you exclude justice.”210  Thus, it is often said 
that having the privilege works to the advantage of the guilty who are 
not subjected to the perils of cross-examination.211
In contrast, there are two arguments that the privilege works to 
reduce Type I errors of mistaken punishment.  First, as the Supreme 
Court stated in Wilson v. United States, not every innocent person, 
“however honest,” can avoid “nervousness when facing others and at-
tempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character,” and thus, 
even a person who is innocent may nonetheless be worried that his 
testimony will “increase rather than remove prejudices against him.”212
A second argument looks at how the privilege works through the 
signaling effects associated with its use.  According to Professors 
Seidmann and Stein, the privilege actually works in favor of the inno-
209 To be sure, there are other values important to retributivism, but I will limit my 
discussion to these core issues. 
210 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 1 (Littleton, Colo., Fred 
B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827). 
211 For a particularly incisive analysis of this point, see Allen, supra note 207, at 
734-36. 
212 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893). 
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cent and against the self-interest of the guilty.213  This counterintuitive 
argument rests on the dynamic effects associated with the privilege.  
The basic idea is that innocent people will not invoke the privilege 
because they have nothing to hide and are willing to share their story 
and be subject to cross-examination.  The factually guilty will not tes-
tify because they will be subject to cross-examination and will be less 
able to corroborate their stories.  Because of this common intuition, 
juries will tend to credit the stories of people who testify more than 
the stories of those who do not.  Defendants invoking the privilege will 
provoke the suspicion of the juries and will likely be found guilty.  In 
this respect, one version of the argument is that the privilege will work 
as a sorting mechanism between the guilty and the innocent. 
But the dynamic-effects story needs revision for two separate rea-
sons.  First, if guilty persons start testifying to exploit to their advan-
tage the received wisdom that only the innocent testify, then the norm 
that is supposed to work to the benefit of the innocent becomes cor-
rupted.  More iterations of the game, in other words, will lead to a 
pooling of guilty and innocent people testifying and a situation in 
which the only people invoking the privilege are the guilty “suckers” 
or the innocent persons worried that they will be wrongfully lumped 
with the guilty “exploiters” who testify.  This quickly turns into a guess-
ing game of how large the number of “exploiters” is within any pool of 
testifying defendants.  Of course, there are two checks on this pooling 
problem.  First, the guilty persons who subject themselves to cross-
examination will have a harder time in individual cases proving to the 
jury that they are credible because there is likely to be some doubt 
sown in their minds by an effective lawyer’s cross-examination.  Sec-
ond, the jurors are not repeat players and thus are less likely to view 
the game associated with the privilege as a game involving repeat 
players, the dynamic effects of which are to be scrutinized. 
But there are also empirical reasons to be skeptical of the Seid-
mann-Stein theory.  As Professor Bibas points out, in real life, most 
suspects will, and do, talk to the police upon arrest because they have 
very good reasons to worry more about the police drawing adverse in-
ferences from their silence than about the adverse inferences that ju-
213 See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent:  A 
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 430 (2000) 
(“Because the right to silence is available, innocent defendants still tell the truth while 
guilty defendants may rationally exercise the right.  Thus, guilty defendants do not 
pool with innocent defendants by lying, and as a result, triers of fact do not wrongfully 
convict innocent defendants.”). 
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ries will draw at trial.214  As Bibas concludes, notwithstanding the ap-
parent elegance of the Seidmann-Stein theory, the privilege only helps 
the guilty, not the innocent.215
If Professor Bibas is correct, then we cannot rely on the privilege 
to work in favor of securing the reduction of Type I errors; this seems 
especially important when the privilege appears to increase Type II 
errors of false acquittals or other nonpunishments of those who are 
factually guilty.  As many have argued, there is good reason to believe 
that an orderly inquiry into a defendant’s actions does not itself of-
fend basic norms of dignity.216  At the same time, such an inquiry per-
mits the factfinder to draw inferences of truth or falsehood.  Of 
course, that does not mean that there aren’t good reasons for sepa-
rately prohibiting statements when the surrounding circumstances 
cast doubt on their voluntariness.  But if the privilege does serve a 
truth-impeding role, then that alone is a good reason for not extend-
ing it to allow the fear of retributive damages to serve as a basis for its 
invocation.  Moreover, even if extended, the privilege should permit, 
but not require, factfinders to draw an adverse inference against the 
defendant who, in a civil torts proceeding, invokes the privilege.217
Of course, the overlap between conduct that renders one eligible 
for retributive damages and conduct that renders one eligible for 
criminal punishment is substantial.  Consequently, we also need to 
have an approach for defendants who do not want to testify in civil 
proceedings lest they incriminate themselves for criminal prosecution 
purposes.  This problem is not unique to the retributive damages 
context, so we can easily reference the current strategy:  namely, that 
defendants can seek a stay of civil proceedings pending the resolu-
tion of a criminal prosecution and force the government to prose-
cute them first, or, alternatively, defendants can seek immunity from 
214 See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 421, 421 (2003) (“Though [the Seidmann-Stein] theory predicts that rational sus-
pects remain silent, roughly eighty to ninety percent of suspects talk to the police.”). 
215 See id. at 432 (casting doubt on the Seidmann-Stein theory by exposing as 
flawed the assumptions on which the theory is based and by identifying the factors that 
it overlooks).  But see Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent:  A Response to Crit-
ics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1115 (2008). 
216 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (“Justice . . . 
would not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry.”). 
217 There is obviously much more to be said on the policies underlying the privi-
lege embedded in the Fifth Amendment.  A good starting point would be the recent 
symposium in the Cardozo Law Review. See Symposium, The Future of Self-Incrimination:  
Fifth Amendment, Confessions, & Guilty Pleas, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 717 (2008). 
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criminal prosecutions that rely on the testimony as links in the chain 
of evidence. 
8.  Duplicative Punishment Concerns in Simple Litigation Contexts 
This subsection considers the relationship that retributive dam-
ages awards should have relative to prior or subsequent sanctions 
through the criminal justice system.  In effect, this discussion largely 
addresses many of the basic questions associated with double jeopardy 
law and policy in the simple litigation context—where X commits Y mis-
conduct and in so doing injures Z and only Z in a manner that would 
be eligible for both retributive damages and criminal prosecution in 
and only in jurisdiction Q.218  The following discussion explains why 
(1) a defendant can face retributive damages and then criminal pro-
ceedings for the same misconduct; (2) a defendant who is acquitted in 
criminal court should under some circumstances be subject to a sub-
sequent retributive damages proceeding; and (3) a defendant who is 
convicted in criminal court should be able to block subsequent re-
tributive damages predicated on the same conduct toward the same 
victim.  I also address parallel proceedings in civil and criminal cases. 
a.  Double Jeopardy Doctrine and Punitive Damages 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment works to 
prevent three separate events:  “a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.”219  As a 
matter of current law, courts have held that earlier punitive damages 
determinations do not serve as “prior punishment” such that a subse-
quent criminal prosecution for the same misconduct to the same vic-
tim would be precluded under the double jeopardy provision of the 
Fifth Amendment.220  Various courts have similarly held that criminal 
218 In the successor article, supra note 9, I will address, among other things, con-
cerns of duplicative punishment arising from multiple injuries inflicted by the same 
course of conduct. 
219 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989), overruled on other grounds by
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 95-96 (1997).  The Court has also made clear 
that notwithstanding the text of the Fifth Amendment’s reference to “life or limb,” it 
also covers monetary penalties and incarceration.  See Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 769 n.1 (1994) (“[I]t is well settled that the [Fifth] Amendment 
covers imprisonment and monetary penalties.”). 
220 See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (holding that a legisla-
ture can “impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or 
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fines or other criminal punishments for certain misconduct would not 
thwart subsequent recoveries of punitive damages based on the same 
conduct.221  Moreover, a defendant who is acquitted in criminal court 
may still face subsequent punitive damages or civil penalties in civil 
court.222  That is because the courts have focused on the fact that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to litigation between private 
parties.223
That rationale, however, only goes so far.  In some cases, the gov-
ernment’s prosecution of a defendant has been permitted even after 
the government sued initially on its own (quasi-private) behalf and re-
covered punitive damages for the underlying misconduct.224  By con-
trast, when the government convicted someone on drug charges and 
then later sought to levy a very heavy punitive “tax” on the defendant 
for the drug conduct, the government’s subsequent tax was invali-
dated.225  Critics of punitive damages without procedural safeguards 
could reasonably point to these double jeopardy distinctions as evi-
dence of arid formalism—in both situations, the government is going 
to capture the gains associated with the civil penalties and criminal 
omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempt-
ing a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense”); United States v. Ely, 142 
F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that a prior recovery of punitive damages by 
the FDIC against bank directors for federal bank fraud did not preclude subsequent 
criminal prosecution); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042  
(5th Cir. 1984) (holding that because punitive damages awards are not criminal sanc-
tions, multiple awards of punitive damages are consistent with the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment); cf. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (holding that double jeop-
ardy only protects against “multiple criminal punishments for the same offense”). 
221 See, e.g., Shore v. Gurnett, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583, 586-87 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding 
that double jeopardy did not apply to punitive damages awarded in a wrongful-death 
suit following the conviction of the defendant for vehicular manslaughter). 
222 See State v. McDowell, 699 A.2d 987, 989 (Conn. 1997) (“Jeopardy attaches only 
to proceedings which are ‘essentially criminal.’” (quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 
528 (1975))). 
223 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 (“The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are 
not triggered by litigation between private parties.”); see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 110-11 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is 
to prevent the State from “mak[ing] repeated attempts to convict an individual”). 
224 See Ely, 142 F.3d at 1121; United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 67-68 (5th Cir. 
1994) (allowing a federal agency first to pursue punitive damages against defendants 
and then to pursue criminal indictments). 
225 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994) (“This drug tax 
is not the kind of remedial sanction that may follow the first punishment of a criminal 
offense.  Instead, it is a second punishment within the contemplation of a constitu-
tional protection . . . .”). 
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fines.  More troubling, the current doctrine creates the conditions for 
substantial overpunishment from a retributive perspective. 
b.  The Duplicative Punishment Problem 
Because of the lack of double jeopardy protection afforded to the 
status of punitive damages, scholars, including Colby and Wheeler, have 
endorsed the idea that a publicly minded punitive damages sanction 
should trigger double jeopardy protection.226  Their concern, like that 
of numerous courts and legislatures around the country, is that multi-
ple punishments or successive prosecutions could lead to overkill.227
From a retributive damages perspective, such overkill is a matter 
of substantial and legitimate concern.  But even if defendants enjoyed 
full “double jeopardy” protection, that would hardly serve as substan-
tial relief to the overkill concern.  As explained immediately below, 
American double jeopardy law does little to protect criminal defen-
dants from duplicative prosecutions and punishments.  As a result, ex-
tending to civil defendants the same protections available to criminal 
defendants might entail disappointing results.  Let me explain quickly 
why that is the case and then suggest what should be done. 
The federal constitutional floor for double jeopardy law is set very 
low.  Specifically, under the Supreme Court’s Blockburger test, a crimi-
nal defendant can be tried for a crime that has elements 1, 2, and 3 
and can then be subsequently tried for a crime that has elements 2, 3, 
and 4, even if the underlying criminal transaction was exactly the 
same event in time.228  Moreover, although some states offer greater 
protection through statute or state constitutions, the majority of states 
provide no more protection than that offered by Blockburger.229  And 
because of the often sprawling and redundant features of many 
226 See Colby, supra note 5, at 452-53 (noting that punitive damages only call for 
criminal procedural protection when they are understood as punishment for public, 
not private, wrongs); Wheeler, supra note 7, at 272 (concluding that the procedural 
safeguards in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments could apply to punitive dam-
ages where the action is criminal in substance). 
227 See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(Friendly, J.) (discussing the danger of overkill from multiple punishments). 
228 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“[T]he test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each pro-
vision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”). 
229 See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 1002-05 (3d 
ed. 2007) (providing a survey of double jeopardy doctrines around the states). 
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American criminal codes, the Double Jeopardy Clause itself does not 
provide a powerful shield against the prospect of overkill.230
The problem of overkill is potentially compounded further by the 
federal constitutional standard because of the dual sovereigns doc-
trine, under which a defendant who is acquitted or convicted of mis-
conduct in criminal court in one jurisdiction might still be subse-
quently pursued and convicted for the same misconduct in criminal 
court if the misconduct occurred in overlapping jurisdictions.231  In 
other words, absent legislative intervention to the contrary, a punitive 
damages suit in one jurisdiction will be legally irrelevant to whether 
an alternative jurisdiction may host a prosecution or civil suit against a 
defendant for the same misconduct.   This is true even when the mis-
conduct at issue affects only one victim.232
Because double jeopardy law provides very little real protection to 
criminal defendants, there is, in reality, very little disparity between 
the civil and the criminal defendant in this regard:  both civil and 
criminal defendants are actually exposed to risks of overkill.   This sug-
gests that either the double jeopardy provisions in the criminal con-
text need strengthening via statute or judicial rule, as some states have 
done,233 or that civil defendants facing retributive damages in multiple 
jurisdictions are, in many respects, in the same helpless position as 
criminal defendants.  To the extent that one is comfortable with cur-
rent double jeopardy jurisprudence in criminal cases, one should not 
fear that civil defendants are being radically mistreated as compared 
to criminal defendants.234
230 Cf. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of Ameri-
can Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635 (2005) (lamenting “legislative hyperactiv-
ity” culminating in “unnecessary and often inconsistent” statutes). 
231 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1959) (holding that state and fed-
eral prosecutions based on the same actions do not violate the Fifth Amendment); 
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (“[A]n act denounced as a crime by 
both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of 
both and may be punished by each.”). 
232 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (applying the dual sovereigns doc-
trine to permit prosecution in two states for the murder of a victim who was kidnapped 
in one state and killed in another). 
233 See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 229, at 1002-05 (discussing the various ways 
that states define double jeopardy provisions). 
234 Galanter and Luban recognize that multiple punitive damages awards are “ex-
tremely troublesome” from their perspective because “if each award has been appro-
priately scaled to the heinousness of the deed, multiple awards amount to overpun-
ishment.”  Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1455 n.302.  Nonetheless, Galanter and 
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The preceding discussion should inform but not constrain the 
normative vision of what is an appropriate level of protection—from a 
retributive justice perspective—for defendants facing accusations 
stemming from the same misconduct in both civil and criminal courts.  
I turn to that issue next. 
c.  Solving the Overkill Problem in the Simple Context 
Because of the dynamic and complex interaction between the civil 
and criminal justice systems, the problem of overkill requires legisla-
tive attention, even in the simple litigation context where there is just 
one wrongful injury caused by one person to another.  This subsection 
explains how, under the retributive damages regime, defendants 
would get more protection than they do under current law.  Of 
course, this discussion assumes that the misconduct in question is sub-
ject to both criminal sanction and retributive damages; legislatures 
obviously can choose to restrict some conduct to separate spheres. 
i.  Should Retributive Damages Follow Criminal Prosecution? 
For the reasons explained below, retributive damages generally 
should not be allowed to follow criminal convictions imposed in the 
simple litigation context for the same misconduct against a particular 
victim.  Whether they ought to be permitted subsequent to acquittals 
in criminal trials should depend on the availability of new evidence in 
the new suit.  However, if a plaintiff in a separate sovereign sought re-
tributive damages against a defendant following a criminal prosecu-
tion in a separate jurisdiction, there would be no difficulty on my view 
with that separate proceeding.  The same conclusion of permitting 
subsequent retributive damages suits would apply even within the 
same jurisdiction if the defendant perpetrated multiple counts of the 
same misconduct. 
Under the constitutional rule described earlier, defendants enjoy 
no double jeopardy protection for punitive damages vis-à-vis earlier 
criminal prosecutions.  In other words, an offender does not generally 
deduct the criminal fine paid from the amount of subsequent punitive 
damages.  This makes sense when the subsequent tort suit achieves a 
compensation function not already achieved by restitution. 
Luban fail to address how punitive damages might also raise similar concerns of un-
fairness vis-à-vis the criminal justice system. 
2009] How Should Punitive Damages Work? 1455
But when the government establishes an extracompensatory dam-
ages scheme in part to effectuate retributive justice, the fact of the 
prior criminal penalty and where it was imposed together warrant 
greater attention when fashioning a retributive damages award.  On 
the view that retributive damages awards are intermediate sanctions 
less severe than a criminal sanction, the criminal penalty in a particu-
lar jurisdiction must presumptively be viewed both as expressing to 
the public sufficient condemnation by the state of the offender’s mis-
conduct and as communicating that condemnation to the offender.  
Thus, allowing a retributive damages award against X to supplement 
that criminal penalty would be duplicative where it is the same wrong 
Y and the same victim Z involved in the same jurisdiction Q .  While 
that postconviction retributive damages award should be forbidden, 
the victim should still be able to pursue compensatory damages (and 
aggravated or deterrence damages if applicable). 
The questions are more normatively complex when a defendant is 
acquitted in the criminal prosecution and then faces a retributive 
damages lawsuit in the same jurisdiction.  On the one hand, the fact 
that the government already sought and lost an opportunity for re-
tributive punishment might suggest that it is time to let sleeping dogs 
lie rather than risk another Type I error.  On the other hand, retribu-
tive damages are meant to be an intermediate sanction with a lower 
standard of proof, and removing the availability of retributive dam-
ages might mean more Type II errors that society wants to avoid, in 
which case it would be permissible to allow a plaintiff (whether a vic-
tim or a private attorney general) to pursue retributive damages.235
My sense is that if the subsequent retributive damages action is predi-
cated on the exact same evidence that the government adduced in its 
prosecution of the defendant, then retributive damages should not be 
permitted.  But if there is a reason to think the private litigation ef-
forts add new and important evidence not earlier adduced during the 
criminal proceedings, then that would be a good reason for permit-
ting subsequent retributive damages claims. 
By contrast, where the retributive damages award is levied by a dif-
ferent sovereign from the one that imposed the earlier criminal pun-
ishment, then the defendant has offended several sovereigns and she 
235 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 280-86 (discussing the private 
attorney general (PAG) structure).  One might fairly question whether the PAG bene-
fits are as strong in the context of a retributive damages action following a defendant 
who was acquitted in a criminal case. 
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is liable for having wronged two (or more) sovereigns separately 
through the same misconduct.  To be sure, the defendant may won-
der why she is being penalized two (or more) times by different sover-
eigns for the same misconduct.  But on the assumption that punish-
ment only occurs for avoidable and culpable conduct, the defendant 
is on notice that each jurisdiction may want to vindicate its interest in 
punishing the particular breach against its own legal order.236  More-
over, if only one jurisdiction were permitted to prosecute the miscon-
duct, there would have to be some rather arbitrary mechanism by 
which it is decided who gets to vindicate that particular legal interest.  
In light of the facts that the dual sovereigns doctrine (1) promotes 
comity (by avoiding conflicts) in both horizontal (state-state) and ver-
tical (federal-state) federalism contexts, and (2) reflects the status quo 
in the criminal and civil contexts today, there is not much reason to 
think that the same notion should not apply with respect to the in-
termediate sanction of retributive damages.237  Thus, a criminal con-
viction in another jurisdiction would not preclude the imposition of 
retributive damages in a second jurisdiction that could also criminally 
punish the conduct but had not done so through criminal proceedings. 
Moreover, even in a jurisdiction that had prosecuted a person for 
particular conduct, if that conduct injured more than one person, 
then the same jurisdiction could impose retributive damages for 
wrongs to those individuals not earlier treated as victims in the crimi-
nal trial.  In other words, retributive damages would also be available 
subsequent to a criminal conviction to punish a defendant for mis-
conduct affecting a victim who was not the focus of the initial criminal 
penalty.  That additional penalty of retributive damages is reasonably 
imposed because, from the criminal justice system’s perspective, the 
misconduct against a second victim is simply another “count” of the 
same underlying misconduct or is separate misconduct altogether.  
And when multiple counts of the same crime or different crimes af-
236 I leave aside for now concerns that persons might reasonably raise about be-
ing punished in polities with universal jurisdiction over certain forms of extreme 
wrongdoing. 
237 This position is consistent with, and expressive of, the institutional account of 
retributivism discussed in Part II of Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, which ac-
knowledges that the same conduct can be subject to sanction in several jurisdictions, 
even consecutively.  A pure “moral” retributivist might think that punishments for the 
same conduct that separately are proportional would in the aggregate be an unfair 
“piling on” because they offend a prepolitical conception of desert.  For some discus-
sion of the shortcomings of a purely moral, as opposed to political, account of retribu-
tivism, see Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 52, at 1451-53. 
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fecting different victims occur, jurisdictions commit no wrong when 
they set punishment (whether fines or incarceration) for those counts 
cumulatively or consecutively.  Indeed, a state that groups penalties 
for all coterminous crimes might appear to be punishing crimes at a 
“buy one, get one/two/three free” discount.  How bad that message is 
must be weighed against other competing values; and, of course, con-
secutive punishments for different counts are also consistent with 
lower sentences across the board for each count.238
ii.  Should Criminal Prosecution Follow Retributive Damages? 
In light of the preceding discussion, we should also consider 
whether retributive damages awards, if reached first, should have a 
preclusive effect on subsequent criminal prosecution and punish-
ment.  Would it be justifiable for the government to prosecute an of-
fender after evidence in a retributive damages case indicated that 
there was a sufficient basis for prosecution under a beyond a reason-
able doubt standard?  In my view, such subsequent criminal punish-
ment is justifiable, assuming that the tortious misconduct was sepa-
rately subject to a criminal law sanction. 
As I explained in Retributive Damages, the retributive damages sanc-
tion is meant to be an intermediate sanction, such that if proven, it in-
vites prosecutors to consider filing subsequent criminal prosecutions.239
Indeed, one reason to cross-fertilize retributive justice with the civil 
tort system is to harness the power of private parties to ferret out and 
bring to public attention the defendant’s misconduct.240  Thus, under 
this proposal, there would be no protection against subsequent prose-
cution afforded to a defendant first found liable for retributive dam-
238 As I explain in Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 9, defendants worried 
about the dangers of seriatim punishment by different plaintiffs should be able to ob-
tain a defensive class action that would aggregate all plaintiffs for retributive damages 
purposes arising from specific misconduct.  See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008) (dealing with the aggregate claims for punitive damages 
of the plaintiff and “others, including commercial fisherman and Native Alaskans”).  
These aggregative strategies would ultimately offer more protection than criminal de-
fendants receive now because if a defendant commits a crime with a jurisdictional 
nexus available to twenty states, she can be punished separately and consecutively 
twenty times. 
239 Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 320. 
240 Cf. Peter J. Boyer, The Bribe, NEW YORKER, May 19, 2008, at 44, 54 (describing 
how employees of State Farm Insurance, suspicious of the company’s fraudulent prac-
tices, shared inculpatory information with private plaintiffs’ lawyers who then passed 
that information on to law enforcement officers). 
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ages.  If the government sees damning evidence during the retributive 
damages proceeding and decides to prosecute criminal actions based 
on that misconduct, it should be able to do so.  After all, if the gov-
ernment wants more severe sanctions and more severe condemnation, 
it can only seek those ends through affording the defendant more 
stringent procedural safeguards.  Under this proposal, however, the 
amounts paid in retributive damages in the civil proceeding should be 
deducted from the total of any subsequent monetary penalties im-
posed on the defendant for proven criminal misconduct that is identi-
cal to the misconduct established in the earlier civil proceedings. 
But just as the state may seek separate punishments for separate 
wrongs against separate persons stemming from the same miscon-
duct,241 so too should prior retributive damages awards not be credited 
against subsequent damage awards for the same misconduct when 
that misconduct has affected people who were not plaintiffs in the ear-
lier retributive damages suit.  Indeed, this is the flip side of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Philip Morris and is also a free-standing 
principle. 
To be sure, there are certain disadvantages that attach to making a 
defendant go through two trials for the same misconduct.  A defen-
dant convinced of her innocence will reveal many, if not all, of her 
cards at the initial retributive damages tribunal.  The government ef-
fectively gets a preview of this defense.  From a retributivist perspec-
tive, however, this may have the effect of reducing both Type I and 
Type II errors over time.  When the government sees the defendant’s 
case in a retributive damages trial, the government may conclude that 
the defendant’s case is strong enough that a jury will not convict un-
der the higher standard of proof (and greater number of procedural 
safeguards) that attaches to criminal defendants. 
One might be concerned about the expense that a defendant 
must incur in trying to defend her misconduct a second time in a 
criminal trial.  But since we cannot reasonably ban civil suits just be-
cause the government might stake a criminal claim against a defen-
dant, this problem of civil and criminal trials is bound to persist re-
gardless of whether a retributive damages scheme exists.  So the 
additional expense is only the marginal difference between litigating a 
241 See, e.g., Ann M. Simmons, Metrolink Killer Is Sentenced to 11 Life Terms in Prison,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at B5 (reporting on a defendant who faced eleven consecu-
tive counts of incarceration for the murders of eleven people caused by one action). 
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case for compensatory damages and litigating one that also permits 
retributive damages. 
Moreover, if there were no records of civil trials available from 
which the prosecutor could examine the case against the defendant, 
there likely would be more crippling criminal cases brought against 
defendants.  Under the retributive damages scheme described here, a 
defendant may be more likely to persuade a prosecutor to forbear from 
pursuing criminal proceedings.  Alternatively, the defendant can ask 
for a stay of the civil proceedings involving retributive damages, pend-
ing resolution of criminal proceedings, an issue that I take up next. 
iii.  Can Retributive Damages Coincide with Criminal Prosecution? 
What if the government has indicted a defendant, thus signaling 
its intent to prosecute X defendant for Y misconduct against Z victim, 
but a private action seeking retributive damages is subsequently filed 
prior to conviction in the criminal case?  In other words, what hap-
pens if there are parallel civil and criminal proceedings?  Typically, if 
the government has already publicly committed its resources to the 
prosecution of X for the same Y misconduct against Z, the defendant 
can seek to stay the civil proceedings pending the outcome of the 
criminal trial.242  That rule makes sense here, in the context of the re-
tributive damages scheme.  In that case, if the government wins, there 
would be no subsequent retributive damages brought for Y miscon-
duct against Z.
The parallel-proceedings problem can also arise if Z files a retribu-
tive damages action against X before the government’s indictment.  If 
the government can just file an indictment midway through the re-
tributive damages case, then the retributive damages “payments” to 
the plaintiff and her lawyers will not be a very satisfactory incentive to 
develop and pursue certain kinds of claims or information.  What 
should happen then is that the government should either wait until 
after the retributive damages action is over, or, alternatively, the gov-
ernment should be able to buy the retributive damages claim from the 
plaintiff by paying the plaintiff her reward and fairly compensating 
the lawyers for their time and investment.  The defendant can then 
ask to stay the civil proceeding while the criminal prosecution pro-
ceeds.  Thereafter, Z and her lawyers should be able to vindicate their 
242 The advantage to the state gained by making X litigate in two fora simultane-
ously is an unfair one, achieved only through the chance of having the wrongdoer dis-
tracted by two simultaneous proceedings. 
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interests in compensatory, aggravated, or deterrence damages at a 
point that suits them after the criminal proceedings.  And in cases in-
volving a defendant with limited resources, the state will need to de-
cide whether the compensation function of tort law should trump the 
social interest in retributive justice.  My sense is that the precise di-
mensions of such a trade-off between competing moral imperatives 
are best left to polities to decide. 
Finally, for all these scenarios, one must also decide which test to 
adopt to determine whether the subsequent litigation is in fact based 
on the same misconduct.  Because of the large number of crimes and 
torts, the Blockburger test described earlier will not do much in reduc-
ing the unfairness if all we must do is compare the elements of the 
crime and the elements of the tort; too often we might find the action 
passing muster under Blockburger’s minimal requirements.  That would 
be good reason for states to reconsider whether Blockburger satisfies 
the fairness concerns of avoiding overpunishment.243  A transactional 
approach or evidentiary approach that limited what evidence could be 
adduced might provide better strategies.244
To summarize, under my proposal, retributive damages actions 
would be permitted and encouraged prior to criminal prosecution.  
Such amounts would be credited against criminal penalties that the 
government would assess.  However, if the government has already se-
cured a criminal conviction for the relevant conduct, that would pre-
clude claims for retributive damages based on the underlying miscon-
duct.  Retributive damages based on the same misconduct to be 
proven in criminal court should not be permitted if the government 
has already filed an indictment (or similar declaration of accusation) 
against the defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, but if the 
criminal proceeding results in an acquittal, the retributive damages 
proceeding should then be permitted if the plaintiff is able to adduce 
evidence different from that which the government adduced in its case. 
243 It will be the defendant’s responsibility to bring information of prior adjudica-
tions to the court’s attention, since the defendant will be in the best position to inform 
a civil plaintiff that she has already been indicted.  If there is a “block” because of coin-
cidental criminal prosecution, the courts should allow the relevant statute of limita-
tions to equitably toll in the event that the prosecution fails. 
244 See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 229, at 1002-05. 
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9.  Excessiveness Review Under the Eighth Amendment 
One might wonder, last, if the allocation of retributive damages to 
the state would cause the Supreme Court to revisit its earlier decision 
in BFI v. Kelco regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment to 
punitive damages.245  In Kelco, a majority of the Court found that the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines did not cover pu-
nitive damages because they were directed to the private party, not to 
the state.246  However, the Court reserved judgment on the issue of 
whether punitive damages going to the state would in fact trigger 
Eighth Amendment review.247  Although not squarely presented by the 
parties, the issue could have been addressed in both State Farm and 
Philip Morris, where the statutes in Utah and Oregon, respectively, in-
volved split-recovery schemes under which a significant portion of the 
punitive damages would go to the state.248  Nonetheless, the Court did 
not address the possible application of the Eighth Amendment, in-
stead focusing its analysis on the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
Assuming arguendo that retributive damages would be deemed a 
fine falling under the scope of the Eighth Amendment, my sense is 
that the proposal here would survive Excessive Fines Clause review for 
reasons I mentioned in the earlier companion article.249  Put briefly, in 
an era where the Court has extended extraordinary deference to legis-
lative schemes of punishment allowing, for example, the incarceration 
of a defendant for at least twenty-five years for the theft of a few golf 
245 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
246 Id. at 275-76. 
247 Id. at 275 n.21.  If there were such review, it would likely follow the framework 
established under United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).  That doctrinal 
framework, by emphasizing whether the punishment is “grossly disproportionate” to 
the underlying offense, id. at 334, is not so strikingly different from the “guideposts” 
framework that the Court has articulated for the review of punitive damages under 
BMW v. Gore and State Farm, under which the primary determinant of the reasonableness 
of a punitive damages award is the reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct. 
248 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201(3)(a) (2008) (granting to the plaintiff the 
first $50,000 of a punitive damages award and one-half of the excess of punitive dam-
ages over $50,000); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(a) (2007) (granting forty percent of the 
punitive damages award to the plaintiff). 
249 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 327-32.  That said, when the 
state collects damages from private entities, other practical problems worthy of atten-
tion can arise. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and In-
jurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (2000). 
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clubs,250 there could be little plausible basis for an objection to a civil 
penalty that stripped unlawful gains and removed no more than ten 
percent of one’s prior wealth.251  Significantly, this retributive damages 
penalty would occur only after proceedings in which the defendant 
enjoyed a cluster of important procedural safeguards, as described 
above.
IV. IMPLEMENTING EXTRACOMPENSATORY DAMAGES
This Part addresses two additional key issues associated with the im-
plementation of extracompensatory damages:  insurance and settlement. 
A.  Should Insurance Be Available—If So, When? 
Assuming a contract existed between an insured and insurer that 
created liability insurance to cover punitive damages,252 there is still 
the question of whether such contracts ought to be enforced on pub-
lic policy grounds.  Currently, nine states prohibit the availability of 
insurance for punitive damages, but the majority of jurisdictions per-
mit such insurance and about a dozen states have not decided conclu-
sively through courts or statutes what the rule is.253  Even in those 
states taking a hostile view of insurance for punitive damages, most 
will make an exception when the punitive damages liability is imposed 
vicariously, as opposed to directly.254  The rationales in support of in-
250 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29-31 (2003) (finding that the defendant’s 
“history of felony recidivism” helped to justify his sentence under a three-strikes law). 
251 Cf. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 (observing the need for deference to the legisla-
tive penalty scheme and a willingness to strike down only those fines that are grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the offense). 
252 See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV.
101, 115 (“[T]here is little dispute that, on their face, most primary general and auto-
mobile policies provide coverage for punitive damages.”).  Nonetheless, insurers em-
ploy a variety of strategies to limit their exposure to paying punitive damages claims.  
See id. at 116-25 (describing how insurance companies use underwriting practices, pol-
icy limits, contract provisions, and refusals to pay based on public policy claims to con-
trol such payments).  The analysis in this Section applies principally to those risks that 
insurance companies want to insure ex ante; their claims about why their contracts 
should not be enforced ex post in particular cases is a problem primarily of contract 
interpretation that I leave aside. 
253 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L.
REV. 409, 430 (2005) (“[T]he legislative and judicial trend in the past several decades 
has been squarely in the direction of expanded insurability.”); id. at 456-60 (presenting 
results from a recent fifty-state survey). 
254 Id. at 428-29. 
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surance for punitive damages have in recent years largely been deter-
rence oriented.255  Unfortunately, a number of courts and commenta-
tors have defended the opposition to insurance for punitive damages 
on retributive justice grounds.256
My goal here is to weaken the opposition, at least in some contexts 
where that opposition is articulated in the discourse of retributive jus-
tice.  As I will argue, this hostile view of insurance is largely mistaken, 
at least when insurance markets for retributive damages are permitted 
to operate in situations when the harm arises from insurable risks—
i.e., those risks that are probabilistic in nature and not “highly suscep-
tible to [an insured’s] moral hazard.”257  The policy that I defend, 
however, explains why the insurance policy for retributive damages 
must also require some form of coinsurance on the part of the defen-
dant, beyond the premium paid ex ante, in order to ensure that the 
defendant faces a direct and coercive setback to her interests through 
the imposition of an intermediate sanction.  The logic of this discus-
sion also applies to considerations of insurance for aggravated and de-
terrence damages. 
1.  Insurance for Insurable Reckless Risks 
Say a law firm partner announced to an insurer, “I’d like to buy 
insurance in case I get sued for when I kill one of my associates next 
week—I’m really frustrated with his performance.”  Practically speak-
ing, no company would insure for this risk of retributive damages be-
cause insurers will not cover damages that are “expected or intended” 
255 See id. at 430-31 (collecting cases referring to this deterrence rationale); see also
George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1989). 
256 E.g., Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962) (“The pol-
icy considerations in a state where . . . punitive damages are awarded for punishment 
and deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately as well [as] 
nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong.”), superseded by statute, VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (2007) (providing that it is not against Virginia public policy to 
obtain insurance providing coverage for punitive damages owed due to “negligence, 
including willful and wanton negligence,” but that it is contrary to public policy to ob-
tain insurance covering punitive damages owed because of intentional misconduct), as
recognized in United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Webb, 369 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Va. 1988). 
257 Priest, supra note 255, at 1029; see also Baker, supra note 252, at 114-25 (detail-
ing insurance company mechanisms for coping with the moral hazard problem associ-
ated with punitive damages).  Moral hazard has been defined as the phenomenon by 
which injury and activity rates increase as a response to a decrease in the expected 
costs of injury.  See, e.g., Priest, supra note 255, at 1023 n.55. 
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from the insured’s perspective.258  In the context of intentional con-
duct—that is, where the defendant is purposefully or knowingly caus-
ing an unjustified harm to someone—the availability of insurance for 
that misconduct might make it appear as if the insurers of punitive 
damages are bankrolling or emboldening the conduct and are thus 
perhaps complicit in it.  After all, the insurers have before them a per-
son who wants to create gains from trade on the basis of planned mis-
conduct that is expected, with practical certainty, to unjustifiably in-
jure someone.  Unsurprisingly, many states allowing insurance for 
punitive damages still maintain an exclusion for intentional con-
duct.259  But aside from the legal prohibitions, insurers won’t take on 
risks that are not insurable in the way defined at the outset. 
By contrast, in the context of reckless conduct, where the defen-
dant disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing harm 
through indifference to the rights and interests of others, the issue of 
insurance for retributive damages is more complex because some risks 
arising from reckless conduct will satisfy an insurer’s test for “insur-
ability.”260  Some states have proscribed the availability of all insurance 
for punitive damages on grounds that it is repugnant to public policy to 
enforce contracts that work to ratify malicious or reckless conduct.261
258 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 255, at 1015 (noting that in every insurance and pu-
nitive damages case studied by the author, the insurance policy excluded intentional 
acts and covered only harms “neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured” (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prods. Co., 743 
S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex. App. 1987))).  Priest also explains how the exclusion of inten-
tional conduct from insurance policies works to the benefit of lowering premiums for 
those “insureds not intentionally engaging in acts causing harm” and prevents losses to 
those who would suffer from intentional harms if insurance for such harms were per-
mitted. Id. at 1026. 
259 Sharkey, supra note 253, at 432 n.118 (listing these states). 
260 The same complexity attaches when a state predicates retributive damages li-
ability on a mens rea formula like “wanton disregard.” 
261 See, e.g., Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1966) (“[W]e 
are convinced from the weight and logic of the case law that Kansas would hold a pol-
icy insuring against punitive damage awards to be violative of the public policy of that 
state . . . .”); McNulty, 307 F.2d at 433-34 (holding that an insurance policy providing 
coverage for punitive damages would “contravene public policy”); Crull v. Gleb, 382 
S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (“We hold that to allow a motorist to insure him-
self against judgments imposed against him for punitive damages, which were as-
sessed against him for his wanton, reckless or willful acts, would be contrary to public 
policy.”). 
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My concern is that failing to enforce contracts for insurance based on 
reckless misconduct may be shortsighted.262
Why would permitting insurance for retributive damages for reck-
less conduct involving insurable risks be attractive?  To understand the 
answer we have to look at the nature of insurance and the incentives 
of the parties created ex ante by the insurance policy for retributive 
damages.  Insurance for retributive damages not only ameliorates the 
judgment-proof defendant problem while also promoting the dis-
tributive goal of loss spreading; it also, through the law of large num-
bers, reduces the amount of harm by the very aggregation of probabil-
istic and independent events.263  Additionally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the insurer will often have strong financial incentives to 
monitor the insured’s behavior and to ensure that the insured does 
not undertake conduct that can instigate retributive damages.264
Moreover, at the time of the initial purchase of insurance, the insurer 
is motivated to engage in an optimal level of “risk-pool definition,” 
which basically involves separation of clients into pools of varying lev-
els of risky activity so one can underwrite insurance policies at the 
right prices:  for example, charging smokers more for life insurance.265
262 To be sure, the line between reckless misconduct and malicious misconduct 
can be hard to draw at times.  Drunk driving—the conduct that motivates many puni-
tive damages cases involving insurance coverage—might be thought of as a hard case.  
In most cases, the defendant’s state of mind is understood to be reckless because there 
is a substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious injury to both the defendant (which 
thereby lessens the moral hazard effect) and to others.  The defendant usually does 
not intend to or know that she will crash and hurt someone, and the risk of harm 
caused might not result in actual harm.  Still, the conduct, even when harmless, is itself 
condemnable as a serious wrong because of the manifestly insufficient regard for the 
well-being of others that such conduct evinces.  And if someone died as a result of the 
defendant’s drunk driving, prosecutors might plausibly say that the defendant acted 
with such depraved-heart recklessness that the mens rea for common law murder 
would be satisfied. 
263 See Priest, supra note 255, at 1021-22 (explaining the math and reasoning of the 
law of large numbers). 
264 But see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Govern-
ance:  The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1807-17 (2007) (pro-
viding some empirical qualitative evidence of instances in which insurers did not seek 
to invest in monitoring during the life of the insurance policy). 
265 Id. at 1022.  Contrary to some views informed by modern portfolio theory, 
which would counsel insurers simply to acquire a diversified portfolio of risk, recent 
empirical evidence confirms that, in the context of entities, insurance companies do in 
fact analyze a prospective insured’s corporate culture to assess risks of misconduct.  See
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:  Evidence from the Di-
rectors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 517 (2007) (noting 
that directors’ and officers’ liability insurance underwriters repeatedly told the authors 
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The risk sorting is often dynamic or experience rated.266  The in-
centives for risk sorting begin when screening prospective insureds, 
and they often continue to exist over the course of the policy.  The in-
surer will typically have an incentive to engage in monitoring and the 
insured will want to keep premiums down; market forces will spur the 
insured to invest in compliance mechanisms and the insurer will help 
ensure that those investments are effective.267  Moreover, to reduce 
moral hazard temptations, insurance companies typically insist on 
some form of coinsurance (whether through deductibles or copay-
ments based on flat or variable percentage amounts) when it comes to 
insurable risks.268
that corporate culture and character are important considerations in assessing risk).  
Perhaps the insurers are making an economic mistake, but they would not be doing 
this risk sorting unless they thought that it was to their advantage to do so; in making 
the risk-selection choices, they are pricing the expected cost of punitive damages vis-à-
vis a particular client into the premium they charge.  That said, Baker and Griffith ar-
gue that, at least in the context of directors’ and officers’ insurance, the levels of insur-
ance purchased by management for the benefit of the shareholders will be inefficient 
and strongly influenced by agency costs.  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 264, at 1800 
(arguing that managers buy certain forms of directors’ and officers’ insurance for “self-
serving” reasons). 
266 As Professor Miriam Baer rightly pointed out in a comment on an earlier draft, 
the possibility of experience-rating the insured should not obscure the fact that other 
factors (whether there is a hard or soft market for insurance, for example) can drown 
out the experience aspect of the premium.  In other words, many market entrants 
might lower the premiums even for those who are prone to driving recklessly.  Con-
versely, it is possible that the reduction in premium that one gets from driving ex-
tremely carefully might be overcome by the overall increase in car insurance when a 
major insurer goes belly-up and the insurance markets contract suddenly. 
267 As discussed supra note 265, however, insurers often have incentives to reduce 
information costs associated with specific investigations and simply follow the portfolio-
theory views of insurance or actuarial tables associated with particular kinds of risk 
borne by particular buyers of insurance.  See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to 
Fail:  Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1743 (2006) (“Most insurance underwriting exercises in-
volve classifying risks using general actuarial tools rather than specific investigation.”).  
But see id. at 1743-44 (discussing the types of insurance products that typically involve 
specific investigations).  The fact that insurance companies choose to conduct their 
business this way is relevant; under my proposal, one is not mandating the availability 
of an insurance policy for retributive damages, but rather is permitting it.  And if it is 
permitted, the insurance company should be able, within reason, to set the terms of 
the agreement and how it thinks it should proceed.  Thus, I am not especially con-
cerned that insurance companies might lose money by failing to monitor insureds 
closely during the life of the policy.  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 264, at 1813. 
268 Should a legislature require that insurers only be able to write insurance poli-
cies that have a coinsurance scheme?  It would be a practical concession to the nega-
tive appearance that some judges and scholars have said is created by permitting insur-
ance for punitive damages.  But it would also ensure that there is a direct, rather than 
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How do these principles apply to a generic lawsuit where a defen-
dant is sued for harms caused by reckless drunk driving and the jury 
finds a basis for retributive damages liability based on the reckless-
ness?  At the outset, the insurance company might engage in loss-
prevention techniques by requiring anyone (of certain age or other 
characteristics) interested in purchasing car insurance to install a 
breathalyzer-ignition system.  Indeed, an insurance market provides 
insurers with incentives to work with technology innovators that can 
ensure that the breath of the person driving is the breath of the per-
son blowing the air.  As for the defendant, to the extent that she proc-
esses costs and benefits at the time of the misconduct in question,269 or 
at a point when she can take steps to avoid the risk of future miscon-
duct, she will fear that her conduct will be excluded as intentional, or, 
if not deemed intentional, that it will trigger increases in her insur-
ance premiums or even subsequent policy cancellation.  She will also 
fear that her insurance policy might not cover the entire amount of 
retributive damages perhaps because of contractual caps on insurance 
payouts or because of contractual coinsurance obligations.  She also 
has reason to fear that she will have to pay litigation costs and endure 
the intermediate condemnatory signal associated with retributive 
damages and the risk that such damages may trigger subsequent 
criminal liability. 
Thus, contra Judge Calabresi,270 there are good instrumental rea-
sons that retributive damages associated with drunk driving should be 
insurable if the insurance companies are willing to assume those risks.  
The logic of having insurance for retributive damages even makes 
sense when no actual harm erupts, as long as the insurer ex ante be-
lieves that the risk of harm is by nature insurable and that the risk is 
capable of being reduced through loss-prevention strategies.271  Hav-
muted, setback to the defendant’s interests that would be independently justifiable and 
warranted.
269 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A Behav-
ioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (providing reasons for 
skepticism about defendants’ amenability to deterrence signals). 
270 See CALABRESI, supra note 18, at 269-70 (arguing that in cases such as careless 
driving, when “normal individuals can choose whether or not to engage in wrongful 
conduct before an accident, an appropriate noninsurable penalty is necessarily a more 
effective deterrent than an already paid insurance premium”). 
271 Say a law student sees her drunk professor leaving the bar, stumbling into a car, 
and starting that car; the student then follows the professor (with a camcorder) for a 
mile, watching the professor swerve across the road.  The professor ultimately drives 
off the road into some grass, hurting no one, and falls asleep.  My scheme would have 
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ing insurance available for retributive damages brought by private at-
torneys general facilitates achieving the intrinsic benefits of retribu-
tion and the norm-projection benefits associated with having a private 
attorney general seek retributive damages when, without such insur-
ance, there might not be any incentive to bother vindicating these 
wrongs.272
The same logic would apply even more strongly to those areas—
products liability, unconscious bias that creates employment discrimi-
nation, and mass torts—where the resulting harm is something that 
the entity’s leaders strongly want to avoid but may not be in a position 
to know about.273  By drawing on insurers’ objectivity, expertise, and 
experience, insureds can use insurers’ involvement to structure opera-
tions to achieve greater compliance and safety.274  Indeed, in certain 
contexts involving sophisticated parties, one can imagine how a de-
fendant’s failure to seek out best (safety) practices from insurers 
legislatures authorize persons to bring actions for retributive damages in instances like 
this. See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 279-86. 
272 Cf. Baker, supra note 252, at 129 (concluding that insurance availability will in-
crease the likelihood that plaintiffs will bring suit). 
273 In the context of purchasers of insurance, we also need to think carefully about 
the differences in treatment of defendants who are individuals versus those that are 
partnerships, and between public- versus private-firm defendants.  First, with corporate 
entities, there is an agency-cost problem worth spotting:  managers may underpur-
chase—or overpurchase—the amount of insurance needed to protect the interests of 
the owners.  Second, the determination of how much insurance to purchase and who 
makes that decision may not relate well to who can nimbly respond to the appropriate 
signals established through insurance markets and who deserves the attribution of 
blame for failing to make good decisions.  Thanks to Dave Hoffman for helping me 
recognize this.  Additionally, the idea of moral hazard in the publicly held corporation 
has a different valence than when applied to an individual, for example.  In the public 
corporation, the shareholders are indirectly paying for the insurance, while some risk 
manager is arranging for the corporation’s yearly insurance policy, and some manager 
or director violates the law.  In that case of disaggregation, insurance for retributive 
damages may be creating a hazard, but it is not necessarily a “moral” one, in the sense 
that the purchaser of the insurance is trying to benefit unduly through its lack of ade-
quate care.  For more on this, see Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 
IND L.J. 1035, 1083-84 (2008).  Of course, ex ante, it is unclear why shareholders 
should be benefiting from structures that would insulate them from punishment for 
the wrongs that these structures of ownership and management perpetrate.  See
Markel, Punitive Damages, supra note 9. 
274 See RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE ch. 8 (2003) (de-
tailing ways in which insurers actively encourage those that they insure to adopt meas-
ures to limit risk and prevent loss); Sharkey, supra note 253, at 413 (“Insurance com-
panies, as private regulators, are well positioned to achieve deterrence through 
experience rating of firms and other actors, as well as by providing risk management 
services.”). 
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might be regarded as a culpable omission if and when suits for re-
tributive damages are filed.  In short, foreclosing the market for in-
surance categorically may lead to more encroachments against the 
rights and interests of workers or customers, and since retributive jus-
tice is properly sensitive to how its structures prevent or cause such 
encroachments,275 insurers have good, publicly justifiable reasons to 
cover even insurable risks from reckless misconduct.276
2.  Does Access to Insurance Blunt the Retributive Condemnation? 
But what of the claim that such insurance undermines the con-
demnatory signal associated with retributive damages?  With the struc-
ture of insurance described above in place, retributivists cannot rea-
sonably complain that the retributive damages have lost their 
condemnatory communicative value.  As long as the party suffering 
the damages award can plausibly be said to experience a coercive con-
demnatory setback to their interests—which they will face through in-
creased premiums, a coinsurance payment, and some reputational 
damage—there has been punishment sufficient to satisfy the demands 
of retributive damages as an intermediate sanction.  And to the extent 
that the objectivity and expertise brought by the insurer facilitate a 
culture of compliance at the insured’s workplace or home, the policy 
can be said to be facilitating the respectful treatment of the rights of 
the individuals in those spaces.277  As Professor Baker rightly argues, 
[W]hether or not a punitive damages award is insured, that award makes 
a public statement about the value of the victim that contradicts the pri-
vate assessment of the perpetrator at the time the wrong was committed.  
Moreover, insured or not, a punitive damages award represents a conse-
quence for extreme culpable behavior that goes beyond that for less cul-
pable behavior.  Although an insured punitive damages award clearly 
will hurt less than an uninsured one, it nevertheless does hurt:  insur-
275 See Baker, supra note 252, at 110-11 (discussing how philosopher Jean Hamp-
ton’s retributive theory incorporates concerns for prevention); Markel, Retributive 
Damages, supra note 1, at 268 (arguing that under the theory of confrontational re-
tributivism, the establishment of institutions furthering retributive justice will in prac-
tice facilitate the prevention of future wrongdoing). 
276 Whether such an insurance market is likely to develop in practice or to become 
too concentrated are questions left for another day.  Cf. Baer, supra note 273, at 1092-
94 (addressing these questions). 
277 This concern for prevention is an aspect of the ex ante function of retributiv-
ism, discussed in Part II of Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, and this rationale 
applies, quite naturally, to permitting insurance for compensatory, aggravated, and 
deterrence damages purposes too. 
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ance is made more expensive and less available in the future; for com-
mercial entities there is a loss of good will; and for any individuals in-
volved, there are negative social consequences.
278
In some ways, the question of insurance is also tied to what the 
state can reasonably ask of a defendant found liable for retributive 
damages.  An analogy might be useful in explaining the limits of the 
argument that the signal for retributive damages is blunted through 
insurance.  Imagine that we fined an individual offender $10,000 for 
her criminal misconduct.  There is no robust insurance market for 
criminal fines,279 probably because many fines are predicated on non-
insurable risks.  Notwithstanding the lack of insurance markets for 
such fines, we do not ask the offender to pay the fine using only her 
earned income.  If the money is derived from a lucky investment, a 
racetrack gamble that paid off, or her husband’s inheritance, the state 
would still take the money; the same is true if the money came from a 
loan from a neighbor or the bank.  So why should we care so much 
when part of the money in a retributive damages scheme comes from 
insurance companies, given that the purchase of such insurance is 
also consistent with a signal of being considerate of others by reducing 
the risk of harm to them?  In the end, it does not make sense to in-
trude too much into how the retributive damages are paid. 
To be sure, some of the preceding remarks justify the practice of in-
surance for retributive damages based on reckless conduct in conse-
quentialist terms.  But I have also tried to defend the use of insurance as 
a vehicle by which the class of future defendants can show that they are 
considerate of those around them and respect people’s rights to well-
being and physical integrity.  This alternative justification helps explain 
278 Baker, supra note 252, at 112.  Baker wrote this paragraph under the inspira-
tion of Galanter and Luban’s account of punitive damages as victim vindication.  See id.
at 110 (“As Galanter and Luban explain, the retributive purpose of punitive damages 
‘is to reassert the truth about the relative value of wrongdoer and victim by inflicting a 
publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer.’” (quoting Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 
1432)).  But with the right adjustment—replacing “the value of the victim” with the 
“value of the social interest in equal liberty under law”—I think the rest of the para-
graph is exactly correct in reflecting the public values of the retributive account in this 
project. 
279 But cf. Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wis-
dom, J.) (“It is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or penalties would be 
void as violative of public policy.  The same public policy should invalidate any contract 
of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent.”), superseded
by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (1986), as recognized in United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. 
Webb, 369 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Va. 1988).  Judge Wisdom, however, goes too far, for rea-
sons that I hope my account explains. 
2009] How Should Punitive Damages Work? 1471
the attractiveness of the policy in nonconsequentialist terms.  Thus, 
one of this account’s innovations is that, contrary to the reasoning of 
courts or commentators that have found otherwise,280 there is now rea-
son to think that insurance for some conduct culminating in punitive 
damages is consistent with the retributive goals of punitive damages. 
Of course, as I stated at the beginning, if there is evidence that the 
insurance company’s agents were actually emboldening the defen-
dant’s reckless misconduct or giving advice on how to engage in the 
conduct with greater likelihood of concealment, then that would be a 
basis for thinking that the insurance company is somehow complicit 
in the wrongdoing.281  But if the insurance company is simply helping 
to reduce the one-time sting of retributive damages and is otherwise 
incentivized and committed to reducing the incidence of the defen-
dant’s misconduct, then there is no good retributive reason to oppose 
insurance for retributive damages for liability based on insurable risks 
associated with reckless misconduct. 
The logic of the preceding argument similarly applies to insurers’ 
desire to cover insurable risks that lead to deterrence and aggravated 
damages.  Since both aggravated and deterrence damages are de-
signed to ensure appropriate cost internalization, there is good reason 
for the defendant to be able to acquire insurance for those purposes 
too, at least to the extent that insurers will continue to exclude inten-
tional acts and cover only insurable risks.282
B.  Settlement, Transparency, and Accountability 
1.  The Danger of Sweetheart Deals to Retributive Damages 
Note that there is very little trouble with the conventional ar-
rangement under which plaintiffs and defendants can settle their dis-
280 See, e.g., id. at 440 (“Where a person is able to insure himself against punish-
ment he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanc-
tions against such misconduct.”). 
281 To facilitate the likelihood of greater monitoring and reduce the possibility of 
this kind of collusion, it might make sense for a jurisdiction to prefer insisting on an 
“occurrence” policy over a “claims made” policy.  Under the former, the insurer at the 
time of the occurrence is required to pay, while under the “claims made” policy, the 
insurer who pays is the insurer at the time the claim is made.  See Baer, supra note 273, 
at 1087 & n.255 (citing James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Mis-
conduct, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aug. 1997, at 1, 33). 
282 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, at 932 (expressing general support for in-
surance for the purpose of cost internalization damages); id. at 932 n.194 (citing oth-
ers who share the authors’ view). 
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putes over compensatory, aggravated, and deterrence damages.  If a 
plaintiff is willing to gain in certainty through settlement what she 
might otherwise win at trial, then that should remain privately or-
dered without much more intrusion than what would normally occur 
under the current system of tort settlements.283
But with retributive damages paid largely to the state, the difficul-
ties with settlement are much greater because of the possibility that 
sweetheart deals between defendants and plaintiffs would obstruct the 
goals of retributive damages.  To use an example, a sweetheart deal in 
this context could occur when a plaintiff and defendant jointly expect 
a damages award to be worth ten dollars at the end of a trial—five in 
compensatory damages and five in punitive damages—and the state 
has a split-recovery scheme that would leave the plaintiff with seven 
dollars total, thus giving three dollars to the state.  In this situation, a 
defendant might try to settle with the plaintiff for something greater 
than seven but less than ten dollars to deprive the state of the retribu-
tive damages. 
Whether the sweetheart deal happens is probably a function of 
the legal shadow under which the parties will bargain.284  Unregulated 
sweetheart deals in cases involving misconduct warranting retributive 
damages trigger two negative consequences.285  First, settlements are 
often sealed and thus the defendant’s behavior may not be adequately 
brought to light, preventing both legal condemnation and the sharing 
of relevant information with prospective plaintiffs who might have 
been similarly harmed.286  In other words, secret settlements may lead 
283 But see supra note 91. 
284 See generally Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation:  In the 
Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 234-45 (listing factors that may alter 
incentives in allocating damages); Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages 
on Settlements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169, 172 (“[H]yperbole and simple confusion may 
shape settlements in a more powerful way than empirical truths.”). 
285 But see Polinsky & Che, supra note 91, at 568 (noting that from an optimal de-
terrence perspective, settlements are good because they reduce litigation costs). 
286 The clergy sex-abuse scandal manifested these problems.  See TIMOTHY D. LYT-
TON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE pt. 2 (2008) (describing the use of sealed 
settlements); see also Scott Moss, Illuminating Secrecy:  A New Economic Analysis of Confi-
dential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 870 (2007) (“With so many lawsuits beginning 
with allegations of grievous social harm but ending with the legal equivalent of ‘never 
mind,’ confidential settlements have drawn increasingly fierce criticism recently, at-
tacked as ways defendants conceal serious misdeeds such as dissemination of hazard-
ous products, discrimination, pollution, or sexual abuse.” (footnotes omitted)); Adam 
Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at 
A1 (“South Carolina’s 10 active federal trial judges have unanimously voted to ban se-
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to nonpunishment in situations where punishment—through retribu-
tive damages—should exist. 
Second, plaintiffs rarely insist that a defendant’s settlement in-
clude money that would be listed on the punitive damages line.  The 
money is treated simply as a transfer payment, with no particular de-
scription, or merely as a payment of compensatory damages.  In the 
absence of any checks and balances, the government misses, among 
other things, two potential sources of revenue:  first, the damages paid 
by a defendant in a settlement are treated simply as a cost of doing 
business and therefore are tax deductible; second, settlements in cases 
involving retributive damages might deprive the state of the retribu-
tive damages it otherwise would receive.  Instead, the settlement cre-
ates a windfall in the plaintiff’s wallet.287  In short, settlement offers a 
legalized form of deception that subverts some of the public goods 
that retributive damages are designed to achieve. 
Here is a partial solution.  First, in order for retributive damages 
to be available, the plaintiff must plead facts in the initial complaint 
that would, if true, evidence malice or recklessness.  Permission to 
amend the complaint to allege such facts later should only be granted 
under compelling circumstances because otherwise, plaintiffs will 
omit such facts initially, threaten defendants during negotiations to 
amend the complaint with such facts afterward, and then settle for the 
sweetheart deal before the court or state representative realizes that 
important underlying facts were strategically omitted.  If retributive 
damages are sought in a complaint initially, that could alert the judge 
cret legal settlements, saying such agreements have made the courts complicit in hid-
ing the truth about hazardous products, inept doctors and sexually abusive priests.”). 
287 The compensatory part of personal-injury awards is not taxable income for the 
victim, but most federal courts have said that punitive damages awards are taxable in-
come.  See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (providing that compensation received, whether by 
suit or agreement, on account of personal injuries or physical sickness is not included 
in gross income, with the exception of punitive damages).  All the money in a settle-
ment, however, would likely be described as “compensatory,” which creates a reason 
for the plaintiff to try to collude with the defendant against the state (or the insurance 
company).  Cf. Baker, supra note 284, at 227-28 (“[B]oth plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers 
would prefer to see those aggravated damages ‘in the guise of compensatory damages’ 
rather than ‘in the guise of punitive damages.’ . . . For plaintiffs, the state share, the 
possibility of remittitur or reversal on appeal, and tax law are all important fac-
tors . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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(and the state) to the greater role needed to supervise the settlement 
process.288
Second, following the filing of such a complaint, the court and a 
representative from the state attorney general’s office would review 
and authorize settlements.  If the state objected to the settlement be-
cause it seemed that the parties were engaging in a sweetheart deal 
and the defendant was trying to buy its way out of disclosing its mis-
conduct, the state could exercise the option of buying the claim from 
the plaintiff (by paying the plaintiff a hypothetical “finder’s fee” of 
$10,000) and prosecuting the claim further than the plaintiff would 
have.289  This rule might especially make sense when the plaintiff sim-
ply wants compensatory damages and minimal sources of irritation.290
Because the state would have the choice of whether to seek re-
tributive damages, defendants would not be able to induce a plaintiff 
to back down once the complaint is filed.  But under the structure 
that I have discussed, even when parties negotiate payouts prior to the 
filing of the complaint, defendants will not agree to participate in a 
quiet shakedown by the plaintiff (i.e., settling a case involving reckless 
or malicious misconduct without paying retributive damages to the 
state as well).291  Defendants will not agree to participate because there 
is always the chance that a private attorney general (PAG) will discover 
or already know about the defendant’s misconduct and will share that 
information with the government.  The government may then bring 
288 Iowa has a split-recovery scheme in which the state plays an active role, for ex-
ample, in monitoring litigation.  For a description of this scheme, see Sharkey, supra
note 5, at 435. 
289 Perhaps the state should be able to sell the action to a third party too.  See gen-
erally Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 699 
(2004) (“Courts increasingly have tolerated claim sales and have begun to view re-
straints on alienation skeptically.”); cf. David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subroga-
tion:  Towards an Ex Ante Market in Tort Claims 307 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 043, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=350940 (“Competitive ex 
ante claims markets (including secondary markets for claim re-sale and aggregation) 
provide the most efficient and effective means of achieving the deterrence ends of tort 
liability and generating the highest clearance price for sellers of potential tort 
claims.”).
290 There is a risk that the government will not obtain all the information that it 
needs to make a good decision, but the government has various civil and criminal 
strategies to ensure that there is a full reporting by the lawyers involved. 
291 But cf. Sharkey, supra note 5, at 445 (noting that the risk of sham litigation in 
the context of the author’s proposal for compensatory societal damages still “looms 
large”).  On settlement pressure generally, see Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: 
Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003). 
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suit for retributive damages, or, if it declines, the PAG may bring suit 
herself.292
Thus, if a plaintiff decided to allege retributive damages in the ini-
tial complaint, she would not be prohibited from subsequently set-
tling.  But this scenario would require plaintiffs to secure governmen-
tal approval to settle, and it would force defendants either to admit 
responsibility and pay some amount of retributive damages to the 
state or to deny responsibility.293  If the defendant denied responsibil-
ity, she would have to convince the state’s representative that this par-
ticular claim was not worth pursuing because it lacked merit.  Other-
wise, the state—or, if the state declined, conceivably another PAG—
could decide to sue the defendant.  Clearly, the dynamics of settle-
ment would change because defendants would have little incentive to 
settle without admitting liability.  With these diminished incentives, 
plaintiffs would be unlikely to bring suits merely for the purposes of 
harassment.  Under this structure, settlements for suits involving reck-
less or malicious misconduct could continue apace, but courts and the 
government would have to supervise the distribution of rewards and 
fees to plaintiffs and their lawyers to ensure a reasonably fair alloca-
tion consistent with what would happen were a trial to occur.294
Transparency with respect to settlement agreements would also be 
required in light of the public retributivist values articulated in Part II.  
A sealed settlement in a case where retributive damages were sought 
in the complaint might deprive the public of valuable information re-
garding the danger of the defendant’s activity and its potential harm 
to others.  Some jurisdictions are considering a prohibition on sealed 
settlements generally, with an eye toward assuring the public that the 
courts will not be facilitating patterns of complicit concealment.295
292 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, at 279-86. 
293 Once the defendant admitted to wrongdoing and settled with the state, such 
information could be stored in a registry of the sort described by Jim Gash, Solving the 
Multiple Punishments Problem:  A Call for a National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1613, 1617 (2005), though some modifications would need to be made to be 
compatible with the structure proposed here. 
294 One might think that this supervisory role would necessitate large-scale hiring 
efforts on the part of government bureaucracies, but such fears seem overstated in 
light of the relative infrequency with which punitive damages are awarded in most ju-
risdictions.  See Sebok, supra note 5 (surveying empirical literature on the infrequency 
of punitive damages).  That said, the structure proposed here would change the litiga-
tion game substantially, so it is inappropriate to dismiss these fears altogether. 
295 For discussions of the of the problems associated with concealing settlements, 
see generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Susan P. 
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Whether such a general prohibition is a good idea is a subject for de-
bate.296  However, it seems that prohibiting sealed settlements in cases 
where retributive damages are alleged in the complaint would be a 
good starting place, at least where the defendant’s misconduct might 
have affected other citizens or might endanger them in the future.297
2.  Settlement, Insurance, and the Public Interest 
The introduction of liability insurance into any tort claim involv-
ing punitive damages further complicates settlement.  Plaintiffs’ law-
yers are most focused on targeting a deep pocket so that they can col-
lect damages.  They also know that insurance policies exclude 
intentional acts.  Hence, if there is a way to manipulate their client’s 
claim so that the defendant is merely reckless, or even better, negli-
gent, then the plaintiff’s lawyer will seek to characterize the harm as 
recklessly or negligently caused.  This strategic decision ensures that 
there is a deep pocket to cover the injury for settlements.  If the de-
fendant has insurance, she too is tempted to collude with the plaintiff 
to change the theory of the case so that an intentional tort is charac-
terized instead as a negligence action.  That collusion will ensure that 
the defendant does not have to pay the damages out of her own 
pocket.298  Indeed, this set of joint interests in transforming punish-
ment into compensation may also explain various trial results. 
There is no question that, to the extent that it would occur under 
the proposal here, this manipulation is subversive of retributive values 
because it undermines the public’s interest in reducing Type II (false-
negative) errors where the defendant escapes any appropriate censure 
for her misconduct.  Additionally, claim manipulation obviously works 
against the interest of the insurance company, which might have had 
Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996); Lip-
tak, supra note 286. 
296 See, e.g., Moss, supra note 286 (arguing that the economic perspective on sealed 
settlements is more ambiguous than previously conceived). 
297 Judges already have a heightened obligation to supervise settlement classes, but 
they should not shirk their responsibility to consider nonclass settlements that may 
have profound effects on similarly situated litigants in the future. 
298 See Adam Liptak, Pain-and-Suffering Awards Let Juries Avoid New Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A14 (analyzing ways in which lawyers and juries circumvent 
state limits on punitive damages, and noting a particular case where a jury awarded a 
woman who endured sexual harassment at work $20 million in compensatory damages 
for pain and suffering). 
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a contractual exclusion for the kind of conduct now being settled and 
described in less noxious terms. 
Such collusion and manipulation are constrained in several ways.  
Generally, the insurance company may do its own due diligence to see 
if there is any reason to suspect that the claim ought to be excluded 
under the contractual provisions.  Moreover, the defendant’s pre-
mium for insurance will increase as a result of past negligence as well 
as past recklessness or malice.  That will reduce the defendant’s ability 
to plausibly move all “punishment” into the insurance company’s re-
sponsibility for “compensation.”  Additionally, the strategic behavior 
may be chilled both by threats of prosecution for insurance fraud, if 
discovered, and by codes of professional ethics that govern the con-
duct of lawyers. 
Moreover, the retributive damages structure that I have proposed 
remedies the claim-manipulation problem in two respects.  First, con-
sider the insurance context.  If the state denies any insurance for puni-
tive damages, the pattern of “transforming punishment into compen-
sation” continues largely unabated.  But if the state permits insurance 
for retributive damages, as I have suggested that it should for certain 
risks, what happens?  The parties lose some of their incentive to mis-
characterize the claim because there will be insurance coverage for 
the retributive damages claim (minus the amount of coinsurance). 
Second, and far more importantly, defendants will be less likely to 
collude with plaintiffs because without paying the public penalty asso-
ciated with that conduct, the defendant will have little to no repose—
depending on statutes of limitations—against any of the private attor-
neys general who might know of or discover the defendant’s miscon-
duct and subsequently bring suit for retributive damages only, even 
after the victim has been paid compensatory damages.  The threat of 
the PAG, in other words, reduces the likelihood of settlements that 
obscure the misconduct from public assessment. 
Finally, even if the retributive damages structure were subverted 
by the intersection of insurance and settlement incentives, plaintiffs 
would still be able to seek retributive damages in those cases where 
the defendant has the wherewithal to self-insure the retributive dam-
ages.  While that regrettably reduces the available scope of retributive 
damages defendants, such a result is by no means a tragic one in light 
of the pronounced difficulty of punishing misconduct by the wealthy 
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and powerful.299  Moreover, if after trying this regime out we still be-
came worried about how abusive or pervasive the manipulation of 
claims was, then we could experiment with increased transparency 
and judicial supervision of settlements even in claims where no re-
tributive damages were alleged. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court’s increased tinkering with the consti-
tutional boundaries of punitive damages over the last fifteen years, it 
has nonetheless left open to states a range of options regarding their 
structure and purpose(s).  This project has sought to give states a 
blueprint for a pluralistic and attractive punitive damages regime that 
could serve separate purposes without those purposes crossing wires 
with each other or with the federal constitutional framework.  While 
also examining the functions of cost internalization and victim vindi-
cation, I have paid particular attention to developing a strategy to ad-
vance the public’s interest in retributive justice without upsetting the 
constitutional framework established by the Supreme Court.  I hope 
that the project makes sense thus far with respect to procedural safe-
guards, settlements, and insurance.  Nonetheless, there are still im-
portant questions to resolve pertaining to the appropriate treatment 
of punitive damages in complex matters regarding multiple injuries 
and lawsuits against entities.  These questions are some of the issues 
that I address in the next article of this series.  In the meantime, the 
Appendix summarizes some of the basic conclusions in the form of 
instructions designed to handle a pluralistic extracompensatory dam-
ages regime such as the one described in this Article. 
299 See Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 1, pt. IV (discussing the rationale of 
retributive damages as a tool to counteract misconduct by wealthy and powerful per-
sons and entities). 
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APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSESSING
EXTRACOMPENSATORY DAMAGES
What follows is a distillation of the principal conclusions of this 
punitive damages project.  This summary is meant as a rough draft for 
potential jury instructions within a given jurisdiction that has adopted 
this pluralistic scheme.  These instructions are also designed to take 
into account the holding of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Philip Morris.300  The use of square brackets below is meant to indicate 
places where the polity has some flexibility with respect to the relevant 
instruction. 
*      *      * 
In considering the amount of extracompensatory damages on the 
defendant, you should determine whether three separate dollar 
amounts are necessary:  (1) an amount to accomplish retributive jus-
tice against the defendant; (2) an amount to accomplish deterrence; 
and (3) an amount to vindicate the injury to the victim’s personal 
dignity.
A.  Retributive Damages 
Retributive damages fulfill the punishment objective of extracom-
pensatory damages.  These instructions apply only to defendants who 
have committed misconduct that you have found to be malicious or 
reckless in nature.  If you do not think, based on clear and convincing 
evidence, that the conduct in question was malicious or reckless in na-
ture, do not award retributive damages. 
Malicious conduct is conduct that was done with a purpose or 
knowledge of causing harm and for which no other legally recognized 
excuse or justification is available as a defense.  A defendant acts reck-
lessly when she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that harm will result from her conduct.  The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the 
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, her disre-
gard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
300 These instructions are a substantially modified version of the kind found in 
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 5, app.  In some places, having mostly to do with cost 
internalization, I expressly borrow the language from their proposed jury instructions. 
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law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.  If there are 
multiple defendants, you must undertake this analysis separately for 
each of the defendants based on each defendant’s misconduct.  [A 
defendant corporation will not be held legally responsible for all of 
the misconduct of each of its employees.]  You must ask whether each 
defendant’s action was malicious or reckless. 
If, and only if, you have determined that a particular defendant’s 
misconduct was undertaken with malice or recklessness, the next step 
requires consulting the chart prepared by the state legislature.  This 
chart should help you determine where on a scale of one to twenty—
with twenty being the most reprehensible and one being the least—
the defendant’s misconduct lies.  The chart tells you whether to add 
points to the scale based on various factors and whether to subtract 
points based on other factors.  Your job is to assess the wrongfulness of 
the defendant’s misconduct based on the reprehensibility chart.  It is 
not your job to assess how much harm the defendant’s misconduct 
has caused to society or other nonparties to this litigation.  This find-
ing of reprehensibility should also be accompanied by an explanation 
of what facts you considered relevant to your determination.  Once 
you have determined the level of reprehensibility, the court will use a 
different chart to determine the amount of retributive damages that 
the defendant will pay based on your assessment of reprehensibility. 
In determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s miscon-
duct, you may, but are not required to, consider “evidence of actual 
harm to nonparties” because that can help show “that the conduct 
that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the 
general public, and so was particularly reprehensible.”301  Similarly, 
you may also consider the harm or potential harm that the defen-
dant’s conduct caused to others in determining whether the defen-
dant’s misconduct was accidental or deliberate or part of a policy or 
pattern and practice.  However, it is important that you not consider 
the mere fact that others were harmed as a basis for assessing a higher 
reprehensibility score.  Those others who are not plaintiffs in this case 
can bring their own suits for compensatory and other damages. 
Two facts are relevant to your task, although they should not in-
form your actual assessment of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
misconduct.  First, the plaintiff will personally receive no more than 
[$10,000] of the retributive damages award.  The balance will go to 
the state [to advance law enforcement objectives, including but not 
301 Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007). 
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limited to providing services necessary for victims and offender reen-
try into society]. 
Second, the purpose of retributive damages is to make the defen-
dant worse off than she would have been had she not undertaken her 
malicious or reckless misconduct.  Thus, when determining the level 
of reprehensibility, do not consider the amount of other damages 
(whether compensatory, “aggravated,” or “deterrence,” described be-
low).  [If the defendant has made such payments or has been other-
wise punished through the criminal justice system of this jurisdiction, 
then you ought to forego making any reprehensibility assessment.]  
[Note to judges:  civil penalties already assessed against the defendant 
for this misconduct against this plaintiff should be credited against re-
tributive damages.  No retributive damages are available if the gov-
ernment has already criminally punished the defendant for the wrong 
to the particular plaintiff in this case.] 
After you make your assessment of reprehensibility, the court [or 
you, the jury] will determine whether any other gains or profits by the 
defendant need to be forfeited in addition to the reprehensibility-
based retributive damages award.  The court may also make subse-
quent determinations regarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 
to be determined in light of the risk, time, expense, and expertise re-
lated to this litigation.  [It may also be your job to determine the fi-
nancial condition of the defendant, or its net value if the defendant is 
an entity.] 
B.  Aggravated Damages for Repairing Personal Dignity Harms 
In deciding the remedy for personal dignity harms, please first en-
sure that you have not already figured this amount into your assess-
ment of compensatory damages, perhaps based on what you attrib-
uted under pain and suffering or emotional distress, or loss of 
enjoyment of life, or other noneconomic damages awarded to the 
plaintiff.  Once you are certain that the amount of compensatory 
damages has not included an amount for insult to the plaintiff’s dig-
nity, consider what action or amount of money is appropriate to vin-
dicate the insult or injury to the plaintiff’s personal dignity.  Injuries 
to personal dignity, as understood here, are those injuries in which 
the defendant specifically targeted her misconduct toward this plain-
tiff with an aim of diminishing the plaintiff’s dignity.  If the defendant 
is a corporation, consider whether the injury to the plaintiff was part 
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of a larger course of conduct or whether it was specifically aimed at 
denigrating the dignity of this particular plaintiff. 
[To facilitate review of your verdict and ensure consistency across 
similar cases, you are required to explain the basis for your reasoning 
in a few sentences or more.]  The remedy you choose here may be an 
amount of money that you determine is appropriate to alleviate this 
particular injury to personal dignity.  Bear in mind that the plaintiff 
(and, depending on the circumstances, her counsel) will receive the 
entirety of the amount that you award under this heading. 
Additionally, or alternatively, you may require the defendant to 
apologize to the plaintiff for the injury to the plaintiff’s dignity in per-
son or via written communication.  You may also suggest other possi-
ble actions that might repair the injury to the plaintiff’s dignity as 
supplements or substitutes. 
C.  Deterrence Damages 
In some cases, extracompensatory damages are desirable to en-
sure that defendants do not impose costs on others that the defen-
dants should properly bear.  This is called “cost internalization.”  In 
making your assessment for promoting cost internalization, bear in 
mind that you are not able to extract money from the defendant for 
harms that happened to persons or entities who are not parties to this 
litigation.  You may only consider whether there is a likelihood that 
the defendant would have escaped having to pay this plaintiff for the 
harm caused to the plaintiff.  Other possible victims of the defen-
dant’s misconduct may bring their own suits.302
Thus, ask yourself whether the defendant might have escaped hav-
ing to pay for the harm for which she should be responsible to this 
plaintiff.  For example, if the harm was substantial, noticeable, and 
likely to lead to a lawsuit, your estimate of the likelihood of escaping 
liability would be relatively low, perhaps even zero.  But if the harm 
might not have been attributed to the defendant, or if the defendant 
tried to conceal her harmful conduct, your estimate of the likelihood 
of escaping liability would be relatively high.  You should use the table 
below to determine the deterrence damages multiplier that corre-
sponds to your estimated probability of escaping liability to this par-
302 Note that these instructions accord with what I view to be the correct reading 
of Philip Morris, not what I think would logically be entailed by an unbridled prioritiza-
tion of cost internalization. 
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ticular plaintiff.  Then multiply the compensatory damages amount 
[plus an amount, if any, for compensating personal dignity harms] by 
your deterrence damages multiplier.  The resulting number is the 
base amount for deterrence damages. 
The base deterrence damages amount should not be adjusted up-
ward or downward because of any of the following considerations: 
(a) reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; 
(b) net worth or income of the defendant or net profits; 
(c) gain or profit that the defendant might have obtained from 
his or her harmful conduct; 
(d) litigation costs borne by the plaintiff; and 
(e) whether the harm included physical injury. 
Table 1:  Probability of Escaping Liability: 
Deterrence Damages Multiplier 
Probability of 
Escaping Liability 
Deterrence 
Damages Multiplier 
0% 0 
10% 0.11 
20% 0.25 
30% 0.43 
40% 0.67 
50% 1.00 
60% 1.50 
70% 2.33 
80% 4.00 
90% 9.00 
*      *      * 
In sum, if you find that the conduct at issue was undertaken with 
malice or recklessness, you should make a finding of reprehensibility 
(using the chart and its commentary as well as guidelines provided by 
the state) based on a scale of one to twenty.  Second, you should de-
termine an amount of aggravated damages necessary, if any, to com-
pensate the plaintiff for personal dignity harms that were not already 
covered by the compensatory damages or that would not be remedied 
by other measures, such as an apology, that you and the court deem 
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appropriate.  Finally, if necessary, you should recommend the amount 
of deterrence damages needed to pursue cost internalization of the 
harm and potential harm caused by this defendant to this plaintiff.  
Recall that other victims of the defendant’s conduct might bring their 
own suits and that you do not need to punish the defendant or extract 
compensation from the defendant based on harms inflicted upon 
these nonparties.303  Your selection of which damages are necessary, 
and in what amounts, should be accompanied by an explanation of 
what facts you considered relevant to your determination. 
303 These amounts should ultimately be adjusted to reflect appropriate tax-
sensitivity judgments, as developed in a subsequent article on the taxation of punitive 
damages that I am writing with Gregg Polsky.  Markel & Polsky, supra note 9. 
